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WILLIAM A. ALTONINVED. P. NANDA
INCREMENTAL PRICING UNDER THE NATURAL GAS
POLICY ACT OF 1978
BY CAROL CORMIE*
On April 20, 1977, President Carter unveiled to Congress and the coun-
try a national energy plan which attempted to provide a comprehensive ap-
proach to the multifarious and controversial energy issues facing the United
States. After approximately eighteen months of debate in Congress, one seg-
ment of this program was signed into law on November 9, 1978, as the Natu-
ral Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).' The ultimate form of this legislation
represented a compromise between widely divergent proposals favored by
the Administration, the House, and the Senate which were coalesced in a
conference report and narrowly approved in both the House and the Sen-
ate.2 The statute must still withstand a constitutional challenge from the
producing states.
3
It is the purpose of this paper first to attempt to analyze some of the
policy considerations leading to the enactment of the NGPA, specifically the
incremental pricing provisions contained in title II. Second, the operation
and effect of incremental pricing will be reviewed together with the role of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in implementing the
program throuagh rulemaking. Finally, an alternative scheme will be pro-
posed that has the potential to achieve the same ends as incremental pricing
by an administratively less burdensome means.
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The NGPA attempts to comply with and give effect to four national
economic policy objectives: maintenance and improvement of economic
health, reduction in unemployment, minimization of inflation, and preserva-
tion of economic equities; at the same time it attempts to achieve efficient
* Carol Cormie received her L.L.M. from Stanford University in 1979 and her L.L.B. in
Alberta, Canada.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-62 1, §§ 101- 110, 92 Stat. 3358 (1978) (hereinafter cited as NGPA).
2. The vote in the Senate was 57 to 42 and in the House of Representatives the vote was
231 to 168 with 31 abstentions.
3. The attorneys-general of Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on November 20, 1978, naming the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as defendant. Subsequently, New Mexico and
Wyoming have joined the suit and the United States as represented by the Federal Justice
Department has filed a motion to intervene in support of the FERC. It is alleged that provi-
sions of the NGPA allowing the FERC to control the price of natural gas sold by producers in
the intrastate market and compelling states to participate in implementing the statute exceed
federal authority under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution and the tenth
amendment. For discussion of similar constitutional difficulties arising from federal air and
water pollution legislation requiring state implementation, see Stewart, P ramtd of &a'nfwe?
Problems of Federa/im in Mandatoy State Implementation of National Environmental Poliy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196 (1977).
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use of energy resources. 4 Complex tradeoffs between equity and efficiency
goals are involved to balance these objectives.
In the most general sense, the NGPA provides a new scheme of controls
on wellhead prices which are paid for natural gas produced in the United
States (intrastate as well as interstate) and also provides controls on volumes
of gas imported into the United States subsequent to December 1, 1978. It
does not directly affect the regulation of the gas pipeline industry except to
the extent that certain obligations are imposed on pipeline companies in or-
der to implement the incremental pricing provisions of the NGPA. While
touted as "deregulation" of gas prices, the statute substantially complicates
both the determination of gas prices charged by producers and the distribu-
tion of the cost of gas services to consumers until 1985. Deregulation of sig-
nificant categories of "new" natural gas production will take place on
January 1, 1985, subject to Presidential or Congressional power to reinstate
controls for one eighteen month period if this appears warranted after six
months of deregulation.5 It is anticipated that by January 1, 1985, the price
of natural gas will be comparable to that of fuel oil on a Btu equivalent
basis.
Since the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court in the Philhps f6 case, the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) and its successor, the FERC,7 have been
charged with responsibility under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) 8 for regulat-
ing the prices that may be charged by natural gas producers and gatherers
for the sale in interstate commerce of gas for resale. Heretofore, the FPC's
function under the NGA had been limited largely to regulition of natural
gas pipelines that sell or transport natural gas in interstate commerce. As
indicated above, this function will continue substantially unaffected by the
NGPA. The setting by the FPC of producer prices for natural has tradition-
ally been based on a cost-of-service, "just and reasonable rates" approach
similar to that used in setting the rates of, for example, electrical utilities or
pipelines. This approach took no special account of the fact that natural gas
production is a wasting resource industry. Initially, the FPC attempted to
control producer prices on a producer-by-producer, contract-by-contract ba-
sis, but this proved impracticable. Faced with a burgeoning administrative
backlog, the FPC began to implement regional price ceilings in 19609 and in
4. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER, COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS POLICY ALTERNATIVES, H.R.
Doc. No. 31, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Dec. 1977 STAFF ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS].
5. The schedule for deregulation and provisions for reinstatement of controls are con-
tained in NGPA §§ 121-122.
6. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
7. Title IV of the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91, § 401, 92 Stat.
582 (1977), authorized the creation of the FERC and the transfer to it of the authority previ-
ously administered by the FPC.
8. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976). Further, the court in Phd/:thslvery narrowly
construed the exemption from regulation of "production or gathering of natural gas" contained
in the NGA. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
9. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1967), sustaining FPC orders estab-
lishing maximum and minimum prices for producers in a large geographic area based on indus-
try-wide costs and using a double-tier rate structure for "old" and "new" gas.
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1974 switched to national maximum prices for gas of different "vintages." '
Because the FPC regulation maintained interstate gas prices at below mar-
ket levels while the intrastate gas market was outside of the FPC regulatory
jurisdiction, two separate markets developed at increasingly disparate prices.
One of the most significant departures from previous regulation under the
NGA is that ceiling prices established under the NGPA will apply to sales of
gas for resale in the intrastate market as well as interstate gas.
The NGPA defines upwards of twenty different classifications of natural
gas and then authorizes the FERC to establish maximum price ceilings pay-
able to a producer for each category. Different formulas are prescribed for
calculating the ceiling price for each category of natural gas.' I One of the
key prices is for "new natural gas,"' 2 which includes production from leases
on the Outer Continental Shelf entered into subsequent to April 20, 1977,
and from wells drilled onshore after February 19, 1977, which are sufficiently
deeper than or distant from existing wells or which penetrate new reservoirs.
Starting at a base price of $1.75 per million Btu as of April 1977, the ceiling
increases each month by the monthly equivalent of a factor equal to the sum
of the annual adjustment factor applicable for that month plus three and
one-half percent until April 1981, and four percent thereafter. This latter
increment is intended to represent the "real growth" factor in the economy.
Under this formula the ceiling price for "new gas" in January 1979, was
$2.10 per million Btu's.
The formula for "new gas" also determines the general ceiling price for
"high-cost natural gas." The ceiling price for stripper well natural gas is
determined in a similar way using a different base price, for example, $2.09
as of May 1978. Section 109 of the NGPA creates a residual formula for
setting the ceiling price of natural gas not falling within any other category,
including gas from the Prudhoe Bay Unit of Alaska. In this case, a base
price of $1.45 per million Btu's as of April 1977 increases monthly by a fac-
tor related to the annual inflation adjustment factor but without the "real
growth" component. The specific calculations of ceiling prices for all catego-
ries of natural gas are obviously complex.
Historically, the FPC and FERC rate regulations have dictated "rolled-
in" pricing whereby the pipeline blended the cost of gas acquired from all
sources pursuant to any applicable contract. This resulted in a common per
unit cost of gas to all consumers.
Title II of the NGPA creates an unprecedented scheme of "incremental
pricing" whereby all interstate pipelines will be required to maintain an "in-
cremental pricing account" to which the pipelines will credit certain por-
10. See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), sustaining cost-based national
ratemaking by the FPC. Initially the maximum price of natural gas from wells commenced in
the 1973-74 biennium was set at 42 per Mcf. Effective June 21, 1974, this rate was increased to
50 per Mcf. The national rate for the 1974-75 biennium was fixed at $1.42 per Mcf, at which
time the rate for the 1975-76 biennium was increased to 93 per Mcf.
11. The specific provisions with respect to wellhead price controls are contained in subtitle
A of title I of the NGPA § 110. It is not the intention of this paper to examine these in detail.
12. NGPA § 102.
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tions of the acquistion costs of specified categories of natural gas.1 3 These
costs must be passed downstream through any intermediary pipeline or local
distributor 14 and ultimately levied as a surcharge against gas purchases by a
"non-exempt" industrial user until such user is paying a price for gas
equivalent to the alternative fuel oil cost on a Btu basis. This will then be-
come a ceiling price to that user until every incrementally priced customer
served by that interstate pipeline is paying its "alternative fuel cost" for gas.
The allocation of credits to the incremental pricing account beyond this
point appears to be in dispute. The FERC staff task force established to
study and propose rulemaking in respect to incremental pricing mechanisms
has advocated that all consumers other than incrementally priced industrial
users should pay these "excess costs" until parity is reached with the price of
gas to incrementally priced consumers. 15 The Interstate Natural Gas Associ-
ation of America has urged that costs be spread among all consumers includ-
ing residential, commercial, and incrementally priced industrial users.
16
Another proposal, from the United Distribution Companies, is to "accrue"
these costs in the incremental pricing account until recovery is possible from
incrementally priced users who become capable of further surcharge absorp-
tion as fuel oil prices increase.
1 7
The NGA will continue to govern pricing of "old" gas in interstate com-
merce although the NGPA authorizes the FERC to amend ceiling prices for
sales of gas previously dedicated to interstate commerce and provides a mini-
mal escalation of "old gas" prices in accordance with the annual inflation
adjustment factor.' 8 "Old gas" presently subject to intrastate contracts will
be regulated under the NGPA only to the extent that contractual prices may
be increased up to but not exceeding the "new gas" price.' 9
The underlying philosophy of the NGPA is that higher incentive prices
are required to encourage exploration for, development of, and production
from domestic natural gas reserves critically needed to reduce dependence
on foreign oil imports. At least since 1960, regulation by the FPC and the
FERC has suppressed the price of natural gas relative to other fuel sources
thereby discouraging new discoveries and encouraging gas consumption by
low priority users.
2 0
13. While incremental pricing has no real counterpart under the Natural Gas Act, analo-
gies can be drawn to emergency purchases and "purchased gas adjustment" clauses.
14. NGPA § 205 prohibits a local distributor from offsetting the surcharge to nonexempt
industrial users through modifications in allocation of costs or any other procedure. Further-
more, title II preempts any state or local law that might have the effect of precluding the pass-
through of the surcharge or otherwise defeating the intention of the NGPA.
15. Staff Task Force Proposal for Regulations to Implement Incremental Pricing, FERC
DOCKET No. RM 79-14 at 25, attachment A (1979).
16. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 12, 1979, at I and 2 and Mar. 12, 1979, at 2.
17. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Mar. 12, 1979, at 2.
18. NGPA § 104.
19. The NGPA § 105 provides that where contract prices under existing intrastate con-
tracts are below the price for "new natural gas," the contract price will prevail, subject to esca-
lation expressly provided for in the contract up to a level equivalent to the "new gas" price.
Where prices under intrastate contracts exceed the new gas price in effect as of November 9,
1978, the price will be fixed as at that date, subject to increases for the inflation factor. In other
words, further escalation clauses contained in the contract would not be enforceable.
20. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., THE ECONOMICS
[Vol. 57:1
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Much of the economic analysis of the NGPA has focused on price elas-
ticity of supply of natural gas. Congressional staff members concluded from
the diminishing ratio of annual additions of proven reserves to annual pro-
duction over the past ten to twelve years that, despite progressively higher
gas prices, long-run supply elasticity of gas is substantially less than 1.0.21
The natural gas industry appears to be of the opinion that domestic natural
gas resources have not been exhausted and that increased gas supplies would
be forthcoming if producers were free from price regulation. 22 While a three
to five year lead time is normally allowed for a program of exploration and
development, it is anticipated that a temporary surplus of "bubble gas" will
come on the market almost immediately.
23
Regulation of gas prices under the NGA failed to take into account the
variable risks and hence variable costs of producing gas from different types
of wells, for example, a high-risk wildcat well as opposed to a development
well. Without an adequate price incentive for new discoveries, producers
have tended to drill fewer exploratory wells and therefore most new proven
reserves have been extensions of existing reservoirs. The aim of the NGPA is
to offer the greatest price incentive to those types of production having the
highest supply elasticity. For example, "high-cost gas",24 produced under
conditions of extraordinary risk or cost will be deregulated as to the price on
the date of the FERC incremental pricing rules go into effect, which must be
no later than November 9, 1979. Assuming that this incentive scheme is
successful, money that would otherwise have been paid to foreign energy
sources will now be channelled to domestic producers. Secondary benefits
should be realized in the form of stimulation of the economy, increased em-
ployment, improvement in the balance of payments position, and strength-
ening of the American dollar.
In addition to the general gas supply problem, interstate pipelines have
suffered particular supply failures. Under the "vintage" pricing regime, con-
siderable incentive has existed for producers to withhold production from
OF THE NATURAL GAS CONTROVERSY, JOINT COMM. No. 9080, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (Sept.
1977) [hereinafter cited as the Sept. 1977 STAFF STUDY].
21. Dec. 1977 STAFF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 10.
22. See Blinn, The Natural Gas Stuation-What Are the Prospects, 23 ANNUAL INST. MIN. L. 31
(1976); Funkhouser, Ultradeep Gas Exploration-An Expanding Frontlir, 16 EXPLORATION AND
ECON. OF PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 103 (1978); Wilson,
The Pohics of Energy, 16 EXPLORATION AND ECON. OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 273 (1978); Mahlein, Domestic and International Repercussions of the
National Energ Plan, 16 EXPLORATION AND ECON. OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 259 (1978).
23. There has been considerable controversy over the significance of this bubble gas in
both extent and duration. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Mar. 12, 1979, at 1.
24. NGPA § 107 defines "High-Cost Natural Gas" to include the following:
(a) production from a well drilled subsequent to February 19, 1977, with a comple-
tion location in excess of 15,000 feet;
(b) gas produced from geopressurized brine;
(c) occluded natural gas produced from coal seams;
(d) gas produced from Devonshire shale;
(e) gas produced under such other circumstances as the FERC determines to present
extraordinary risks or costs.




interstate commerce in anticipation of higher future prices. Furthermore,
production has been diverted to the higher priced intrastate market when-
ever possible. With increasing frequency, interstate pipelines have had to
impose curtailment measures against their industrial customers 25 and ar-
range for short-term emergency gas purchases from producers, intrastate
pipelines, or local distribution companies at "unregulated" prices.
26 An an-
cillary problem has been the economic dislocation caused by industry mi-
grating to the "southern rim" producing states in order to obtain a more
secure supply of gas from intrastate pipelines despite higher prices.
27
It is anticipated that the establishment of a uniform price for new gas in
both the intrastate and interstate markets will enable interstate pipelines to
compete more effectively with intrastate pipelines for new supplies.
Futhermore, because the average price of "old" interstate gas is approxi-
mately $0.60 per million Btu's compared with $1.30 per million Btu for in-
trastate gas,28 the interstate pipelines can roll in higher volumes of the more
expensive "new gas" and still maintain a lower blended price. This could
provide interstate pipelines with a competitive advantage over intrastate
pipelines, allowing them to increase their market share. In any event, estab-
lishing a definite price path for gas until deregulation should facilitate long
range planning and financing by producers and also alleviate the problem of
withholding production until prices are higher.
Congressional economic advisers postulated that to completely deregu-
late gas prices at this time would cause massive inflation without any sub-
stantial gains in supply.29 A pipeline company is less concerned about the
price it is paying to the producer than about the security of supply needed to
maintain its customers because its profits are based upon the volume of gas
carried. Particularly in the initial stages of deregulation the price of new gas
could be driven above its Btu equivalent price in relation to oil since this
higher cost "new gas" (a small percentage of total gas volumes) could still be
sold at a price lower than fuel oil on a Btu equivalent basis when blended
with low-cost "old gas." It is feared that rapidly rising prices would cause
marginal industrial gas users to convert to alternative fuel sources, leaving
the residential and small commercial customer to finance a disproportion-
ately large burden of the fixed costs of gas service as well as paying for the
higher priced gas.
The incremental pricing provisions contained in title II of the NGPA
are designed to shield the residential and small commercial consumer of gas
25. See Harrison & Formby, Regzonal Distortions in Natural Gas Allocations, 57 N.C.L. REV. 47
(1978).
26. The price of such emergency purchases was regulated to the extent that the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976), required the President of the United States to authorize emer-
gency purchases by interstate pipelines on terms and conditions (including price) which he de-
termined to be "appropriate."
27. A. WILLIAMS, C. MEYERS & F. MAXWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS 58 (4th ed. 1979).
28. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER, COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF H.R. 5289 (NGPA of 1978). H.R. Doc. No.
62, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 STAFF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
29. Id. at 5.
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from the increased wellhead prices allowed under the statute, at least in the
short run.' ° A second objective of incremental pricing is to achieve a more
efficient allocation of resources by shifting the burden of new higher priced
gas onto low priority users up to the point where they are paying a price that
equates natural gas to its Btu equivalent in fuel oil. Although scarce, natural
gas has unique properties that make it a particularly superior fuel for pur-
poses such as domestic cooking, water heating, and space heating. 3 1 How-
ever, at the prices that have prevailed under the FPC and FERC legislation,
industry has drawn heavily on supplies of this resource rather than using
relatively higher priced but abundant fuels such as coal. 32 From time to
time the FPC has attempted to exercise a general allocation and conserva-
tion function with respect to natural gas, but its effectiveness has largely
been thwarted by lack of jurisdiction over intrastate sales.3 3 As of Septem-
ber 1977, it was estimated that seven Tcf of natural gas were sold annually to
industrial users,34 and as of October 1978, it was estimated that approxi-
mately ten percent of interstate demand (1. 1-1.2 Tcf annually) consisted of
industrial users of gas as boiler fuel. 35 This latter group will be affected most
seriously and immediately by the incremental pricing provisions of the
NGPA.
II. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF INCREMENTAL PRICINC-
RULEMAKING UNDER THE NGPA
A. Substantive Rulemaking
The NCPA does not specifically prescribe incremental pricing. Instead,
the recent enactment of section 4(a) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act 36 directs the FERC to prescribe and make effective an incremental pric-
30. It is estimated that prices will increase to residential consumers under NGPA at ap-
proximately the same rate as without it, and may in fact be less to consumers supplied from the
intrastate market, until 1983 when industrial users are expected to reach their threshold of fuel
equivalent price. Thereafter, prices to residential consumers can be expected to rise more
steeply. Id. at 13.
31. See dissenting opinion of Jackson, J. in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944).
32. This raises a vivid example of competing interests in national energy policy. With the
advent of stationary source emissions standards and ambient air quality standards established
by the EPA, there has been further demand for gas as a clean and efficient fuel. At the same
time, government is enforcing coal conversion under the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 45
U.S.C.A.). Meanwhile, then Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger is quoted as saying, "we
wish to burn all the gas that we can in the short run to hold down oil imports." Wall Street J.,
Nov. 16, 1978, at 2, Col. 3 (Western ed.).
33. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 385 U.S. 1 (1961) (the Supreme
Court ultimately sustained the refusal by the FPC to issue a certificate of public convenience
and necessity required by Consolidated Edison Co. to transport gas reserves from Texas for use
as boiler fuel in New York City). See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (the court dismissed petitions for review of Order No. 467 issued by the FPC January 8,
1973, establishing a "Statement of Policy" on priorities of deliveries by jurisdictional pipelines
during periods of curtailment. This policy was designed to ensure that during periods of
shortage of supply there would be full curtailment of all industrial users before any curtailment
to residential or small commercial customers).
34. Sept. 1977 STAFF STUDY, szepra note 20, at 86.
35. 1978 STAFF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 28, at 16.
36. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (1976). In this
1979]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
ing rule; >e., a rule designed to provide for the pass through to certain ulti-
mate consumers of certain costs incurred by pipelines in purchasing natural
gas. The statute specifies in some detail how the incremental pricing pro-
gram is to function and therefore what the FERC must include in its initial
rule and any subsequent amendments. Nevertheless, the FERC has been
granted considerable latitude and inevitably will make important policy
choices.
Rulemaking pursuant to title II of the NGPA can be roughly classified
into four areas: determination of who will be subject to incremental pricing,
what costs will be incrementally priced, what will be the "alternative fuel
cost" to incrementally priced consumers, and what mechanical and account-
ing procedures must be adopted in order to implement the scheme.
(1) Who is subject to incremental pricing?
Section 201 of the NGPA requires that no later than November 9, 1979,
the FERC will prescribe and begin to enforce a rule providing for pass-
through of incremental costs to consumers of gas for industrial boiler fuel use
who are serviced by interstate pipelines. No later than May 9, 1980, an
amendment to this rule must be proposed pursuant to section 202 to extend
the application of incremental pricing to a wider class of industrial consum-
ers. In anticipation of the controversy surrounding this exercise of discre-
tion, the NGPA expressly provides that both the House and the Senate must
review such amendment and either congressional body may adopt a "resolu-
tion of disapproval" rejecting the amendment. 37 Obviously, this is a politi-
cally sensitive issue since the residential consumer will feel the effect of
higher gas prices more slowly if the incremental pricing net is cast more
widely.
The discretion of the FERC in such rulemaking is constrained by statu-
torily mandated exemptions from incremental pricing. However, the nature
of the exemptions portends onerous case-by-case decisionmaking on the part
of the FERC. 38 Exemptions are to be granted in two stages: an interim
exemption applicable for a six-month period from November 9, 1979, and a
permanent exemption to be promulgated not later than eighteen months
from enactment of the NGPA. Exemptions are to be granted to the follow-
ing consumer groups:
(a) Small industrial-An interim exemption must be granted to
statute the President of the United States was required to promulgate a rule providing for allo-
cation of petroleum and petroleum products in emergency situations.
37. NGPA § 202(c).
38. The procedure proposed by the FERC Staff Task Force with respect to granting ex-
emptions is to require all suppliers to identify from their delivery records prior to October 1,
1979, all end-use customers who qualify for the small industrial facility exemption. The remain-
ing customers would receive exemption forms from their supplier no later than October 1, 1979,
to be completed and returned no later than October 20, 1979. If a responsible officer of such
end-user swears under oath that facts exist qualifying the facility for exemption, that customer
will be exempt from incremental pricing. No later than November 15, 1979, each supplier will
be required to confirm to its customers whether or not it has qualified for exemption. Critics of
the Task Force proposal would like to see exemptions determined at an earlier date to avoid
compliance costs to groups who will ultimately be exempt from incremental pricing.
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industrial boiler fuel users in existence on November 9, 1978,
consuming on average less than 300 mcf of gas per day. 39 The
permanent exemption rule is potentially more restrictive and
will apply to small industrial boiler fuel facilities whose aver-
age daily consumption during a peak month of 1977 did not
exceed either 300 mcf or such lower amount as the FERC
may determine as a maximum rate of consumption (total vol-
ume of gas consumption by facilities eligible for this exemp-
tion is not to exceed five percent of the total volume of gas
transmitted by the interstate pipelines and used as boiler fuel
in 1977).40
(b) Agricultural-A facility will be exempt from incremental
pricing in the interim period to the extent that its consump-
tion of natural gas is for an "agricultural use," which includes
strictly agricultural purposes such as irrigation pumping and
crop drying and also industrial uses such as those utilized in
food processing and in production of fertilizer, agricultural
chemicals, and animal feed. 4 1 The permanent rule must ex-
empt agricultural users from incremental pricing in all cases
where an alternative fuel is neither "economically practica-
ble" nor "reasonably available."
'42
(c) Schools, hospitals and other similar institutions.
43
(d) Any electrical utility.
44
(e) Any qualifying cogenerator to the extent provided by FERC
rules.
45
(f Any other incrementally priced facility or category thereof
designated by FERC rules, subject to the right of either the
House or the Senate to pass a resolution of disapproval within
thirty days.46 Under this provision the FERC has discretion
to exempt "in whole or in part" and therefore would appear to
have authority to establish variable levels of incremental pric-
ing for specified industrial consumers.
(2) Costs to be incrementally priced.
The costs that are to be passed through to non-exempt industrial users
39. NGPA § 206(a)(1).
40. NGPA § 206(a)(2).
41. NGPA § 206(a)(3). In the proposed rulemaking by the FERC StaffTask Force, "agri-
cultural use" has been defined as any use of natural gas which is certified by the Secretary of
Agriculture as an "essential agricultural use" qualifying for exemption from curtailment under
NGPA § 401. This is an exceedingly broad category essentially including every agricultural use
necessary for "full food and fiber production."
42. NGPA § 206(b)(2).
43. NGPA § 206(c)(1). This wording has been criticized as creating "an open-ended area
of confusion" in effect encouraging "all sorts of people to claim they are in a similar use." Inside
FERC (McGraw-Hill), Feb. 19, 1979, at 11.
44. NGPA § 206(c)(2).
45. NGPA § 206(c)(3). The cogenerator must meet the definitional requirements pre-
scribed in the Federal Power Act § 3(18)(B), as amended by the Public Utility Regulatory Poli-
cies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a-828c (1974 & Supp. 1978). Essentially a cogenerator is an
electric power plant or major fuel-burning facility which produces electric power and some
other form of useful energy (steam, gas, heat) to be used for industrial, commercial or other
space heating purposes.
46. NGPA § 206(d).
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served by an interstate pipeline are the following acquisition costs of natural
gas incurred by such pipelines subsequent to January 1, 1980 and calculated
in accordance with section 203:
(a) An interstate pipeline must include in its incremental pricing
account the amount by which such pipeline's "first sale ac-
quistion costs" for certain categories of natural gas exceed the
"incremental pricing threshold" applicable for the month in
which delivery of the gas occurs. "First sale acquisition costs"
are defined as the price paid per million Btu in the first sale of
natural gas (exclusive of any amount of state severance tax)
with respect to domestic gas production and the price paid
per million Btu at point of entry in the case of natural gas or
liquified natural gas imported into the United States.47 The
"incremental pricing threshold" is a monthly calculation
based on $1.48 per million Btu as of March 1978, afterwards
adjusted for inflation.48 The categories of natural gas whose
costs are subject to this scheme of incremental pricing are the
following:
(i) New natural gas-includes gas (other than
Prudhoe Bay Unit gas from Alaska) produced
from a new lease on the Outer Continental Shelf" 9
or from any new onshore well 50 more than two and
one-half miles from a marker well5 ' or deeper than
any marker well within a two and one-half mile
radius by more than 1000 feet, or from a new reser-
voir which had no commercial production of natu-
ral gas prior to April 1977.52
(ii) Natural gas under'intrastate rollover contract-in-
cludes gas sold under a contract renegotiated sub-
sequent to enactment of the NGPA that was not
previously dedicated to interstate commerce.
53
(iii) New onshore production well gas-includes gas
(other than Prudhoe Bay Unit gas) from an on-
shore well in which surface drilling began on or af-
ter February 19, 1977, and which essentially
represents production from a reservoir having had
no previous commercial production.
54
47. NGPA § 203(b)(1). The FERC also has power under NGPA § 203(b)(2) to prescribe
rules for determining proper "first sale acquisition costs" with respect to gas produced by any
interstate pipeline or its affiliate.
48. NGPA § 203(c). The "Annual Inflation Adjustment Factor" is defined in NGPA
§ 101(a).
49. NGPA § 2(9) defines a "New Lease" to include a lease of submerged acreage entered
into on or after April 20, 1977.
50. NGPA § 2(3) defines a "New Well" to include a well the surface drilling of which
began after February 19, 1977, or which was recompleted after that date at a depth at least
1000 feet below its previous completion location.
51. NGPA § 2(5) defines a "Marker Well" to include a well from which natural gas was
produced in commercial quantities at any time between January 1, 1970, and April 20, 1977,
excepting certain "new wells" that might otherwise also fall within this definition.
52. NGPA § 102(c).
53. NGPA § 2(12).
54. NGPA § 103(c).
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(iv) Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) imports55 _-subject to a
general rule that incremental pricing will not apply
to LNG where importation was authorized or an
application to import was pending prior to May 1,
1978. However, the right has been reserved to the
FERC or the Secretary of the Department of En-
ergy (DOE) to impose incremental pricing in the
granting of an import permit for LNG under the
NGA.
56
(v) Sales of gas from an intrastate pipeline to interstate
pipeline or any local distribution company served
by an interstate pipeline-subject to the authoriza-
tion of the FERC in accordance with section 311 (b)
of the NGPA.
57
(b) To the extent that the volume of imported natural gas
(other than LNG) exceeds the maximum delivery obli-
gations under a contract entered into prior to May 1,
1978, and exceeds the volume of gas delivered under
that contract for the comparable period in 1977,58 its
first sale acquisition cost in excess of the "new gas" price
will be included in the incremental pricing account.
59
The FERC or the Secretary of the DOE has the right to
impose incremental pricing as a condition to granting
any import permit for natural gas with respect to
volumes in excess of 1977 deliveries. 60
(c) First sale acquisition costs of non-associated natural gas
from a stripper well that are in excess of the "new gas"
price will be included in the incremental pricing ac-
count. A stripper well is one that produces no more than
sixty mcf per day at its maximum efficient rate of flow.
6 '
(d) First sale acquisition costs for "high-cost" gas in excess of
130 percent of what is determined by the FERC
monthly to be the equivalent Btu cost of No. 2 fuel oil
landed in New York will also be included in the incre-
mental pricing account.
62
(e) Two types of costs may be incrementally priced with re-
spect to Prudhoe Bay Unit gas transported through the
natural gas transportation system approved under the
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976.63 One
of these is first sale acquisition cost exceeding the maxi-
mum lawful price computed under section 10 9 .
61 The
55. NGPA § 207.
56. NGPA §§ 207(a), (c).
57. NGPA § 203(a)(10).
58. NGPA § 207(b).
59. NGPA § 203(a)(5).
60. NGPA § 207(c).
61. NGPA § 203(a)(6).
62. NGPA § 203(a)(7). For definition of high-cost gas, see supra note 24.
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 719 (1979).
64. NGPA § 109 provides a ceiling price for residual categories of natural gas not included
within any other section of subtitle I, and specifically covers natural gas produced from the
Prudhoe Bay Unit of Alaska. As a general rule, this price has been set at $1.45 per million Btu
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other is any amount paid other than to the producer for
costs of gathering, processing, treating, liquifying, trans-
porting, or compressing such gas prior to its delivery into
the system.
65
(f) One further cost that is to pass through to non-exempt
industrial consumers under the incremental pricing
scheme is any increase in state severance tax above the
level in force on December 1, 1977, unless such increase
results from a change in the method of computing the tax
meeting certain statutory criteria.66 However, the pre-
December 1977 base amount of such tax will be shared
by all consumers.
As is obvious from the above discussion, one of the most complicated
and potentially controversial aspects of implementation of the NGPA will be
the certification of each source of production as belonging to one of the cate-
gories defined in the statute. Categorization has a threefold impact: it deter-
mines the maximum price to which the producer is entitled; it determines
whether any part of that acquisition price will be subject to incremental
pricing, and, if so, the formula to be applied in determining the amount to
be included in the incremental pricing account; and it determines when, if
ever, the price of that production will be deregulated. It is further apparent
that in some circumstances a well could meet the requirements of more than
one category. The FERC is required to establish a rule for classifying gas in
order to calculate the pass-through of acquistion costs based upon the classi-
fication for pricing purposes in title I. Where natural gas would qualify for
inclusion in more than one pricing category, it must be classified within the
category yielding the highest price.6 7 Under most circumstances this will
work to the advantage of the producer. However, because of the various
dates for deregulation of different categories of gas and the various ways
pass-through portions of acquisition costs are calculated, it could be in the
best interests of the producer to seek a lower-priced classification in the short
run in anticipation of greater long-term revenue and increased marketabil-
ity.
Much of the technical information required to properly classify the dif-
ferent types of natural gas production must come from the various state
agencies responsible for regulating the actual drilling and operations of the
as of April, 1977, adjusted monthly thereafter for inflation. However, NGPA § 109(b)(2) pro-
vides that the FERC may increase the maximum lawful ceiling price applicable to the first sale
of any category of natural gas ordinarily subject to this section, provided that such price is "just
and reasonable" within the meaning of the NGA. Hence the seemingly incongruous wording of
NGPA § 203(a)(8)(A) that first sale acquisition costs of Alaska natural gas exceeding the maxi-
mum lawful price (insofar as NGPA § 109 sets a ceiling price for other categories of natural gas)
shall be included in the incremental pricing account.
65. NGPA § 203(a)(8)(B). It is significant to note that actual transportation costs within
the proposed new pipeline will be rolled-in to the price of the Alaska natural gas. This was
deemed necessary in order to attract the vast sums of private investment capital sought in con-
nection with construction of the pipeline.
66. NGPA § 203(a)(9).




producers.68 In many instances the records of these agencies are inadequate
and can't provide the information required by the NGPA with respect to
matters such as well completion depth and volume of production. 69 Techni-
cal engineering expertise will be required to assess whether a well drains a
new reservoir from which there has been no previous commercial produc-
tion. There is considerable room for honest differences of expert opinion on
these questions. A further problem will be the resistance anticipated from
state agencies regarding the additional workload and expense imposed by
this federal statute.
(3) Determination of alternative fuel cost.
Another key rulemaking function delegated to the FERC is determina-
tion of "alternative fuel cost," a critical fulcrum on which incremental pric-
ing is balanced. Each non-exempt industrial gas user will be subjected to
incremental pricing until its cost for gas reaches its alternative fuel cost.
This then becomes a ceiling for that user, at least until all customers of the
interstate pipeline supplying the gas have reached their respective alterna-
tive fuel cost.
The NGPA provides as a general rule that the FERC will designate
regions throughout the country. Within each of these regions the alternative
fuel cost will be the price per million Btu paid for No. 2 fuel oil by industrial
users of such fuel in that region.7° However, to alleviate the risk of rapid
conversion of industrial gas users from gas to other fields by applying this
broad standard, the FERC is authorized to reduce the "alternative fuel cost"
for any category of incrementally-priced industrial user or individual facility
within a region to a level not lower than the price per million Btu of No. 6
fuel oil in that region. In deciding whether an alternative fuel cost should be
reduced the FERC must satisfy itself, after an appropriate investigation and
hearing, that such conversion is "likely to occur" if the appropriate alterna-
tive fuel cost is not reduced and that rates and charges to high-priority gas
users would be increased if conversion took place.
7 1
The FERC is not empowered to consider the relative cost of coal as a
potential alternative fuel source in setting the threshold for incremental pric-
68. NGPA § 503 prescribes the procedure for classifying categories of natural gas. In gen-
eral, the federal (e.g., USGS) or state agency having regulatory jurisdiction in respect to the
production of natural gas will have authority to make such determination based upon the appli-
cation filed by a producer with respect to each well. These findings are then reported to the
FERC which has 45 days in which to review and take action thereon or the determination will
be conclusive. The FERC may issue a "preliminary finding" in doubtful circumstances which
allows them a further 120 days to investigate the producer's claim. Applications made by pro-
ducers prior to March 1, 1979, will qualify for the higher gas prices retroactive to December 1,
1978; subsequent to that date the higher price is applicable only from the actual date of receipt
of the application. This has placed an inordinate assessment burden on the reviewing agencies
in the early stages of the legislation.
69. Stuart, A Bad Start on Gas Deregulatton, FORTUNE, Feb. 12, 1979, at 87.
70. NGPA § 204(e)(1).
71. NGPA § 204(e)(2). Where conversion to coal is mandatory under the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 42, 45 U.S.C.A.,) a category-wide reduction in "alternative fuel cost" is not appropriate
since such conversions are unrelated to the level of incremental pricing of gas.
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ing. It is anticipated that if gas prices rise to a Btu equivalent of No. 6 fuel
oil there will be massive conversion to coal in the Rocky Mountain states
where coal is readily available resulting in load-shifting to high-priority gas
users. It would seem that Congress either was not concerned with or did not
appreciate fully the impact of increased gas prices upon residential and com-
mercial users brought about by industrial users converting from gas to coal.
The principal preoccupation has been to minimize dependence on oil. The
extent to which high-priority users should bear the cost of gas and gas service
raises squarely the conflict between efficiency and equity considerations. On
the one hand, a more efficient resource allocation should result if cost savings
can be realized by industry through conversion to coal once gas has been
priced at its true Btu value. On the other hand, it may be thought that load-
shifting creates an undue hardship on residential and commercial consum-
ers, a situation made more an anathema because of the regional basis on
which conversion to coal is likely to occur, e.g., within the western states
where enormous reserves of low-sulphur coal are readily accessible.
In calculating the "alternative fuel cost," no consideration is given to
the captial and operating costs of conversion. Unless there were full substi-
tutibility of fuels within an existing plant, it would be rational for facilities to
resist incurring costs of conversion where the marginal cost of the fuel itself
was equal. Theoretically, this will achieve the optimal outcome of a facility
paying the full Btu value of the gas without converting to oil. However,
other factors such as the long run security of supply and the environmental
considerations will also be critical to management in making the decision to
convert.
There is an obvious incentive for almost every incrementally-priced in-
dustrial gas user to apply either to be exempted completely from the scheme
or to have its alternative fuel cost reduced. 72 The administrative costs of this
rulemaking process could be formidable. In addition, there is a com-
pounding effect because as some industrial users are exempted or have their
alternative fuel cost reduced, incremental pricing will be accelerated for
others.
(4) Accounting procedures and other mechanics of implementation.
It is inevitable that the metering, accounting, reporting, and filing func-
tions imposed on the pipeline industry as a result of incremental pricing will
be onerous. The greatest challenge to rulemaking in this area may be to try
72. See supra note 46, and accompanying text. Utah and Wyoming have already indicated
their intention to apply for state-wide exemptions from incremental pricing, alleging that it is
"inappropriate" where the alternative fuel to gas is coal. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill), Feb. 19,
1979, at 1. California has also proposed that a state should be exempted when it can certify that
gas prices are already equal to the designated alternative fuel. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill)
Mar. 12, 1979, at 7. One proposal put forward by an FERC staff adviser is to have incre-
mentally-priced users self-certify their alternative fuel cost; ge., each facility would indicate
whether No. 2 or No. 6 fuel oil represented its alternative fuel cost with the understanding that
if the selection was made for the fuel oil which resulted in a higher incremental pricing burden,
the facility would have higher priority in respect to curtailment. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill)
Apr. 9, 1979, at 5, 6.
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to minimize the administrative paperwork. 73
The supplier who is farthest downstream must maintain records respect-
ing each of its non-exempt customers in regard to volumes of gas delivered;
this includes distinguishing between volumes of gas used for exempt and
non-exempt purposes by any given customer 74 and the alternative fuel cost
of each. Accounts must be kept of costs to be incrementally priced including
surcharges imposed by upstream suppliers and carrying charges. Calcula-
tions must be made with respect to surcharges to be imposed on each non-
exempt user based upon the volume of gas consumed by that user in relation
to all gas consumed by non-exempt users who are serviced by that supplier
and subject to each user's alternative fuel cost ceiling. Accounts must be
maintained with respect to collection of such surcharges and information
must be passed upstream as to capacity to levy a surcharge as customers
reach their respective alternative fuel cost.
75
Corresponding accounts must be maintained by each of the upstream
suppliers in the chain in order that the scheme can be maintained in dy-
namic equilibrium. Obviously the system becomes increasingly complex as
the number of carriers between producer and consumer increases. In addi-
tion, the FERC will undoubtedly prescribe rules requiring filing of tariff
sheets and detailed computations of surcharges together with other informa-
tion that the FERC and Energy Information Administration (EIA) believe
to be necessary to monitor the incremental pricing program.
One of the critical aspects of implementation will be timing. Under the
NGPA, the FERC was effectively allowed one year to make incremental
pricing operational. Given the extensive rulemaking required, this imposes a
considerable time constraint and encourages the FERC to incorporate in its
rules provisions for deferment of certain calculations as statutorily allowed. 76
The FERC is authorized to provide by rule that the surcharge applicable for
volumes of gas delivered in one calender period can be levied and collected
in the next year.77 Presumably this would have the advantage of allowing
time for the accounting function to be performed with some degree of accu-
racy rather than making an initial calculation which might later require re-
visions and rebates. The problem, however, is how long these costs can be
73. The FERC is requesting 300 new staff members at a cost of I I million per year to
alleviate the start-up workload anticipated as a result of passage of the NGPA. Supra note 69, at
88.
74. The FERC Task Force proposal for rulemaking has been criticized for failing to deal
with the costs of metering gas volumes. "Sub-metering" devices would have to be installed in
those industrial facilities consuming gas for both exempt and non-exempt use. It is argued by
industrial users that these costs should be borne by gas customers who are essentially being
subsidized by the incrementally-priced consumers, or at least should be included in calculating
the cost of the gas service in relation to its achieving a price level equivalent to alternative fuel
cost. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 19, 1979, at 11.
75. NGPA §§ 201-202.
76. NGPA § 204(c)(3)(A).
77. The FERC Task Force proposal provides that incremental costs incurred within a six
month period ending December 31st and June 30th would be billed to users in six equal
monthly installments commencing on the following May 1st and November 1st. This inordi-
nate time lag and the concomitant carrying charges have been seriously criticized by the indus-
try. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 19, 1979, at 10.
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The FERC is directed by the NGPA to observe the customary rulemak-
ing procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 including the usual
notice provisions and opportunity for comment by interested persons. The
FERC has approached its rulemaking obligations under title II of the NGPA
by segmenting them into two categories, one the designation of alternative
fuel cost regions and the pegging of an alternative fuel cost for each region
and the other all residual matters requiring rulemaking. A separate task
force has been assigned to analyze the issues and draft proposed rules in each
area. A sixteen part questionnaire was sent by the EIA to interstate pipe-
lines, local distributors, state commissions, and other interested persons in an
attempt to compile the data base necessary to draft rules relating to alterna-
tive fuel costs. 80 Written and oral public comments on this issue are also
solicited through regional meetings.
With respect to other rulemaking responsibilities, the FERC issued a
Notice of Informal Public Conference and Inquiry on January 12, 1979,8'
containing the recommendations of its staff task force together with some
proposed alternatives. Written comments on the proposed rules were solic-
ited for a thirty-day period8 2 and an informal public conference to provide a
forum for oral presentations followed. Other regional meetings were sched-
uled to address particular problem areas such as accounting mechanics and
state implementation schemes.
After consideration of these informal comments, the task force amended
its original proposal and circulated the revised draft notice of proposed
rulemaking to the FERC. After meeting on the proposal, the FERC issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in accordance with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The FERC then subjected the rules to public scrutiny 3 once
again because section 502(b) of the NGPA expressed Congress' intention
78. Northern Natural Gas Co. estimated that its deferred costs under incremental pricing
would be $47 million by the end of June, 1980 and $180 million after three years, with carrying
charges of $680,000 per month to support this debt. To meet these cash-flow difficulties suppli-
ers argue that they will be required to arrange short-term financing at interest rates in excess of
the carrying charges. Id
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
80. Industry has resisted supplying the information requested, alleging that if answered the
form would lead to "unwarranted conclusions" about potential for fuel substitution. The form
has also been criticized for lacking the refinement necessary to distinguish among different fuels
that can be used for some but not all of an industry's activities and to distinguish between the
substitutability of fuels and the conversion to a completely new system. Inside FERC (Mc-
Graw-Hill) Feb. 5, 1979, at 11-12.
81. Staff Task Force Proposal for Regulations to Implement Incremental Pricing, supra
note 15.
82. This deadline was later extended to allow time for evaluation of new methodologies
advanced by industry representatives. Inside FERO (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 19, 1979, at 10.
83. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976) exempts from notice and
public hearing procedures, interpretive rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency or-
ganization, procedure of practice, and situations where the agency makes a well-reasoned find-
ing that such procedures are impraticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
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that, to the maximum extent practicable, an opportunity for oral presenta-
tion of data and arguments should be afforded prior to the effective date of
any rule.8 4 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning alternative fuel
cost was issued May 18, 1979, and was followed by four to six weeks of re-
gional hearings. Redrafting and recommendations by the FERC are neces-
sary before the final rule is issued. 85 The procedure for rulemaking on the
incremental pricing mechanism will follow the same pattern.
8 6
The FERC must provide by rule a procedure whereby anyone claiming
"special hardship, inequity or an unfair distribution of burdens" by reason
of the substantive rules can apply for an "interpretation, modification, or
rescission of, exception to, or exemption from" such rules.
8 7 If the FERC
rejects such a request for adjustment, an aggrieved party is entitled to seek
judicial review in accordance with section 506 of the NGPA.
It is significant to note that Congress delegated extensive decisionmak-
ing power to the FERC under title II of the NGPA but, in keeping with
recent legislative trends, reserved to itself a veto power in respect to those
matters which are anticipated to be most contentious and politically sensi-
tive. Thus, congressional review is allowed in two instances. Section 202(c)
of the NGPA allows either the House or the Senate to adopt a resolution of
disapproval with respect to the amending rule which expands the class of
industrial users who will be subject to incremental pricing. In the event of
such congresional disapproval, authority exists for the FERC to resubmit an
amending rule within certain time limitations. Section 206(d)(2) of the
NGPA allows either the House or the Senate to adopt a resolution of disap-
proval with respect to any rule providing for exemption in whole or in part
of a category of industrial users or of a specific facility from incremental
pricing. It remains to be seen whether the exercise of this veto power will
seriously hamper the effective administration of the NGPA by the FERC.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCREMENTAL PRICING
While the theoretical rationale for incremental pricing seems meritori-
ous, the implementations and administrative costs are prohibitive and unjus-
tifiable considering the time frame within which incremental pricing will be
operative. Unless fuel oil prices rise dramatically, it is estimated that in cer-
tain jurisdictions industrial users subject to incremental pricing will have
84. The original House bill provided that an opportunity for oral presentation of views
would be required in addition to observing the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976). The Senate bill relied on the provisions of the
Natural Gas Act allowing the Commission to establish procedures for its own hearings, investi-
gations, and proceedings. H.R. REP. No. 95-1752 at 116, reprthtedz'n [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 8983, 9033. NGPA § 502(b) specifically excepts from this requirement any rules of
orders made pursuant to the emergency authority granted the FERC in §§ 301-303 inclusive,
but does not contemplate an exercise of discretion on the part of the FERC pursuant to
§ 553(d)(3) of the APA to shorten or totally abrogate the 30 day period between publication
date and effective date provided an opportunity for oral presentation is afforded within 45 days
or 30 days respectively after the effective date.
85. 44 Fed. Reg. 29090 (1979). The final rule, when issued, will be at 18 C.F.R. 282.
86. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Apr. 19, 1979, at 8.
87. NGPA § 502(c).
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little capacity to absorb surcharges before their cost of gas will be equivalent
to a Btu level of fuel oil.88 Certainly, at some point between 1983 and 1985,
by which time most "new gas" prices will have been deregulated, low prior-
ity gas users will probably have converted to an alternate energy source or
will be paying a price for gas equal to its full Btu value.
An alternative solution to incremental pricing would have been to use a
taxing mechanism. Such a program would maintain the wellhead price ceil-
ings and staged deregulation provisions contained in title I of the NGPA to
assure proper incentives for exploration and development of new gas reserves
without causing precipitous inflation. However, the full cost of new gas ac-
quisitions would be rolled in and passed on pro rata to all consumers.
Recognizing that this rolled in price would not reflect the true Btu
value of the gas in relation to fuel oil, at least so long as significant volumes
of "old gas" were available, a tax would be assessed against large industrial
users of gas as boiler fuel based upon volume of gas consumed. The same
criteria and procedures would be adopted for determining who would be
subject to taxation as are set out in the NGPA for deciding who will be
subject to incremental pricing.
The tax rate would be fixed on a monthly basis equal to the difference
between the actual price paid for gas by the low-priority user and the
equivalent Btu cost in that period for a particular grade of fuel oil. For the
sake of simplicity, it would be preferable to establish a uniform standard of
fuel oil, such as No. 2 fuel oil, the delivered cost to be calculated monthly on
a state by state basis. However, if it appeared that in certain regions this
would trigger massive fuel conversion by industrial users or any of the dis-
cussed corresponding problems, variations in the quality of the benchmark
fuel oil could be introduced on a regional basis.
The supplier of the gas to the industrial consumer, whether an interstate
pipeline or local distributing company, would be responsible for assessing
and collecting the tax based on its own delivery records and information
from the state regulatory agency as to the appropriate fuel oil cost for that
month. Some sub-metering would be required where an end-user consumes
gas for both exempt and non-exempt purposes, but otherwise the calculation
of the tax would be reasonably straightforward.
Efficiency and conservation gains would be realized by imposing the
fuel cost of gas consumption on the general populace. If it is perceived that
this results in undue hardship to certain classes, relief could be granted
through the income tax structure on a more progressive basis than the pro-
posed subsidy to all non-incrementally priced consumers. Lost tax revenue
from such allowances would be recovered from the "boiler fuel gas consump-
tion tax."
This proposal would retain key policy objectives of incentive pricing for
increased domestic gas production and of normalizing prices in interstate
and intrastate gas markets. While residential consumers would feel the im-
pact of higher gas prices more rapidly than under the incremental pricing
88. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Mar. 12, 1979, at 7.
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scheme, the increase would be a gradual one in view of the schedule of
staged deregulation. Industrial consumers of gas as boiler fuel would experi-
ence an immediate increased cost equal to the "alternative fuel cost" rather
than an incremental increase up to this level. If empirical research disclosed
that this would precipitate undesirable widespread fuel conversion, the ef-
fects could be modified by using a lower grade fuel oil as the initial taxation
standard with progressive substitutions of increasingly higher quality alter-
native fuels. In any event the net effect would be a more efficient allocation
of resources in respect to both residential/commercial and industrial con-
sumers since both groups would face costs more closely related to the true
heating value of natural gas relative to other fuel sources.
The immediate inflationary effects of this scheme would undoubtedly
be greater than under incremental pricing. Residential consumers would
face higher direct costs of gas consumption and indirect costs of consumer
products as industry internalized the tax into its cost structure. Assuming a
certain price elasticity of demand for natural gas, these effects would be off-
set to some extent as consumers reduced consumption and implemented con-
servation measures.
The most salient advantage of this proposal over incremental pricing
would be the elimination of costly accounting and administrative proce-
dures. Although the taxing scheme also requires implementation and en-
forcement mechanics, it would eliminate the calculation of gas acquisition
costs in excess of the threshold levels for different categories of gas. It would
eliminate the determination of surcharge absorption capability of individual
facilities. It could eliminate much of the rulemaking in respect to alternative
fuel costs, depending upon how finely tuned the tax was to be regulated.
Furthermore, it would eliminate the mechanics of pass-through of costs
among the various carriers in the chain of delivery from producer to end-
user. As gas prices increased, the total tax revenue would decrease and
would eventually be phased out, subject of course to variations in the price
of fuel oil.
IV. CONCLUSION
Incremental pricing lacks political support from virtually all segments.
Interstate pipelines and local distributing companies are antagonistic be-
cause of the administrative burden. Non-exempt industrial gas users foresee
rapidly increasing costs of gas consumption. Even the residential consumer
for whose benefit the scheme is essentially being implemented will continue
to experience rising gas costs and will probably lack an understanding of
how much more severe these increases would be without incremental pric-
ing. Resistance is anticipated from state agencies whose cooperation is vital
in effectively implementing the scheme. All of these factors will aggravate
the problems associated with a complicated piece of legislation such as the
NGPA especially one which relies heavily on voluntary compliance.
In a period when public reaction toward government regulation and
mushrooming bureaucracy is so negative and vociferous, incremental pricing
lacks political credibility. Throughout the lengthy congressional debates
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and extensive economic analyses that preceded the final draft of the NGPA,
more consideration should have been given to how public sentiment could
be reflected in choosing among alternative solutions to the problems of natu-
ral gas pricing. By this criterion alone, the proposal set forth in Part III of
this article would be preferable to the incremental pricing scheme.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IN CHILD SUPPORT CASES:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ESTABLISHMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
IN THE DENVER DISTRICT COURT
By Lucy MARSH YEE*
Child support is, or should be, of significant concern to society. It has
been estimated that approximately seventy percent of the children in this
country live in households which do not include both of the child's natural
parents.' Therefore, a high percentage of the children in the United States
theoretically should be entitled to some child support. Establishment and
enforcement of child support orders, however, do not seem to have a high
priority in our judicial system, nor are establishment and enforcement han-
dled consistently.
The following three orders for child support were made by the same
judge: father A pays $60 per month to support two children from a net
monthly income of $450, father B pays $50 per month to support two chil-
dren from a net monthly income of $900, father C pays $120 per month to
support two children from a net monthly income of $450. Why does the
father with the highest monthly income pay the least? Why does father C,
with exactly the same income as father A, pay twice as much?
During 1978, a study was undertaken of child support orders entered by
the District Court in Denver, Colorado, to determine what orders are en-
tered for child support, what factors cause the dramatic variation in these
orders, how well child support orders are being enforced, and what means of
enforcement seem to be most effective. The study is based on a scientifically
selected random sample of cases2 scheduled for hearing in the Denver Dis-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, and Deputy District
Attorney, City and County of Denver, Colorado. B.A. 1963, Smith College. J.D. 1966, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School.
The author wishes to express particular thanks to three law students, Ruth Bennett, Mona
Goodwin, and Robert Truhlar, for help with this study. Ruth and Mona spent a tremendous
number of hours going through the files of the Denver District Court and the Denver District
Attorney's Office to collect the requisite data. Bob was invaluable in his efficient, thoughtful
coordination and tabulation of the data to get it into usable form. Special thanks are also due
to Dale Tooley, Denver District Attorney, and David R. Costello, Chief Deputy District Attor-
ney, Child Support Division, for permission to use the files of the Denver District Attorney's
Office for this study. Any errors in this article are entirely the responsibility of the author.
1. Interview with Margaret Perkins, M.S.W., N.A.S.W., L.S.W. 11 (1979).
2. It was the goal of the author to include 150 cases in which a new support order was
entered and 150 cases in which a case was set for hearing on a contempt citation. Because of
various data collection problems, the final data is based upon 135 new support order cases and
152 contempt citation cases. Between January I and December 31, 1977, the Denver District
Attorney's Office handled 574 cases for new support orders. There was an attempt to include in
the study every fourth support order case in which the respondent was served and the case was
set for court hearing. Using a random number table, we began with the seventh case in the time
frame of the study. Since 266 contempt citations were handled by the Denver District Attor-
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trict Court during the period from January 1, 1977, to September 30, 1978,
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).3 Al-
though the scope of the study is limited, it is believed that the results are
representative of child support orders in general.
4
ney's Office in 1977, an attempt was made to include every other case in which a citation had
been set for hearing, starting with the random number nine.
3. Only cases brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (here-
inafter cited as URESA) are included. URESA is used primarily to enforce duties of support
owed to minor children, but it is available for use on behalf of anyone to whom a duty of
support is owed; e.g., a former spouse or a child over the age of 21 who is incompetent and
therefore entitled to continued support. URESA is not used when both parents of a child live
within the same county. Therefore, many support orders entered as part of a divorce never
become part of the URESA system. Each URESA order is a new order and "does not nullify
and is not nullified by a support order made by" another court of the same state or of a different
state. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-5-132 (1973). Thus, there is no guarantee that a support order
entered in a divorce proceeding when both parties are present will be followed when a new
support order is entered under URESA. Usually the URESA order is sought because the origi-
nal order is not being obeyed.
URESA has been adopted, either in the original or the revised version, by all 50 states.
The Colorado URESA is found at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-5-101 to 143 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
Both the original version and the revised version provide for substantially the same procedures:
a person who has legal custody of a child, or a welfare department making payments for the
benefit of the child, files a complaint for support in the child's local court. Normally the person
seeking support on behalf of the child is assisted in filing the complaint by the local district
attorney. See id. § 14-5-113. The assistance of a district attorney at any stage of the proceedings
usually is provided without charge to the petitioner, as it is in Denver. Once an action for
support has been commenced, the local court, if it determines that a duty of support probably is
imposable on the person named in the complaint, forwards the action to the jurisdiction in
which that person may be found. In other words, a mother in Pennsylvania, seeking support for
her children, may file a URESA action in her local court with the help of her local district
attorney. The action will then be sent to the district court of the jurisdiction in which the father
of the children resides, Denver, Colorado, in this example. The Denver District Attorney will
then assist the court by securing service on the father. The Denver District Attorney will repre-
sent the petitioner at the hearing to establish a support order and at all enforcement proceed-
ings thereafter required. Support payments made by the respondent will be paid to the clerk of
the Denver District Court and forwarded by him to the proper authorities in Pennsylvania,
eventually reaching the petitioner, the mother of the children.
Child support orders under URESA are entered and enforced by the same judges who
enter and enforce other child support orders, but the fact that a father resides in a different state
from his children is undoubtedly significant in the results. A father who rarely sees his children
will be less likely to maintain a close personal involvement with them and probably will be less
likely to pay. However, this may be offset by the fact that a father who rarely sees the mother of
his children may be less likely to get into bitter battles with her. A father's anger toward the
mother of his children undoubtedly has an effect on his willingness to pay child support.
A Wisconsin study on compliance with child support orders found that "after one year only
38 percent of the fathers were in full compliance and 42 percent were in total non-compliance,
i.e., they paid nothing. But at the 10th year compliance had dropped to 13 percent and total
non-compliance had risen to 79 percent." Conti, Child Support.- His, Her, or Their Responsih/lites?
25 DE PAUL L. REV. 707, 718 n.62 (1976). Thus, absence from the home and distance from the
children seem to have an impact on payment of child support. It was not unusual in URESA
cases for a father to explain that he had not paid support primarily because he did not approve
of the present conduct of his former wife, even though such approval or disapproval is legally
irrelevant to the obligation to pay child support.
4. During the period of this study, all URESA cases were assigned to the two domestic
relations judges in the Denver District Court. These were the same judges who also heard
privately initiated cases for dissolution of marriage, child support, child custody, and similar
matters on a regular basis. The system currently used in the Denver District Court has been
modified to some extent. New petitions for a support order are now heard initially by either of
two designated referees. The referee then recommends entry of a particular support order, and
the order is actually signed by one of the regular domestic relations judges. Thus future studies
should include an analysis of the impact of the referees, as well as the judges, on establishment
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In any study of child support orders, variation would be expected both
as to the amount of support ordered and as to the methods of enforcement
because the needs and resources of the particular people involved vary. In
addition, child support cases, like any others, are affected by the relative skill
and ability of the lawyers and judges who handle the case.
The impact of the style and ability of individual attorneys, however, is
somewhat diminished in the present study by the fact that all of the cases
were handled by one of two attorneys assigned to the Child Support Division
of the Denver District Attorney's Office.5 Thus, only two attorneys were
involved in representing the petitioners.
Similarly, only two judges, who were assigned to domestic relations,
were involved in a large percentage of the cases (86% for establishment of
support orders and 72.8% for enforcement). The remainder of the cases were
decided by nine other judges. The variation among the orders of the judges
involved, particularly those of the two primary judges, indicates that the
personality, beliefs, and attitude of the particular judge who hears a case
have a distinct impact on the outcome of the case. Again, since most of the
data originated from the orders of only two judges, a fairly valid picture of
the cases handled by those two judges may emerge, but not enough cases
were included in the study from each of the nine other judges to ascertain a
consistent pattern for all judges-if there is one.
So, recognizing the limits of the study, this article will discuss the data
secured. Part One discusses the establishment of child support orders, the
amounts awarded, and the factors which influenced the size of the orders.
Part Two summarizes the family and welfare consequences of those support
orders. Part Three deals with the enforcement of child support orders.
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
A. The Amount Awarded
Child support orders entered by the Denver District Court during 1977-
78 ranged from a low of zero for two children to highs of $640 per month for
five children ($128 per child) and $225 per month for one child. The aver-
age order was $84.53 per month,6 but that number is misleading. Some or-
ders were entered for the benefit of several children. Other orders were
entered for the benefit of only one child. The average order per child was
$47.15 per month.7
of support orders. All contempt citations in URESA cases continue to be heard by the regular
domestic relations judges.
5. Although two attorneys handled all the child support cases for the Denver District
Attorney, only one of them was full time. The other, the author, worked only ten hours per
week. The author handled litigation of all cases scheduled to be heard before one of the two
domestic relations judges, but did almost no work on settlements and stipulations reached prior
to the day of trial.
6. This number was determined simply by adding together the amount of the order from
all 135 cases, including the cases which appeared twice in the sample and the cases in which no
order was entered, and dividing that sum by 135.
7. This number was determined by dividing the total of all orders, as found by the




Perhaps the average amount ordered per child still does not accurately
portray the situation. It may be true that two cannot live as cheaply as one,
yet the cost of raising two children in the same household is simply not twice
the cost of raising one child. Clothes are usually handed down. Car pay-
ments are totally unaffected by the presence of a second child. Babysitters
usually charge no more for additional children. Rent and utilities, though
they may increase somewhat as family size goes up, simply do not double or
even increase by one-third when a second child is added to a family.
8
It was beyond the scope of this study to ascertain just how much more
per month should be paid for the second or third child in a family. How-
ever, two sources of financial data were available for comparison with the
amounts awarded by the Denver District Court. Welfare payments to a
family with dependent children increase somewhat with the number of chil-
dren in the family. Table 1 sets forth an example of such payments. In
addition, in 1973 the late Judge William Burnett of the Denver District
Court promulgated guidelines to be considered in establishing child support
orders. The guidelines were published in the Family Law Newsletter of The
Colorado Lawyer9 with a strong admonition from the Family Law Council
that the guidelines should not be used to replace individual discretion in
particular cases. For ease of comparison, Judge Burnett's guidelines have
been converted to a monthly basis,' 0 using 4.3 weeks per month. The con-
verted monthly guidelines are set forth in Table 2 and will hereafter be re-
ferred to as the guidelines. These guidelines are based on the net income of
the person subject to a court order for support, as are all income figures
mentioned in this study. The average monthly payment actually ordered
when there was one child covered by the support order was $78.06 per
month." t The average monthly payment when there were two children cov-
ered by the order was $97.28.12 This is an increase of 23.2% for the second
child. The guidelines at a comparable net income level provide for an in-
crease of roughly 86.7% for the second child, yet they provide for only a .20%
incremental increase for the third child. This study did not include enough
families with three children, however, to make a valid statistical comparison
of the increase ordered by the courts when there were three children.'
3
Further refinement of this data may be necessary to portray accurately
the amount of child support ordered. The calculations in the preceding par-
agraph included all cases which were part of the random sample, but forty-
8. A third source is available for comparison: child support guidelines published by the
Maricopa Co. Bar Assoc., Maricopa Co., Ariz. See 8 COLO. LAW. 1032, 1036 (1979). It was not
used in this study.
9. 5 COLO. LAW. 45, 46 (1976).
10. Only the guidelines for one, two, and three children were converted to monthly figures,
as few cases in this study included four or more children. See note 13 bifia.
11. This number was secured by using all cases in which one child was involved, excluding
duplicate cases.
12. The amount of $97.28 was figured by the same method indicated in note 11 supra.
13. In fact, there were only 10 families in the study with 3 children, 5 families with 4
children, 2 families with 5 children, and 3 families with 6 children. Of these 20 families, only 12
were involved in cases in which a support order was actually entered. Disregarding cases in
which no order was entered, we are left with only 7 families with 3 children, 3 families with 4
children, 2 families with 5 children, and no families with 6 children.
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nine of these cases, 36.3%, resulted in the entry of no support order. At first
glance it would seem that these cases simply should not have been included
in the study, but the information provided by them is too important to ig-
nore. The possible reasons for the "no order" rate will be analyzed later.'
4
At this time, however, it is sufficient to emphasize that 36.3% of the total
number of cases studied resulted in no order. 15 Since an order requiring
support payments may later have been obtained in many of those same
cases, it seems proper when analyzing the average amount of support or-
dered to disregard the cases in which no order was entered.
Returning to the average amount ordered per case and per child, and
considering only those cases in which some support order was entered, we
find that the average order per case was $126.68;16 the average order when
there was one child in the family was $95.30; and the average order when
there were two children in the family was $122.39 or $61.20 per child. In
other words, the average support order for two children was 28.4% higher
than the average support order for one child. Under the guidelines, the sup-
port obligation would be expected to increase by 86.7% for a second child. If
the guidelines were applied, a father who paid a total of $95 for one child
would be expected to pay approximately $180 for two children. Clearly the
gap between the guidelines and what actually happens in support order
cases is dramatic. Whether a second child actually causes household ex-
penses to increase by 28.4% or by 86.7% is beyond the scope of this paper.
The fact remains that in Denver the average increase for the second child
when some order is entered is 28.4%.
However, averages per se are not particularly enlightening. Too much
has been left out. We need to know the details of specific support orders and
the factors which have caused the particular orders to be made. Then we
should be interested in ascertaining the variation or deviation from the "av-
erage" which exists in particular cases.
B. Income of the Respondent
It would seem reasonable that the single most important factor in deter-
mining the size of a support order should be the income of the parent
charged with the duty of support. Although mothers and fathers have an
equal duty to support their children, and although URESA specifically ap-
14. See section D of the text, Allomeys, nta.
15. This should not surprise judges who have been involved in trials of URESA cases.
Perhaps it is no worse than the comparable rate in other cases, but it is a sad commentary of the
efficiency of the court system. Considerable time and effort was expended by court personnel,
attorneys, and parties, while no results were obtained. Each case had been set by the District
Attorney's Office for hearing, the respondent had been served, court personnel had checked out
the court file and secured a computer printout of all past payments made by the respondent
through the Denver District Court. The case had appeared on the docket on the hearing date,
thus crowding out other possible cases. Each case probably had been called by the judge and
both a minute order and a written order prepared, all of which showed that nothing particu-
larly significant had occurred on the trial date. Subsequently, the files had to be returned to the
proper storage areas.
16. The average order per case is based on all cases, including those in which there were
four or five children.
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plies to and is enforced against both parents, no single case appeared in this
study in which a support order had been entered against a woman.' 7 Since
all orders in this study were imposed upon fathers, this article will refer to
the parent subject to a support order either as father or respondent.
It should be mentioned at this time that the income of the mother is not
one of the factors which should be used to explain the variation in orders. In
the first place, in slightly more than 60% of the cases studied, the children
were on welfare, indicating clearly the mother's inability to support the chil-
dren. More importantly, under URESA the only factors to be considered by
the court are the needs of the children and the ability of the non-custodial
parent to pay support. 18 Normally it would be expected that children whose
father makes $2,000 per month would receive more child support than chil-
dren whose father earns $400 per month. The children of a father with more
money are simply expected to be able to enjoy a higher standard of living.
There is no reason to penalize children whose parents both work by not al-
lowing them to receive appropriate support from both parents, so the sup-
port obligation owed by one parent should not be decreased by the earning
ability of the other parent. In fact, the law requires that such a reduction
not take place.' 9
This article now turns to an examination of the relationship between
the income of the respondent and the size of the support order entered.
The net income of the "average" father included in the study, using
only those cases in which some order was entered, was $659.03 per month.
20
The "average" father would have paid 14.5% of his income ($95.30) for the
17. The writer was involved in attempting to enforce some support orders entered against
mothers, but these cases were rare. This is probably a reflection of the fact that, at the time of
this study, it was still true that in most cases a woman was granted custody of her children when
the parents were divorced. The mother, therefore, would have the responsibility of day-to-day
care of the children, but she would not be ordered to make additional cash payments-to her-
self, in essence-for the benefit of the children. For interesting Colorado cases on the custody
issue, see Catron v. Catron, 577 P.2d 322 (Colo. App. 1978); Menne v. Menne, 572 P.2d 472
(Colo. 1977).
18. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972). See also County of
Clearwater v. Petrash, 589 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1979).
19. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972). See also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-5-125 (1973): "If the responding court finds a duty of support, it may order
the obligor to furnish support or reimbursement therefore and subject the property of the obli-
gor to the order." There is no provision in the URESA statute which states that the financial
resources of the custodial parent are to be taken into account in setting the amount of the
support order, as contrasted with the Colorado version of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act which specifies that the financial resources of the custodial parent are to be considered. Id.
at § 14-10-115(l)(b). The fact that an order of support entered as part of a divorce or dissolu-
tion proceeding is modified or nullified will have no effect on the URESA order. See id. at § 14-
5-132; note 3 supra. In other words, a URESA support order is entered after consideration of
different factors than those considered in establishing a support order as part of a dissolution
proceeding. All payments made under any order, however, are credited to payments due under
the URESA order. Id.
20. The average income was figured by adding the income of all the fathers whose income
was known and dividing by the number of fathers. This computation did not include six of the
cases used to determine the average order entered, since in these cases the amount of the order
was available, but not the income of the father. In two of the omitted cases, the father's income




support of one child. Based on the actual support orders entered by the
courts, an "average" father of two children would have paid 18.6% of his
income ($122.39) for the support of his two children.
By contrast, if the guidelines had been followed, a father with a net
monthly income of $635 would have paid 20% of his income ($127) for one
child and 34% of his income ($215.90) for two children. So two children
actually receive very nearly what the guidelines suggest for one child. The
actual average order for two children is $93.51 per month less than the
guidelines suggest-a difference of $1,122.12 per year. To put it another
way, the average father paid only 56.7% of the amount recommended by the
guidelines to support two children.
So much for the "averages." The facts of the real, individual cases are
considerably more striking. As indicated at the beginning of this article, one
father with a net monthly income of $450 was ordered to pay $120 per
month (27% of his income) to support his two children. Another father net-
ting $900 per month was ordered to pay only $50 per month total (6% of his
income) to support two children. Both orders were entered by the same
judge after a full court hearing. Neither order was the product of a stipula-
tion between the parties. Clearly, there is dramatic variation in the orders of
the specific judge involved.
When we look beyond the orders of any particular judge to consider all
the support orders included in the study, there are even more dramatic con-
trasts. A father with a total net income of $250 per month, for example, was
ordered to pay $60 per month for one child (24% of his income). A father
making $840 per month was ordered to pay only $50 per month-SO less
(only 6% of his income-to support his one child).
It is difficult to decide which are the most extreme cases. It could be, at
the top of the percentage spectrum, the case in which a father with net in-
come of $625 was ordered to pay $300, or 48% of his income, to support
three children, or it could be the case in which a father with $450 per month
was ordered to pay $150, or 33.3% of his income, to support only one child.
Possibly, no one of these cases at the top seems extreme, since it would not be
surprising to spend $300 a month to raise three children or $150 a month to
raise only one child. The guidelines suggested approximately $258 per
month for the support of three children from an income of $625 per month
and $77 per month for one child from an income of $450. The $300 per
month order was slightly above the guidelines; the $150 per month order was
nearly twice what the guidelines suggested.
The orders at the low end of the percentage spectrum are harder to
understand. Fathers with $900 and $874 incomes, respectively, were each
ordered to pay $50 per month total to support two children (5.6% and 5.7%,
respectively). Fathers with incomes of $1,342 and $1,053, respectively, were
each ordered to pay $100 per month for one child (7.5% and 9.5% respec-
tively). Fathers with incomes of $840 and $800 were each ordered to pay $50
per month for one child (6% and 6.3% respectively). In contrast, a man with




In an attempt to isolate the determinative factors that cause this varia-
tion, five additional aspects of each case were studied: the particular judge
involved, the presence or absence of a private attorney for the respondent,
the pattern of conduct by the district attorney's office, and the other rela-
tively fixed living expenses of the respondent, and the season of the year in
which the support order was entered.
C. Individual Judges
First, cases were broken down as to the judge who signed each particu-
lar order. Included were only those cases in which some order had been
entered and in which at least the number of children and the father's income
were known.
Table 3 sets forth the orders entered by Judge A;2 1 Table 4 lists the
orders made by Judge B; Table 5 is the record of Judge C; and Table 6
indicates the type of orders made by the other judges who handled cases in
which the minimum data was available. 22 Judges A and B, the judges regu-
larly assigned to domestic relations during most of the time frame included
in the study, handled 43.5% and 40.6% of these cases, respectively. In other
words, these two judges accounted for 84.1% of the cases. Judge C, who had
extensive prior experience in the domestic relations division, accounted for
only 7.2% of the cases. The other 8.7% of the cases were assigned to several
judges, each of whom handled few such cases.
At a glance, it is clear that the range of variation in the orders of Judge
A and Judge B is far greater than the range of variation indicated by the
table for Judge C. This may be explained simply by the fact that more cases
from each of these two judges were available for comparison. As more cases
are studied, the chances of finding particuarly high orders or particularly
low orders would be expected to increase. Perhaps the variation can be ex-
plained simply on that basis.
Another explanation also is possible. It may be that Judge A and Judge
B, assigned full time to domestic relations during the period of the study,
had developed attitudes toward child support cases that were different than
those of their brethren who were assigned to other divisions. Some, albeit
slim, support is found for this theory by closer analysis of Table 6. Of the
five judges included in Table 6, two were new judges just entering into full
time assignment to the Domestic Relations Division. Those two judges, even
during their first few months on the bench, were exposed to more child sup-
port cases than most other judges would see in a full year.23 Thus, although
21. Although the data in the study was collected and analyzed by using the names of the
actual judges involved, it would serve no useful purpose to use the names of the judges in this
article. The article is intended to ascertain how the system itself works without regard to the
personality of any particular individuals involved.
22. Normally, cases were handled by judges other than those assigned to domestic relations
only when the domestic relations docket became so crowded on a particular day that cases were
sent to other judges who had indicated a willingness to help.
23. The study includes few support orders from the new domestic relations judges, F and
H, because of the time frame necessary to gather sufficient data. It was only necessary to in-
clude new support orders entered between Jan. 1, 1977 and Jan. 1, 1978. The contempt citation
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the study itself would not indicate it, Judges F and H really should be
counted as judges assigned full time to domestic relations. If their orders are
removed from Table 6, the range of variation in orders becomes even
smaller: from 25.6% of income to 41.7% of income, from a low order of $125
per month to a high order of $200 per month. Thus, if full time domestic
relations judges are compared with judges from other divisions, 24 it is appar-
ent that there are far more variations in the orders of full time domestic
relations judges than in the orders of other judges. This may be simply a
quirk of the small number of cases examined that were decided by non-do-
mestic relations judges, but it could indicate something more.
Whenever possible, the deputy district attorneys who tried child sup-
port cases would mention to the presiding judge the amount of support
which would be ordered under the guidelines. Clearly, if the guidelines had
been followed, there would be no significant variation in the percentage of
income ordered. It would be roughly 20% for one child and roughly 34% for
two children. The non-domestic relations judges were probably made aware
of the guidelines by the deputy district attorney. They may have felt some-
what bound by the guidelines; or they may have tended to rely rather heav-
ily on the deputy district attorney's presentation in the belief that the deputy
had, in fact, been exposed to far more child support cases;25 or they may
have been less sensitive to the factors which cause individual orders to vary
so widely and to deviate so far from the guidelines.
Domestic relations judges may be less inclined to rely on the experience
of the district attorney, since the judge himself has heard an equal if not
greater number of child support cases. Because of his familiarity with the
field, a domestic relations judge may be less hesitant to strike out on his own
and make an order which seems appropriate to him in a particular case,
regardless of the orders which have been entered in other cases.
If the data for this aspect of the study is valid and not simply a fluke
caused by the small size of the sample, then the results are significant in
considering a separate "Family Court." Presumably, if there is more varia-
tion in orders by judges who are assigned to domestic relations (usually for
one year) than in the orders of other judges, there could be still more varia-
tion in the orders ofjudges who were assigned to a "Family Court" full time,
year after year.26 Another study would be necessary to verify whether, in
fact, there is more variation by judges assigned to domestic relations. Then
the policy issue could be faced as to whether such variation is desirable.
data, however, includes more cases handled by Judges F and H, because it was necessary to
include contempt cases through Sept. 1978.
24. Judges from other divisions include Judge C (Table 5) and Judges D, E, and G (Table
6).
25. Judges who handled few domestic relations cases were more likely to ask for the recom-
mendation of the deputy district attorney, as were judges newly assigned to domestic relations.
After a judge felt more experienced in the area, however, he was less likely to ask or permit the
deputy district attorney to make recommendations. A judge who worked with the same deputy
week after week seemed to develop a need to maintain a separation between the bench and the
District Attorney's Office-which was probably entirely appropriate.
26. If that thesis is true, the results obtained in a special "Family Court" might be even less
predictable than the results now obtained in the domestic relations division.
1979]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Let us return to the records of the individual judges, particularly Judge
A and Judge B. A glance at Tables 3 and 4 shows that for both judges there
is tremendous variation in the percentage of income required to be paid for
child support. It seems impossible to believe, after examining Tables 3 and
4, that the net income of the respondent was the crucial factor in determin-
ing the amount of child support. About the most that can be said is that no
individual order was likely to be less than $50 per month, no matter how
many children were involved. No order in Judge B's courtroom was likely to
be higher than $150 per month, regardless of the number of children in-
cluded in the order. Orders in Judge A's courtroom ranged as high as $300
when three children were involved, but were unlikely to be more than $150
when only two children were included. The average order and the average
percentage of income were both somewhat higher when signed by Judge A
instead of Judge B.
27
Perhaps the explanation for the variation in orders lies behind the data
presented in Tables 3 and 4. Not all of these orders resulted from full trials.
In fact, the majority of them did not. As in any other field of litigation, a
settlement often was reached prior to the court date, so the order entered was
the signed stipulation of the parties.28 Such settlements were designated in
the study as signed stipulations (hereinafter simply called stipulations).
Many other cases were settled in the halls of the courthouse just a few mo-
ments before trial. Such settlements are designated as agreements at court.
Only a minority of cases actually went to trial and were decided by the
judge. When Tables 3 and 4 are revised to eliminate all stipulations and
agreements at court, the results are as indicated in Tables 7 and 8.
Comparing Tables 7 and 8 with Tables 3 and 4, it is immediately obvi-
ous that the range of variation has, in fact, narrowed significantly. What has
actually happened in decisions made by both judges is that the top part of
the range has been eliminated. In fact, though he may have approved orders
as high as 48% or $300, Judge A has never himself made an order higher
than 18.8% or $150. Similarly, although Judge B approved orders as high as
33.3% or $225, he never made an order higher than 26.6% or $125. Thus,
there is less variation among orders actually decided by the judges after a
hearing in court, and the orders made after a hearing are significantly lower
than the full range of orders approved by the same judges.
Several factors may be causes of this result. One of them may be the
presence or absence of an attorney representing the respondent. In addition,
the presence or absence of an attorney may have a significant impact on
other aspects of the case. Let us, therefore, turn to an analysis of the impact
on a child support case of the representation of the father by a private attor-
ney.
27. The average for Judge A was $130.07 per month or 20.5% of income; the average for
Judge B was $94.43 per month or 16.3% of income.
28. Such orders typically arose when the respondent or his attorney contacted the District
Attorney's Office well before the court date and worked out an agreement, which was reduced
to writing; signed by the respondent, his attorney, if any, and the deputy district attorney; and




The absence of attorneys, in the cases represented in Tables 7 and 8 is
striking. In only one of the fifteen cases was the respondent represented by
an attorney. The same general pattern holds true for all child support cases
in this study. Clearly, private attorneys do not normally litigate child sup-
port cases.
29
Both the lay public and lawyers, unfortunately, would expect to find
that lawyers stall the cases. That is indeed the fact. In 35.7% of the cases in
the study in which nothing happened except a continuance to another date,
the respondent was represented by an attorney. This is particularly signifi-
cant considering the fact that private attorneys were involved in only 29% of
the total cases studied. Thus, private attorneys, handling 29% of the cases,
accounted for 35.7% of the total continuances. Many of these continuances
were not the first made in a particular case. On the average, a case which
was newly continued when picked up in the study already had been contin-
ued .75 times before if the respondent was not represented by an attorney. If
the case was handled by an attorney, it had been continued .88 times before.
So, to the surprise of no one, the study confirmed that cases are more likely
to be continued from one trial date to another when the respondent is repre-
sented by an attorney.
Certainly attorneys do more for their clients than postpone court dates.
They also keep the amount of the orders down somewhat, particularly when
orders are analyzed as a percentage of the respondent's income. The average
income of a respondent represented by an attorney was $780.80 per month.
The average income of a respondent not represented by an attorney was
$640.66 per month. 30 In those cases in which a support order was actually
entered, however, the income gap between respondents with an attorney and
respondents without an attorney widened: the average income of a respon-
dent with an attorney was $800.93 per month, while the average income of
an unrepresented respondent was $617.88 per month. 3 1 The average sup-
29. There are probably two basic reasons for this. First, attorneys are more familiar with
the possibility of settlement on the courthouse steps and are better able to catch the attention of
the deputy during the moments before trial. Attorneys, almost in a flock at times, follow the
deputy around during the hour or so before the cases are heard, insisting on being given the
opportunity to negotiate. Although any deputy would be willing to negotiate with a respondent
appearing pro se, the individual respondents usually are not quite so persistent as attorneys.
The second reason attorneys try fewer cases is probably a reflection of their case loads and
their familiarity with the judges and deputies involved. Basically, an attorney usually cannot
afford to litigate a URESA case: his fee simply is not large enough to justify that much court
time. In addition, knowing the judge and D.A. involved, the respondent's attorney is in good
position to make a realistic offer which is likely to be accepted.
30. This figure was obtained by using all 135 cases included in the study, except the one
case in which it was not determined whether the respondent had been represented by an attor-
ney. The average income of respondents represented by attorneys was computed using all cases
in which an attorney was involved. If the same case appeared more than once in the study, the
data for him was used only once.
31. This may indicate that attorneys are relatively successful in accepting only those clients
who will be able to pay, or it may mean that only those respondents who think that they could
pay an attorney seek a lawyer's services. A respondent with a net income of $1,000 per month,
however, chose not to be represented by an attorney, while a respondent with a net income of
$445 per month was represented by an attorney.
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port order for a respondent with an attorney was $116.09 per month (14.5%
of income) while the average order for the unrepresented respondent was
$132.56 per month (21.5% of income). Again, this finding should not sur-
prise either lawyers or laymen, but it should be of concern.
What is somewhat surprising is the number of cases handled by an at-
torney in which data on the respondent's income was not available either in
the court file or the file of the district attorney. In 41% ofthe cases handledby an
attorney, there was no data bi thefiles on the respondent's income. In only 5.2% of the
cases in which the respondent was unrepresented did the files lack income
data.32 Are the experienced child support private attorneys consciously
avoiding having the court or the district attorney know the exact monthly
income of their clients? Does an offer of $100 or $150 per month satisfy a
busy judge or district attorney without regard to what the father might
really be able to pay or the standard of living the child might have enjoyed if
the parents' marriage had not ended?
33
If attorneys basically do not litigate, what do they do in child support
cases, besides stall and keep the amount of the order down? The obvious
answer is that they negotiate settlements, which they seem to do quite effec-
tively. Seventy-six percent of the cases handled by an attorney in which
some order was entered resulted in a negotiated settlement in contrast with
68.6% of such cases not handled by an attorney. Thirty-two percent of the
cases handled by an attorney in which some order was entered resulted from
a signed stipulation, meaning that the parties did not have to appear in
court. 34 By contrast, 59% of the non-attorney cases were settled by signed
stipulation.3 5 The percentages for orders resulting from agreement of the
parties at court show a dramatic reversal. Forty-four percent of the attor-
ney-handled cases in which some order was entered resulted from agree-
ments at court, whereas only 9.8% of the non-attorney cases resulted in such
agreements.
36
Attorneys seem to do relatively well for their clients on these agree-
ments. No respondents who had private attorneys entered into stipulations
in which the support payment exceeded the guidelines. Twelve and one-half
32. Financial affidavits are always sent to the respondent, along with the summons and
subpoena, in hopes that the affidavits will actually be filled out in compliance with the local
court rules and thus expedite matters at trial.
33. An experienced domestic relations attorney probably has a very good idea of what
amount actually may be ordered by a particular judge and what number is likely to seem
acceptable to the particular deputy involved. See note 29 supra.
34. Signed stipulations are used only when there is sufficient time for mailing between the
date on which the agreement is reached and the court date.
35. One factor which is important in this context is that a district attorney virtually never
accepted an oral agreement from a respondent. There was simply no way in which a deputy
could determine whether a man whom he had met once would keep his word. Therefore, as a
matter of policy, all negotiations were reduced to writing and signed by both parties before they
were considered to be agreements.
On the other hand, most attorneys involved in domestic relations work had established a
reputation of credibility with the D.A. If the attorney and the deputy agreed to particular
terms orally, on the day of trial or before, the attorney would not later attempt to change the
terms; consequently, more stipulations were simply read into the record on the court date, thus
appearing in the study as agreements at court.
36. The same factors mentioned in notes 29 and 35 supra were relevant here.
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percent of the stipulations were below the guidelines by less than 10%; 12.5%
were more than 10% below the guidelines. In 62.5% of the cases, the respon-
dents' incomes were unknown. The comparable percentages for unrepre-
sented respondents were 5.6% more than 10% above the guidelines, 13.9%
above the guidelines by less than 10%, 8.3% within 1% of the guidelines,
22.2% less than 10% below the guidelines, 41.7% more than 10% below the
guidelines, and 8.3% with income unknown.
37
The fact that the percentages for represented fathers are so similar in
various categories may result from the fact that too few cases appeared in
this category to make the data valid. Nevertheless, it is significant that the
only time a father signed a stipulation above the guidelines is when he was
not represented by an attorney. Perhaps those fathers who are basically will-
ing to pay substantial child support simply come to the district attorney's
office prepared to commit themselves to a high support order without put-
ting up a fight.
Of all the cases in which agreements were reached at court, 64.5% were
cases in which the respondent had an attorney.38 Of these, none was above
the guidelines, 39 10% were within 1% of the guidelines, 50% were below the
guidelines by less than 10%, and 30% were more than 10% below the guide-
lines. In the remaining 10% of the cases, the respondents' incomes were un-
known. Comparable data for agreements made by unrepresented fathers
indicate 16.7% were more than 10% above the guidelines, no agreements
were within 1% of the guidelines, 16.7% were less than 10% below the guide-
lines, 16.7% were more than 10% below the guidelines, and 33.2% with in-
come data unknown.
Again the percentages clearly show that there is not enough data on
cases settled at court without an attorney to make the results particularly
valuable. As with settlements prior to court, however, only unrepresented
fathers reached agreements for amounts above the guidelines.
In summary, attorneys stalled cases, avoided litigation, frequently failed
to disclose income data, settled 32% of their cases prior to court and 44% at
court, kept the orders somewhat lower than the guidelines, and never allowed
their clients to end up with an order above the guidelines. The presence of an
attorney did, in part, determine how high a support order will be, but the
range in attorney-handled cases was from 6% to 31.6% of a father's net in-
come, with a low of $40 per month for two children and a high of $300 per
month for two children. The presence of an attorney, therefore, does not
explain why particular support orders are entered.
37. The guidelines per se are not controlling, but they do provide a means of comparing
the payments ordered at various income levels.
38. Seventeen cases were settled at court: II by the respondent's attorney and 6 by the
respondent himself.
39. In one of the I I cases, a respondent who reportedly had no income was ordered to pay
$100 per month to support two children. Obviously this amount would be considerably above
the guidelines. The order was probably entered because the parties believed the respondent's
earning capacity was sufficient to enable him to pay $100. Not knowing what that earning
capacity was considered to be, it was felt that inclusion of data from this case would distort the
accuracy of the remaining data.
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E. The D'str'ct Attome
All URESA cases tried in the Denver District Court are handled by the
office of the Denver District Attorney.40 The district attorney is involved in
every case from beginning to end. A respondent who is served with a sum-
mons and subpoena also receives a letter at the time of service suggesting
that he contact the district attorney to discuss possible settlement and advis-
ing him that he may bring a lawyer of his choice with him. 4' In 41.9% of the
cases in which some order was entered, the respondent and the district attor-
ney reached an agreement prior to the court date, which was then reduced to
a signed stipulation to be approved by the court. In the writer's experience,
not once was a signed stipulation disapproved by the judge,42 so the agree-
ment between the district attorney and the respondent became binding.
When respondents were represented by an attorney in negotiating with
the district attorney, neither the signed stipulations nor the agreements at
court were above the guidelines. When respondents are not represented by
an attorney, the orders may exceed the guidelines. The presence of an op-
posing attorney seemed to keep the district attorney somewhat in check.
It is clear, then, that what the district attorney does when an opposing
lawyer is present should be distinguished from what happens when there is
no opposing attorney. The average order for a signed stipulation when an
opposing attorney was present was $105 per month or 13.2% of the respon-
dent's income. When there was no attorney, the average order resulting
from a signed stipulation was $143.31 or 22.9% of respondent's income.
4 3
The range of support amount when the respondent was represented was 6%
to 31.6% or $40 to $300 to support two children. Without an attorney, re-
spondents paid 5.7% to 52.9% of his income; or $50 to $250 to support two
children, or $640 to support five children. The range of variation when
there was a signed stipulation, even when a respondent is represented, is thus
decisively larger than the comparable range of orders entered by regular
child support judges in a contested hearing, whether or not an opposing at-
torney is present (the ranges for Judge A and Judge B were 10.5% to 18.6%
and 5.6% to 26.6%, respectively). The range of variation found in orders
pursuant to a stipulation reached without an opposing attorney present is
larger than any other range found. The district attorney's office, which is
involved with every URESA case in Denver, tolerated more variation in or-
ders reached by agreement than either the judges or the private bar.
The district attorney, on the average, also secured higher orders. The
average order when an agreement was reached entirely by the district attor-
ney and the respondent by signed stipulation was $143.31 per month. If a
private attorney was involved and the case settled by signed stipulation, the
average order was $105.00 per month. If the case was settled at court by a
private attorney, the average order was $96.67. If the case went to trial and
40. See note 3 supra.
41. To date, attorneys have not been appointed in URESA cases.
42. The experience covered approximately three years, including the time period of this
study, but was on a part-time basis, handling only one day of hearings per week.
43. These figures include only the cases in which some order was entered.
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the respondent was represented by an attorney,44 the average order was
$114.00 per month. If the respondent went to trial pro se, the average order
was $100.12 per month. The best bet for a respondent seems to be to have
an attorney negotiate an agreement at court.4 5 His next best option is to go
to trial pro se. His third best alternative is to hire an attorney to negotiate
for him prior to the court date. He should go to trial with an attorney only if
necessary. At all costs, he should avoid negotiating alone with the district
attorney.
Remembering that the people represented by attorneys did in fact have
a higher average income, let us compare percentage of income for the five
possible routes.46 The average percentage of income paid by a father who
reached an agreement directly with the district attorney was 22.9%. If the
father was represented by an attorney in reaching a signed stipulation, the
average order was 8.7% of income. When cases were settled at court by the
respondent's attorney, the average order was 12.3% of income. When pri-
vate attorneys took cases to trial, the average award was 14.5%. If the re-
spondent went to trial pro se, the average award was 17.0%. Here there is a
slight change. If the respondent is primarily concerned with paying as small
a percentage of his income as possible, his best routes, in order, are: negotia-
tion by an attorney prior to court date, negotiation by an attorney at court,
trial with an attorney, trial pro se, and negotiation directly with the district
attorney.
Using either method of analysis, a respondent was in greatest jeopardy
dealing directly with the district attorney. The district attorney seems to
secure the lowest orders in terms of dollars by reaching a settlement at court
with a private attorney and to secure an order for the lowest percentage of
income when he negotiates a signed stipulation with an opposing attorney.
The district attorney clearly did best if he negotiated privately with an un-
represented respondent.
The variation in cases handled entirely by private negotiation between
the district attorney and the respondent is the largest range of variation of
any segment of this study. It would appear that the greater the relative
"power" of the district attorney, the greater the variation which will result
among individual orders; yet the presence of the district attorney alone can-
not fully explain the variation in orders.
This article will now discuss the fifth possible explanation-the impact
of the relatively fixed living expenses of the respondents on the amount of
the order.
44. Keep in mind that, as indicated in note 29 supra, few cases actually go to trial when a
respondent is represented by an attorney.
45. Clearly the success of this strategy depends on the cooperation of the deputy district
attorney. The lawyer must be prepared to go to trial, and the respondent must be prepared to
pay him to do so; but the respondent seems to secure a better result, from his point of view, if
the case is not actually heard and decided by the judge.
46. See notes 30 & 31 supra.
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F. Relatiely Fixed Living Expenses of Respondent
The two most common relatively fixed living expenses are car payments
and housing payments. Both are somewhat flexible in amount, but most
people are in fact making some regular monthly payments for both a car and
housing. As in other areas of this study, not all the relevant data was avail-
able for every case. In many cases, neither the court file nor the district
attorney's file included data on either car or housing payments. In 48.8% of
the cases in which some support order was entered, data was available on
either car or housing payments or both.
In those cases in which both car and housing payments were known, the
average combined payment was $332.45 per month. In those same cases, the
average support order was $130.48 per month, 39.2% of the total combined
average car and housing payments. The support order was equal to 20.5% of
the respondent's average monthly income of $638.04, while his car and hous-
ing payments represented 52.1% of his monthly income. The average order
was for the support of 1.6 children.
47
Since car payments may be less fixed than housing payments in that it is
possible to do without a car, it may be of interest to compare car payments
with child support payments. The average car payment was $136.97 per
month. The average support payment of the same fathers was $113.59 per
month. In only 33.3% of the cases was a father ordered to pay more to sup-
port his child or children than he paid for his car. In general, such orders
resulted from agreements at court. In only one out of five cases at trial did
the judge enter a child support order higher than the car payment.
Again, individual cases were quite interesting. One man, paying $250
per month for his car, was ordered to pay $80 per month for the support of
his child. Another man, paying $211 per month for his car, was ordered to
pay $100 per month for the support of his two children from a net income of
$1,000 per month. Both orders were entered as a result of signed stipula-
tions.
It seems clear that support orders will generally be lower than car pay-
ments. The range of variation of support orders as a percentage of car pay-
ments is from 6% to 319.1%. The comparable range of variation between
support orders as a percentage of combined car and housing payments is
13.8% to 68.2%. Clearly, support orders were more closely correlated with
combined car and housing payments than with car payments alone. How-
ever, the variation is so great that the relatively fixed living expenses of re-
spondents do not adequately explain the variation in orders.
G. The Season
Most practicing attorneys are aware that relatively little gets done in
court--or elsewhere--during the latter part of December. Everyone is sim-
47. This number is based only on data from those cases in which both the car and housing
payments were known. The fact that it correlates so well with the average number of children
in all the cases involved indicates that the cases in which car and housing payments are known
are probably representative of all the cases.
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ply too interested in getting ready for the holidays. There appear to be
other, generally unperceived, effects of season on legal proceedings.
Table 9 illustrates the breakdown of support orders by month. The per-
centage of income ordered for support is strikingly lower during November
and December than during the other months. This could be because fathers'
expenses tend to be particularly heavy during those months, and both the
court and the district attorney may tend to accept lower orders in November
and December, despite the fact that the order will be applicable for the en-
tire year.
48
Another interesting factor which emerges from Table 9 is the decided
decrease in activity during July. Perhaps the combined effects of judge, dis-
trict attorney, and private attorney vacations during the summer have more
impact on case activity than the recognized December holiday period.
Since all the data collected in this study pertains only to one calendar
year, it is impossible from this study alone to make a valid analysis of sea-
sonal patterns. Certain patterns seem to emerge from the data. Further
studies are necessary to determine the validity of these apparent patterns.
H. Conclusions on Establishment of Support Orders
It is clear that whether the order is entered by stipulation, by agreement
at court, or by the judge, there is wide variation among the percentages of
income being paid by the respondents. The greatest variation is found in
stipulations reached between the district attorney and respondents not repre-
sented by an attorney. The least variation is found in orders entered by
judges not usually assigned to domestic relations.
The highest orders tend to be entered either when the respondent bar-
gains alone with the district attorney or when a non-domestic relations judge
decides the case. When a respondent is represented by an attorney, his order
tends to be lower-as long as the case does not actually go to trial.
Two-thirds of the fathers are ordered to pay less to support their chil-
dren than they do for their cars.
There may be some seasonal variation in orders, with orders entered in
November and December being substantially lower than orders entered dur-
ing the rest of the year and generally less activity on the cases in July.
No one of the six factors analyzed in this study really explains why one
father with an income of $900 monthly pays $50 per month to support two
children while another father, who has a $450 monthly income, pays $60 per
month to support two children.
When all the cases are considered together without regard to any of the
six possible distinguishing factors, only 2.4% of the orders were for less than
$50 per month, and only 5.9% of the orders were for more than $250 per
month. Eleven and nine-tenth's percent of the orders were for $50; 10.7% of
48. Living expenses are higher in November and December because of heating bills, but
the financial crunch felt by many people prior to'the holiday season may well be an additional
factor.
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the orders for $75; 15.5% for $100; 16.7% for $150. In sum, 54.8% of the
orders were for one of these nice round figures.
The study, though indicating the relative amount of variation found in
various aspects of the process by which a support order is established, did not
isolate what objective factors, if any, actuallly caused the amount of a partic-
ular order to be set at a particular number. It was the impression of this
author, while working on child support cases for the district attorney, that
the objective factors were not the most significant factors in the establish-
ment of child support orders. Rather, the particular attitudes of judges, dis-
trict attorneys, and private attorneys toward each other and toward the
individual respondent seemed to be most decisive.
Would it not be far more just to a father for his child support order to
be determined primarily in accordance with objective standards? Is not the
major difference between respondents really the net income that each has?
How can reliance on personality factors be justified, particularly when the
beneficiaries of the child support orders, the children, are never before the
court?49 Presumably, if the judges, district attorneys, and private lawyers
involved with child support cases met the mothers and children who initi-
ated the support proceedings in other states, they would be affected, favora-
bly or unfavorably, by the personality or particular financial circumstances
of the petitioners. Is it fair to permit subjective factors to be determinative
when only one party is before the court? Would it not be far more just to
establish objective guidelines for establishment of child support orders, at
least in URESA cases?
II. FAMILY AND WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF SUPPORT ORDERS
In 48.8% of the cases, the URESA order was for the benefit of only one
child. In 36%, the URESA order was for two children. Thus, in only 15.2%
of the URESA cases was there an order for the benefit of more than two
children. However, 19.2% of the respondents also had children in a second
family to support. Forty-five and eight-tenths percent of the second families
contained only one child; 37.5% of the second families contained two chil-
dren; and 16.7% of the second families contained more than two children.
The average number of children included in a URESA order was 1.7. The
average total number of children supported by a URESA respondent was
2.1. Thus, fathers subject to URESA orders did not seem to have signifi-
cantly more children than parents generally.
The average age of the oldest child in a URESA family was 10.2; so
URESA does not seem to be used primarily for the benefit of children of
short marriages.50 The age of children named on URESA petitions ranged
49. The petitioner and the children are represented before the court only by a deputy
district attorney, who in nearly all cases has never seen, or been in personal contact with, the
people he represents. See note 3 supra.
50. The marriages may have been stormy, or they may have been short; however, in most
cases a URESA petition is filed within a year or two after dissolution of the marriage. It should
be noted, moreover, that there is no requirement that the respondent have ever been married.
The only issue is whether the respondent is the father of the children and, therefore, owes them
a duty of support.
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from one to eighteen.5 '
Most children for whom URESA cases are brought are receiving wel-
fare. Of the total number of cases included in the study, 60.2% of the chil-
dren were receiving welfare; 39.8% were not. Although URESA is available
to both welfare and non-welfare recipients, welfare departments tend to file
more URESA cases and to persist in prosecuting them.
52
In those cases in which a support order was entered and the amount of
welfare was known, 76% of the support orders were for less than the amount
of welfare. In 16% of the cases, the support ordered was enough to get the
children off welfare. In 8% of the cases the support order was exactly the
same as the amount of welfare being paid. Thus, in 76% of the cases, the
children remained on welfare after the order was entered.
The fathers of welfare recipients were neither outstandlingly rich nor
extremely poor. On the average, they had a net income of $594.75 per
month; a net income, after taxes, social security, union dues, etc., of $7,137
per year.
Of course, some respondents had a higher income. One man with net
income of $874 per month ($10,488 per year after taxes) was ordered to pay
$50 per month ($600 per year) to support two children. The taxpayers in
the state of the children's residence were contributing $258 per month
($3,096 per year) for the support of the two children.
At the other end of the spectrum was a father with a net income of $450
per month ($5,400 per year) who was ordered to pay $150 per month ($1,800
per year) to support one child. The taxpayers were paying almost an equal
amount ($1,872 per year) for the support of his child. If the man with net
annual income of $5,400 actually makes the support payments ordered, his
child will probably be off welfare. The children of the man with the net
income of $10,488 per year probably will continue to be supported primarily
by the taxpayers.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ORDERS
How well are payments really made under support orders? Do men
with low orders and high incomes tend to be more dependable in making
51. An occasional petition came through for the benefit of a child not yet born. In addi-
tion, some questions arose as to whether a respondent was liable for support of a child 18 or over
who would have been considered emancipated under the laws of his home state. It was the
position of the Denver District Attorney's Office that the state law of the responding jurisdiction
was to be applied in such situations, and that Colorado law requires a parent to pay support for
his child until the child reaches 21 or is otherwise emancipated. See Cowo. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4-
401, 14-5-105 (1973); accord, Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 585 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1978); In re
Marriage of Weaver, 571 P.2d 307 (Colo. App. 1977).
In re Marriage of Fetters, 584 P.2d 104 (Colo. App. 1978) provides an interesting case in
which respondent's daughter was held to be temporarily emancipated during her voidable mar-
riage. When the marriage was annulled, the respondent was obligated to resume child support
payments.
52. In many cases, it takes three months or more for a URESA case to reach its first court
hearing after the initial petition is filed. There may then be repeated delays which may become




payments? Is the size of the original order a factor in enforcement? Are the
ages of the children or the fathers' incomes factors? What methods of en-
forcement, if any, seem to be most effective?
An attempt will be made to answer these questions. First, a caveat is in
order. The enforcement part of this study includes only problem cases, those
in which the father did not pay as ordered. The primary means of enforce-
ment in such a case is to cite the father for contempt of court for failure to
obey the court order. After a court hearing, the father may be found in
contempt of court and ordered to pay a fine or serve a jail sentence.
53
The factors relevant in determining whether a man is in contempt of
court are numerous. Many of them are also difficult to quantify. For exam-
ple, when a support order is established, the income of the father and the
number of children to be supported are almost always easily ascertainable
and appear as part of the court records. In a contempt case, however, many
of the significant factors will not appear in the record.
A father's attitude toward payment of support is crucial in a hearing on
a contempt citation.54 The willfullness of a failure to pay is usually ascer-
tained in large part by the demeanor and attitude of a respondent in court.
It might be clear to everyone in the courtroom that a father had no intention
of paying child support under any circumstances, but there would almost
never be a specific finding of that mental attitude in the order of the court.
The mental attitude of the respondent, which plays a very large role in con-
tempt citation cases, has not been included in this study.
Another important factor which has been omitted from the study of
contempt citations is the background financial situation of the respondent.
While, the current income of the respondent frequently was available,55 and
some attempt was made to determine whether the respondent's employment
had been relatively steady, 56 actual periods of unemployment, unexpectedly
large medical bills, and unusual financial crises of other kinds did not appear
in the court records. Therefore, such matters, recognized as highly signifi-
cant on a contempt citation, have not been included in this study.
It is in the field of contempt citations that the individual wisdom and
discretion of the judge are most important. It should be recognized that a
53. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-5-127 (1973).
54. See Marshall v. Marshall, 35 Colo. App. 442, 445-46, 551 P.2d 709, 710 (1976). In
order to find a father guilty of contempt of court, the court must find that he knew of his
obligation to pay support under the court order, and that he had an ability to pay all or part of
support ordered. Therefore, a man who is unemployed or who simply did not have the financial
ability to pay support would not normally be held in contempt of court. The only cases in
which an unemployed person might be held in contempt of court are those in which the court
finds that the unemployment itself is willful.
55. The availability of this information depended in large part on the willingness of the
respondent to fill out the financial affidavit forms which were supplied to him prior to the court
hearing. In addition, at the hearing itself, the deputy district attorney would undoubtedly ask
the necessary questions to ascertain the current income of the respondent as part of the crucial
proof necessary to find the respondent in contempt.
56. In some files a pattern of intermittent employment was clear. Frequently, the files of
construction workers or day laborers hired on a temporary basis would show a pattern of such
employment. In many cases, however, it simply could not be ascertained conclusively whether a
father's employment had been steady.
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judge is usually in the position of enforcing an order made by another judge.
Since new judges rotate into the Domestic Relations Division of Denver Dis-
trict Court each year, it is unusual for a judge to be asked to enforce one of
his own orders.5 7 If a judge personally believes that an order for one child
should be approximately 20% of the father's income, he may have difficulty
enforcing an order for 48% of income. Furthermore, a judge has no author-
ity to change the amount of a child support order as part of a hearing on a
contempt citation.
58
Recognizing the problems inherent in a study of contempt citations, let
us return to the initial questions posed at the beginning of this section: Do
men with lower orders pay better? Is the age of the children a significant
factor? What sort of enforcement seems to work best?
A. Size of the Original Order
When a case comes before the court on a contempt citation, it means
that something is wrong. Either the order was too high to begin with, the
respondent has had unexpected financial difficulties, or the respondent sim-
ply does not intend to comply in full with the order. The unexpected
financial difficulties of the respondent and his personal attitude do not ap-
pear in the court records; therefore, these factors are not part of this study.
The size of the order, however, is readily available for consideration.
Rather striking results were obtained when the cases included in this
study were analyzed on a purely financial basis. First, it was determined
what percentage of a man's income he was ordered to pay for child support,
based on his income at the time the order was entered. Then this data was
further broken down as to what percentage of income on the average was
ordered for the support of one, two, or more children. The percentages were
12.1% for one child, 19.0% for two children, 27.1% for three children, 25.6%
for four children, 33.4% for five children, and 30.6% for six children. This
compares with 1977-78 orders which averaged 14.5% for one child and 18.6%
for two children. In the study of 1977-78 support orders, there were not
enough families with more than two children to make the data for larger
families significant.
The fact that the average percentage of income represented by orders
for one child in 1977-78, 14.5%, is larger than the average for the contempt
cases, 12.1%, may indicate either of two things. First, it may indicate that
cases do not become problems requiring enforcement through contempt cita-
tions merely because the orders are too high. The majority of support orders
do not require constant enforcement. 59 Furthermore, the average order
57. Of the 133 cases included on Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16, in only 12 instances was the
enforcement action taken within one year of entry of the original order.
58. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 107(c)-(d) indicates the extent of the hearing to be held on a con-
tempt citation. Modification is an entirely separate issue.
59. For the calendar year 1977, 574 new cases were brought before the Denver District
Court on petitions for a support order, and only 266 contempt citations were brought before the
court. Since contempt citations may be brought in any case in which a support order previously
has been entered, it seems clear that in most cases the respondent is not brought before the court
after the initial support order has been entered.
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seems to be as high or higher than the orders requiring enforcement. Sec-
ond, the comparison could indicate that enforcement is particularly difficult
for the 1977-78 orders, the time frame of the study, or that any order near or
above 12.1% is hard to enforce. It seems unlikely, however, that the orders of
1977-78, on the average, were substantially higher than orders for any other
year.
60
When the percentages of income ordered for the support of two children
in the 1977-78 cases (18.6%) and the contempt citation cases (19.0%) are
compared, there does not seem to be a significant difference. Evidently, or-
ders in this range have at least their share of problems in enforcement.
There was, of course, a variation in the number of orders which fell into
any particular percentile group. Fifteen and one-tenth percent of the orders
were for less than 11% of the respondent's income at the time the order was
made. Forty-one and five-tenths percent of the orders were for amounts be-
tween 11% and 20% of the father's current income. Twenty-six and four-
tenths percent of the orders were between 21% and 30%. Thirteen and two-
tenths percent of the orders were between 31% and 40%. Only 2.8% of the
orders were between 41% and 50%. The highest single order, in terms of
percentages, was for 50%, ordering a salesman to pay $250 per month for the
support of his two children from a commission averaging $500 per month.
The original support order was less than a year old when the case came to
court on a citation. At that time it was continued by agreement of the re-
spondent's attorney and the district attorney to allow time for the respon-
dent to make payments on $1,250 in arrears.
The over all average percentage of order to income on cases brought
before the court on contempt citations was 20.5% ($117.94).6' The income
of respondents seems to be higher at the time of the citation than it had been
at the time of the original order. The average monthly income of respon-
dents at the time of entry of the orders was $593.27. At the time the orders
were before the court for enforcement, the average income of the respon-
dents had increased to $763.73 per month-an increase of 28.8% during a
time when the amount of the orders stayed fixed.
What sort of jobs do respondents in child support cases hold? Are they
all relatively low income people with seriously fluctuating income? The an-
swer appears to be that people from a large spectrum of employment have
problems paying child support. The respondents included an engineer, a
mortgage banker, a contract administrator for an aircraft company, police
officers, truck drivers, retired military men, an entertainer, a deputy sheriff, a
United States Air Force sergeant, clerks, janitors, typists, gas station attend-
ants, bartenders, butchers, shoe salesmen, carpenters, painters, welders, shop
foremen, bakers, and many others. In fact, from the wealth of occupations,
60. The author's experience did not indicate any such variation in the orders for the time
period included in this study. In addition, the fact that the guidelines have remained un-
changed for such a long time is some indication that there probably has not been any dramatic
shift in the amount of support ordered by the Denver District Court.
61. This percentage is below the maximum ordered in any of the situations analyzed, but
it does approach the upper limit of the orders entered by experienced domestic relations judges
after trial at court.
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it was difficult to come up with any particularly appropriate categories.
62
The following categories were chosen, however, to illustrate the variety of
occupations. Seven percent of the respondents were white collar workers.
Missionaries, truck drivers, and retired military persons each accounted for
1.4% of the respondents. Professional persons and supervisory personnel
each made up 2.7% of the sample. The self-employed were 4.1%. Salesmen,
skilled workers, and the unemployed each constituted 4.8% of the group.
Next came unskilled workers with 6.1% and government workers with 6.8%.
Finally, 17.6% of the sample were employed with the particular job un-
known, and the employment situation of 40.7% of the respondents was un-
known. Perhaps, in a larger study, particular employment patterns might
emerge, but in this study the large variety of occupations seemed to be the
significant finding.
It would not appear, then, that people with certain kinds of jobs have
significantly more difficulty in paying child support than others. One thing
that does seem to distinguish respondents in contempt citations from other
people under child support orders, however, is the size of their families.
B. Famil Considerations
The average respondent in a new support order was ordered to pay sup-
port for 1.7 children. 63 That same father, on the average, was supporting .4
children in a second family, for a total of 2.164 children. In the problem
support cases brought to court on citations, the average respondent was sup-
porting 3.4 children, 2.2 in his first family, for whom the support order was
made and 1.2 in his second family. The average size of a respondent's sec-
ond family in a contempt citation case was therefore approximately three
times as large as the average second family for the respondents on new sup-
port orders, 1.2 compared with .4 children.
The difference is even more striking considering that almost none of the
families for whom a new support order was entered contained more than two
children. By contrast, in those cases which were brought before the court on
a citation, 38.1% of the original families had one child; 25.9% had two chil-
dren; 21.1% had three children; 7.5% had four children; 5.4% had five chil-
dren; and 2.0% had six children. The range for children in the respondent's
second family was comparable. 65 The respondents who seemed to have
62. Ruth Bennett and Mona Goodwin, law student assistants who collected the data for
this study, simply wrote down the best description of the respondents' employment which could
be obtained from the file of the district attorney; e.g., cab driver, janitor, stock clerk, salesman.
Robert Truhlar, law student assistant who coordinated all the data collected, chose 14 represen-
tative categories and determined in which category each particular occupation should be
placed. The categories selected were employed, job unknown; government worker; missionary;
professional; retired military; salesman; self-employed; skilled; supervisory; truck driver; unem-
ployed; unknown; unskilled. In a larger study, these categories might be further refined to
plumbers, electricians, janitors, etc. However, in this study the number of cases involved was
simply too small to justify more specific categories.
63. See Farmil and W/are Consequences of Support Orders, Part II of the text supra.
64. d.
65. Although 47.2% of the second families had no children, 9.4% had one child, 28.3% had
two children, 5.8% had three children, 1.9% had four children, 5.8% had five children, and one
family (1.9%) was reported to have nine children.
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more trouble paying child support also seemed to be the fathers who had
larger families. No guess will be hazarded as to which is cause and which is
effect.
The children of a respondent cited for contempt seemed to be somewhat
older than the children involved in a new support order.66 The average
youngest child of a respondent cited for contempt was 10.5 years old; the
average oldest child was 13.1 years old.6 7 Since the average time between
entry of a support order and a citation for contempt was 2.9 years, the age of
the children seems to indicate nothing more than the passage of time be-
tween the entry of the order and enforcement.
It is interesting to note how old some of the children were. In the cases
in which there had been two or more contempt citations, the average age of
the youngest child is 12.8 years; and, in 37.9% of those cases, the youngest
child is 16 years of age or older, as indicated by Table 10. It appears that as
children near the age of emancipation their mothers realize that chances of
collecting past due child support will be even slimmer after the children
leave home. In fact, the debt of past due child support continues after the
children become emancipated, 6 8 and it is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
69
Mothers, probably correctly, seem to think that courts will not be overly
enthusiastic about enforcing child support orders after the children are
grown. 70
The data in this study, in contrast to the data in other studies,7 I does
not indicate that men pay less well as their children get older. Although that
may be the case, there simply was not a significant gap between the average
age of the youngest child in the new support cases and the average age of the
youngest child in citation cases.
C. Methods of Enforcement
Probably all judges and all attorneys involved with child support cases,
not to mention the parties, would like to know what methods of enforcement
work best. David Chambers has suggested that a self-starting enforcement
procedure and a high jailing rate are the most effective combination.
72 Den-
66. See Family and Welfare Consequences of Support Orders, Part II of the text supra, indicating
that the average age of the oldest child on a new support order is 10.2 years.
67. These numbers were obtained by using the data from all citation cases, including
duplicates.
68. See Beardshear v. Beardshear, 143 Colo. 293, 352 P.2d 969 (1960) in which the Colo-
rado Supreme Court stated that "mature installments in a divorce decree are final judgements."
143 Colo. at 296, 352 P.2d at 970. Moreover, "the payments in question are, under our practice,
considered final and not modifiable." 143 Colo. at 297, 352 P.2d at 971.
69. it U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976) provides that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all of his provable debts. . . except such as. . . (7) are. . . for maintenance or
support of-wife or child." See, e.g., Hylek v. Hylek, 148 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1945).
70. In court hearings, when a judge becomes aware that the children of the respondent are
now emancipated and supporting themselves, his order for repayment of the arrears is likely to
be set at an extremely low level.
71. Se, e.g., Conti, ChildSupport: Htzr, Her, or Their Responsibility? 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 707
(1976).
72. U-M Researcher Studies Child Support System, 22 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES I (Winter 1978)





The Denver District Attorney's Office, which initiates the issuance of all
contempt citations in Denver URESA cases, has no method of checking on a
routine basis to determine whether a respondent is paying. 73 The only time
a citation is issued is when the intended recipient of child support complains
to the district attorney. When such a complaint is made, the pay record of
the respondent is called up on the computer, and a citation is prepared if the
respondent is significantly behind. Usually, a respondent will need to be at
least two months behind before the court mechanism will be geared up for a
citation. Occasionally, when a citation does not seem necessary, one of the
deputy district attorneys in the child support division will send a letter to the
respondent or call the respondent's attorney. As a general rule, no action is
taken until the situation seems to be serious enough to warrant a citation. If
the intended recipient of child support does not complain, the father can
stop paying entirely, and nothing will happen.
The second effective factor in enforcement, a high jailing rate, also is
lacking in Denver. In the 152 contempt citation cases studied, only one re-
spondent was sent to jail for failure to pay child support. Clearly, Denver
does not have a high jailing rate. Occasionally, however, a respondent in
Denver is threatened seriously with jail. In six cases, 3.9% of the total, a
respondent was sentenced to jail. The sentences were then suspended on the
condition that the respondents begin to make payments.
No particular judge in Denver seems to be more reluctant to send a
father to jail for failure to pay child support than any other judge. In fact,
Table 11 indicates that there is really only one judge in Denver who will
consider such a tactic, at least among the ten judges Who handled some con-
tempt citations during the period of the study. Only 4.6% of the respondents
were seriously threatened with jail, which does not constitute a high rate. A
man appearing before the Denver District Court on a citation, in fact, has an
extremely small chance of going to jail.
The enforcement method most commonly used in Denver seems to be
repeated issuance of citations. On the average in the survey cases, .96 prior
citations had been issued. Fifty-two and six-tenths percent of the respon-
dents had received no prior citations, 25.8% had received one prior citation,
and 21.6% had received two or more citations. Some respondents had re-
ceived as many as seven prior citations, but in most instances the record was
not nearly that bad.
This does not mean that the respondents were particularly good about
paying, though the record is certainly not as bad as it might be. The average
respondent, when cited for contempt, appeared to be $1,760.90 behind in his
payments, based only on the amount owed under the Denver support or-
der.
7 4
Within the ten days before their court appearances, 26.8% of the re-
73. Additional staff simply does not seem to be available to add this task to the tasks al-
ready undertaken by the existing child support staff.
74. Additional arrearages may be owed in other states and are frequently alleged on a
petition for support when the action is initiated in the Colorado courts. Because proof is not
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spondents made some payment. Checks for .8% of such payments bounced.
With the exception of the occasional check that bounced, at least some
money seemed to be collected simply as a result of initiating court action. A
few respondents paid the accrued arrears entirely before the court date.
75
Whether the cost of this form of collection is appropriate is an issue that is
beyond the scope of this article.
Table 12 indicates the type of case in which a payment typically was
made within ten days before the court hearing. The success of such a tactic
seems unquestionable: in 44.1% of the cases in which a respondent made a
payment ten days before the hearing, the contempt citation was then dis-
missed, despite the average continuing arrears of $1,282.14 in those cases.
Private attorneys seem to be aware of the efficacy of this practice, since
33.3% of such payments were made by fathers represented by attorneys, even
though private attorneys handled only 22.7% of the total cases included on
Table 12.
One effective means of enforcement, then, seems to be the mere issuing
of a contempt citation and setting it for hearing. Perhaps if a procedure
could be developed in the district attorney's office to check payments and
initiate contempt citations on a regular basis, this means of enforcement
could be even more effective. A man might be more inclined to make
prompt support payments if he were aware that after missing payments for
three consecutive months he would be cited for contempt of court. At least,
based on this study, 26.8% of the respondents would make some payment
within ten days of the date the case was set to go to court. 76 Such a system
seems to have worked effectively in Michigan.
77
There are some distinct advantages to a self-starting, automatic system
and some crucial disadvantages. The chief advantages, in addition to secur-
ing more frequent payments, are that the court would appear to be serious
about its orders,78 and that the burden would no longer be placed on the
individual petitioner to request enforcement by the district attorney's office.
There is a definite problem when enforcement depends on the individ-
ual request of the person for whose benefit the order is made.79 Enforcement
then becomes just another negotiating tool between two people who gener-
ally are not getting along very well anyway. A mother may threaten to have
a contempt citation issued if a father insists on exercising his rights to visit
his children, although the law clearly provides that visitation and child sup-
port payments must be treated as separate issues.80 Occasionally a mother
who wants her second husband to adopt the children of her first marriage
apparently will use the threat of a contempt citation as a way to force the
readily available on arrearages alleged in other jurisdictions, this study made no attempt to
ascertain how much money may be owed under court orders in other jurisdictions.
75. See Tables 12 through 16.
76. Id.
77. See -M Researcher Studies Child Support Systzm, supra note 72, at 1.
78. The effect of this tactic may be lessened when a respondent is repeatedly cited for
contempt and discovers that he is in no real danger of being sent to jail.
79. Enforcement may be requested either by an individual petitioner or by a welfare de-
partment making payments for the children.
80. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972).
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natural father to give his consent to the adoption. 8 A man suddenly faced
with court proceedings to collect a large arrears of child support payments
who may think that he is in danger of going to jail may be more receptive to
the idea of signing the requested consent for adoption forms. If the power to
determine when a contempt citation would be brought did not rest in the
mother's hands, improper conduct of this kind would be avoided.
Routine, steady enforcement of support orders has worked in Michi-
gan.8 2 However, there are several problems with routine, steady enforce-
ment for Denver. The first, most decisive problem is that neither the district
attorney nor the district court has the staff for such enforcement. Like exten-
sive plea bargaining, rather sporadic enforcement for support orders does, at
least, keep many of the cases out of court. Presumably no child goes hungry
because his father does not pay the court-ordered support. Rather, the child
relies more heavily on welfare or a higher percentage of his support comes
from his mother or stepfather.83 Either result probably is less expensive to
society as a whole than a high, consistent rate of court enforcement of child
support orders.
If the choice is between a rather high, steady rate of court enforcement
and a much lower, more sporadic rate of court enforcement, it is clear that a
high rate of court enforcement would be more effective, but a low rate of
enforcement may actually be less expensive to society.
Other means of enforcement are available. In many cases, the order
may be made almost self-enforcing. This is done by the simple technique of
requiring the respondent to execute an assignment of wages. 84 By an assign-
ment of wages, the respondent requests and the court orders that the respon-
dent's employer withhold from each of respondent's paychecks an amount
sufficient to meet his child support obligation for the applicable period. The
employer then sends the money directly to the clerk of the Denver District
Court, who forwards it to the initiating court. The payment is then for-
warded by the initiating court to the petitioner, or the welfare department,
as appropriate. 85
Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 indicate the frequency with which various
district court judges have ordered assignments. Judge A ordered assign-
81. Only a few instances of this tactic came to the attention of the author while engaged in
child support work with the district attorney. The fact that the tactic is ever effective should be
of grave concern.
82. See U-M Researcher Studies Child Support Sstem, supra note 72, at I.
83. In many cases, it seems clear that the second husband of the mother is in fact support-
ing the children in his household. Perhaps society should simply recognize that this will be the
result. It does seem, however, to put additional pressure on the mother to remarry.
84. In most cases, an assignment resulted from bargaining between the district attorney
and the respondent. If the respondent agreed to execute an assignment of wages, then the
district attorney normally would agree to move to have the contempt citation dismissed or at
least to have the citation continued for a period of four to six months to ascertain whether the
assignment was effective. In some cases, the judge also would indicate that the citation would
be dismissed if an assignment were signed. In one case, the judge indicated that the respondent
must either sign an assignment of wages or go to jail. To the surprise of everyone, including
counsel for the respondent, the respondent indicated that he would prefer to go to jail. The
final resolution of the case was that the citation was simply continued with an admonition to the
respondent to make his payments as ordered. In fact, the respondent made such payments.
85. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-5-129 (1973).
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ments in 11.3% of the cases. Judge B ordered assignments in 11.1% of his
cases. Assignments were never ordered by Judge C. Judge F ordered assign-
ments in 9.1% of his cases. Thus the rate for all four judges is relatively low.
There may be a seasonal pattern in the ordering of assignments. Ap-
proximately 64% of the assignments were made during the relatively cold
months of October, November, December, and February. Why assignments
as a means of enforcement may be more attractive to judges in these months
is not indicated by the study.
In 64.3% of the cases in which an assignment of wages was ordered, the
contempt citation was dismissed at the same time, which meant that the
court was no longer involved with that particular citation. In 42.9% of the
cases in which an assignment was not ordered, however, the case was contin-
ued to another date, requiring at least one more day of court involvement.
It is clear from an examination of the average arrears remaining for the non-
assignment cases in which the citation was continued ($2,143.69) that the
underlying problem really had not been resolved.
Judge A seemed to order assignments for fathers with relatively low in-
comes ($576.71 average) who had not been to court often before (average
number of prior citations .43). Judge B tended to order assignments for re-
spondents with higher incomes ($851 average) who had had slightly more
than the average number of prior citations (.83). The data thus may indi-
cate an underlying difference in the philosophies of the two judges. Which
philosophy is more effective for enforcement purposes simply requires more
data.
The answer to the question of why assignments were not used more
often is difficult to ascertain. Sometimes skilled workers were ordered to exe-
cute assignments; sometimes they were not. Unfortunately, the data simply
does not seem to indicate any pattern. In fact, the individual's particular
employment history-his number of years at the same job-was normally a
significant factor in determining whether or not an assignment would be
ordered. Such data, unfortunately, was generally not included in the files
and thus not available for this study.
Although assignments would seem to be a highly effective, low cost
means of enforcement, they simply will not work for the self-employed, un-
employed, or those who change jobs frequently.
Probably the only other alternative means of enforcement is incarcera-
tion. How effective does this seem to be in Denver? First, the answer is
extremely hard to determine, because so few people (4.6%) were ever even
sentenced to jail during the period studied. When the tool was used, how-
ever, it probably was not effective. Using Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16, we note
that 14.2% of the respondents from whom data was available had been sen-
tenced to jail previously. Of those who had previously been ordered to serve
time in jail, 71.4% had actually served some time, yet they appeared again
before the court on contempt citations. Evidently these fathers simply would
not pay child support, and being sentenced to jail, or actually serving some
time, did not shake their resolve. If only 4.6% of the respondents on a con-
tempt citation are given jail sentences, and yet 14.2% of the same group of
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respondents have been sentenced to jail before, jailing does not seem to con-
stitute a particularly effective tool for enforcement in Denver.
What, then, seems to be the keys for enforcement? The size of the order
relative to income does not seem to matter. The age of the children involved
is not significant. The number of children involved is important. It is pre-
dictable that men with larger families will have more problems paying child
support and will appear more often before the court on contempt citations.
Jail is hardly ever used in Denver and, when used, does not seem to be par-
ticularly effective. Assignments seem to be both effective and economical for
society, but they are not appropriate in all cases and are, in fact, ordered in
only approximately 11% of the cases. A significant number of payments
seem to be secured simply by issuing a contempt citation and setting it for
hearing, but that may be a relatively expensive means of enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the very high percentage of children in the United States
who do not live with both their natural parents, child support is of potential
major significance to society; yet there seem to be serious problems with both
the establishment and enforcement of support orders. The orders which are
established do not seem to be consistent. No one of the six objective factors
analyzed in the study of establishment orders really explains why one father
pays $50 per month to support two children from a net monthly income of
$900 while another father pays $60 per month to support two children from
a net monthly income of $450. Too often the amount of the order seems to
be determined primarily by the interaction of the judge, district attorney,
private attorney, and respondent involved, with the personalities and moods
of each of these individuals dictating the result.
The ability of the father to pay, based on his net monthly income, is not
the determinative factor, even though the law indicates that the ability of
the father to pay and the needs of the children should be the oni issues in a
URESA case.8 6 Whether the order is entered by stipulation, by agreement
at court, or by the judge, there is wide variation among the percentages of
income paid by the respondents. 8 7 The greatest variation is found in stipula-
tions reached between the district attorney and respondents not represented
by an attorney. The least variation is found on orders entered by judges not
usually assigned to domestic relations.
The highest support orders tend to be entered either when the respon-
dent bargains alone with the district attorney or when a non-domestic rela-
tions judge decides the case. When a respondent is represented by an
attorney, his order tends to be lower, as long as the case does not actually go
to trial.
86. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972).
87. The range in the amount of the order as a percentage of the respondent's income is as
follows: 5.7%-52.9% in stipulations between the district attorney and unrepresented respon-
dents, 6%-31.6% when respondent is represented by an attorney, 5.6%-26.6% in orders entered at




The relatively fixed living expenses of the respondent do not adequately
explain the variation in orders. Support orders as a percentage of car and
housing payments vary widely. It is interesting to note, however, that two-
thirds of the fathers for whom data was available were ordered to pay less to
support their children than their car payments.
Some variation in orders may be attributable to seasonal factors, with
orders entered in November and December being substantially lower than
orders entered during the rest of the year.
When all the cases are considered together without regard to any of the
six possible distinguishing factors, only 2.4% of the support orders were less
than $50 per month, and only 5.9% were more than $250 per month. The
majority of the new support orders (54.8%) were for even figures: 11.9% for
$50, 10.7% for $75, 15.5% for $100, and 16.7% for $150. The study, though
indicating the relative amount of variation in various aspects of the process
by which orders were established, did not isolate the objective factors, if any,
that cause the amount of a particular support order to be set at a particular
sum.
The needs of the children seem to receive virtually no consideration
when the amount of support to be ordered is determined. The majority of
children who were on welfare when a support order was sought remained on
welfare even when the order was paid in full. There can be no question that
the actual needs of any child far exceed the minimal amount of support
available from welfare. Children of men who, in fact, have enough money to
support them are being supported by other taxpayers. Yet the taxpayers
show no signs of a serious protest against this practice. Instead, inadequate
and inconsistent support orders are entered, followed by sporadic, unequal,
and frequently ineffective enforcement.
Denver has no systematic method of initiating enforcement proceedings
against a father who fails to make child support payments. Unless the
mother of the children or a welfare department initiates enforcement pro-
ceedings, the father may discontinue support payments without any legal
consequences.
In the contempt citation cases analyzed in this study, the two most ef-
fective means of enforcement seemed to be repeated issuing of contempt cita-
tions and securing assignments of wages. Of these two methods, issuance of
contempt citations is the more expensive and the more common approach.
Jailing was rarely used as a means of enforcement in Denver.
The actual pattern of establishment and enforcement of child support
orders in Denver is significantly different from the pattern which the law
would seem to suggest. It would seem to be far preferable, given the poten-
tial importance of child support, to take time to establish fair, consistent
standards to be used in establishing support orders, so that all children and
all fathers would be treated equally, no matter who the particular lawyers
and judges involved with each case might be. Then, if the courts and society
are serious about enforcing child support obligations, the orders should be
consistently and effectively enforced. The required judicial machinery is




MAXIMUM WELFARE GRANT IN COLORADO AS OF FEBRUARY, 1979
Number in Household Summer Winter
One Adult Plus: April - October November - March
I Child S 201 S 217
2 Children 252 269
3 Children 307 326
4 Children 363 383
5 Children 413 441
TABLE 2
GUIDELINES FOR MONTHLY CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
Net
Income
Per % of Net 2 % of Net 3 % of
Month I Child Income Children Income Children Net Income
$ 146
or (19% (35%
less $ 27.95 min.) $ 51.60 min.) $64.50 (44% min.)
150 30.10 (20%) 51.60 (34%) 64.50 (43%)
176 32.25 (18%) 55.90 (32%) 68.80 (39%)
198 34.40 (17%) 55.90 (28%) 86.00 (43%)
220 36.55 (17%) 62.35 (28%) 77.40 (35%)
240 38.70 (16%) 70.95 (30%) 83.85 (35%)
262 43.00 (16%) 71.10 (27%) 94.50 (36%)
284 45.15 (16%) 81.70 (29%) 101.00 (36%)
305 49.45 (16%) 88.15 (29%) 118.25 (39%)
327 53.75 (16%) 98.90 (30%) 129.00 (39%)
348 58.05 (17%) 105.35 (30%) 135.45 (39%)
370 62.35 (17%) 113.95 (31%) 141.90 (38%)
391 64.50 (16%) 120.40 (31%) 154.80 (40%)
412 68.80 (17%) 129.00 (31%) 163.40 (40%)
435 73.10 (17%) 137.60 (32%) 172.00 (40%)
455 77.40 (17%) 146.20 (32%) 180.60 (40%)
477 81.70 (17%) 154.80 (32%) 191.35 (40%)
500 86.00 (17%) 163.40 (33%) 199.95 (40%)
520 90.30 (17%) 172.00 (33%) 208.55 (40%)
540 96.75 (18%) 180.60 (33%) 217.15 (40%)
563 103.20 (18%) 189.20 (34%) 225.75 (40%)
612 109.65 (18%) 197.80 (32%) 234.35 (38%)
606 116.10 (19%) 206.40 (34%) 242.95 (40%)
628 122.55 (20%) 215.00 (34%) 258.00 (41%)
650 129.00 (20%) 223.60 (34%) 270.90 (42%)
670 133.33 (20%) 227.90 (34%) 277.35 (41%)
692 137.60 (20%) 236.50 (34%) 283.80 (41%)
714 141.90 (20%) 240.80 (34%) 290.25 (41%)
735 146.20 (20%) 249.40 (34%) 296.70 (40%)
756 150.50 (20%) 253.70 (34%) 303.15 (40%)
778 154.80 (20%) 262.30 (34%) 309.60 (40%)
800 159.10 (20%) 266.60 (33%) 316.05 (40%)
821 163.40 (20%) 275.20 (34%) 322.50 (39%)
843 167.70 (20%) 279.50 (33%) 335.40 (40%)





885 176.30 (20%) 296.70 (34%) 354.75 (40%)
903 180.60 (20%) 305.30 (34%) 364.43 (40%)
928 184.90 (20%) 313.90 (34%) 374.10 (40%)
950 189.20 (20%) 322.50 (34%) 383.78 (40%)
972 193.50 (20%) 331.10 (34%) 393.45 (40%)
993 197.80 (20%) 339.70 (34%) 403.13 (41%)
1,015 202.10 (20%) 348.30 (34%) 412.80 (41%)
1,036 206.40 (20%) 356.90 (34%) 422.48 (41%)
1,058 210.70 (20%) 365.50 (35%) 432.15 (41%)
1,079 215.00 (20%) 374.10 (35%) 441.83 (41%)
1,100 219.30 (20%) 382.70 (35%) 451.50 (41%)
1,122 223.60 (20%) 391.30 (35%) 461.18 (41%)
1,144 227.90 (20%) 399.90 (35%) 470.85 (41%)
1,165 232.20 (20%) 408.50 (35%) 480.53 (41%)
1,187 236.50 (20%) 417.10 (35%) 490.20 (41%)
1,208 240.80 (20%) 425.70 (35%) 499.88 (41%)
TABLE 3
JUXE A
Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered
and Respondent's Income Known
Amount of Order Net Monthly Income % of Income Number of Children Amount/Child
S 40 $ 550 7.2% 2 5 20.00
50 445 11.2% 1 50.00
50 840 6.0% 1 50.00
65 618 10.5% 1 65.00
75 334 22.5% 1 75.00
75 875 8.6% 1 75.00
75 900 8.3% 1 75.00
75 785 9.6% 1 75.00
75 581 13.0% 1 75.00
90 350 25.7% 2 45.00
100 420 23.8% 1 100.00
100 561 17.8% 2 50.00
100 525 19.0% 2 50.00
100 515 19.4% 2 50.00
100 600 16.7% 1 100.00
t00 1,000 10.0% 2 50.00
112 400 28.0% 2 56.00
125 560 T2.3% 1 125.00
125 800 15.6% 4 31.25
150 400 37.5% 2 75.00
150 676 T2.2% 2 75.00
I50 800 18.7% I 150.00
150 135 II l.]% 4 37.50
150 475 31.6% 3 50.00
175 640 27.3% 2 87.50
225 900 25.0% 3 75.00
250 838 29.8% 2 125.00
270 968 27.9% 3 90.00
300 625 48.0% 3 100.00
300 1,000 30.0% 3 100.00
Average Order - $129.38 Average % - 20.5%
Range 6.0% to 48.0%*6
Average Per Child - $70.79
*All aveeage exclude the I 11.1% order




Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered





























Average Order - $96.07 Average % - 16.3%
Range 5.6% to 33.3%**
Average Per Child - S68.26
$All averages exclude the 100% order
-Excluding the 10t, order
TABLE 5
JUDGE C
Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered
and Respondent's Income Known



















Average Per Child = $77.78Average % - 18.6%








Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered
and Respondent's Income Known
Net
Monthly
Amount of Order Income
Average Order = $133.33
Number of
% of Income Children
Average '% - 24.3%
Amount/Child
Average Per Child = $80.00
Range 10.5% to 41.7%
TABLE 7
JUDGE A
Orders Entered After a Contest at Court
Net
Monthly
Amount of Order Income
Number of















Average Per Child = $48.00
Range 7.25h, to 18.6%'*
If Respondent has no Attorney
Average Order - S110
Average % - 15.7%
Average Per Child - $55
Range 10.5% to 18.6%**
*All averages exclude the I 11. 1% order












Amount of Order Income
Average Order = $79.63
Number of










Average % = 17.5%
Amount/Child
Average Per Child - $45.50
Range 5.6% to 26.7'7,.
*All averages exclude the 100.0' order
-Excluding the 100.0% order
TABLE 9
ORDERS BY SEASON OF THE YEAR
Number
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I. SECTION 16(b) GENERALLY
A. Background of Section 16(b)
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the Exchange
Act) is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme 2 which was enacted by
Congress to remedy widespread abuses on the national securities exchanges.
3
The statute was enacted in the aftermath of the stock market collapse of
1929 to protect the market from insider trading which undermined investor
confidence. 4 The factual background of abuse that led to the enactment of
the Exchange Act is summarized in section 2 of the Act.5 The Exchange Act
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976) provides as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him for any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty
days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules
and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsec-
tion. [Hereinafter cited as section 16(b)].
2. The federal securities acts comprising the scheme are: Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat.
74 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976)); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976)) [hereinafter cited
as Exchange Act]; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838 (codified in
amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z (1976)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149
(codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976)); Investment Company Act of
1940, 54 Stat. 789 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976)); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 2, 54 Stat. 847 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I
to -21 (1976)).
3. Those abuses included excessive use of credit in securities transactions, pool operations,
manipulations such as matched orders, and other devices designed to create a misleading ap-
pearance of activity. See generaly, Stock Exchange Regulation. Hean'ngs on HR. 7852 and HR. 8720
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Stock Exchange
Practices Hearings on S Res 84, S Res. 56 and S Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Curreng, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
4. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
5. For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control
of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including transac-
tions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate re-
ports, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control
reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the na-
tional credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the na-
tional banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets in such transactions:
(1) Such transactions (a) are carried on in large volume by the public generally
and in large part originate outside the States in which the exchanges and over-the-
counter markets are located and/or are affected by means of the mails and instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce; (b) constitute an important part of the current of inter-
[Vol. 57:1
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imposes regulatory controls upon the national securities exchanges, upon the
practices employed in trading in securities listed and registered on such ex-
changes, and upon brokers and dealers. These controls are designed to pro-
tect the investing public by the establishment and maintenance of free and
open markets for the buying and selling of securities, and by preventing and
prohibiting abuse of facilities provided by the exchanges.
The Exchange Act seeks to accomplish these designs by mandating that
listed corporations file and publish detailed information about their organi-
zation, operations, management, and financial prospects; 6 by limiting the
use of credit in security transactions; 7 by outlawing pooling operations, ma-
nipulations, and similar deceptive devices in the securities market;8 by re-
quiring complete disclosure in connection with proxy solicitations; 9 by
requiring officers, directors, and owners of more than ten percent of any class
of any equity security (other than an exempted security) of an issuer, which
is registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act, to file reports of the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner and any changes in such ownership;' 0 by depriving such officers, di-
rectors, and ten percent shareholders of any incentive to abuse their position
by trading in the securities of their corporations on the basis of information
not known to the public;"I and by completely prohibiting certain sales.
1 2
Section 16 is a vital cog in this statutory scheme. Directors, officers, and
state commerce; (c) involve in large part the securities of issuers engaged in interstate
commerce; (d) involve the use of credit, directly affect the financing of trade, industry,
and transportation in interstate commerce, and directly affect and influence the vol-
ume of interstate commerce; and affect the national credit.
(2) The prices established and offered in such transactions are generally dissemi-
nated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries and constitute a
basis for determining and establishing the prices at which securities are bought and
sold, the amount of certain taxes owing to the United States and to the several States
by owners, buyers, and sellers of securities, and the value of collateral for bank loans.
(3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are sus-
ceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives rise to
excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices
of securities which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion and unreasonable
contraction of the volume of credit available for trade, transportation, and industry in
interstate commerce, (b) hinder the proper appraisal of the value of securities and thus
prevent a fair calculation of taxes owing to the United States and to the several States
by owners, buyers, and sellers of securities, and (c) prevent the fair valuation of collat-
eral for bank loans and/or obstruct the effective operation of the national banking
system and Federal Reserve System.
(4) National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate com-
merce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and pro-
longed by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices
and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emer-
gencies the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden the national
credit.
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976) See also H.R. REP. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP.
Nos. 792, 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/, 78m (1976).
7. Id 7 8g, 78h.
8. Id § 78i, 78j.
9. Id § 78n.
10. Id. § 78p(a).
I1. Id § 78p(b).
12. Id § 78p(c).
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ten percent shareholders of corporations, by virtue of their inside position,
have access to information not available to the general investing public. By
reason of their control, these insiders have the ability to pervert corporate
actions for the sole purpose of influencing stock prices. If an insider takes
advantage of special knowledge and trades in the stock of the corporation,
the result is a market in the security that does not represent a true appraisal
of its value.
The investigation that preceded the adoption of the Exchange Act un-
covered numerous instances in which insiders had taken advantage of their
special knowledge.1 3 For example, during 1939, over 100 stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange were subjected to pooling operations. 14 This use
of inside information to reap large profits from stock market activity at the
expense of non-insiders resulted in a countrywide call for reform. Congress
answered that call with section 16, to "bring these practices into disrepute
and encourage the voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards."'
15
Section 16(b) allows the issuer of securities registered under section 12 of
the Exchange Act,16 or a shareholder suing on behalf of such an issuer, to
recover any profit realized by insiders on securities transactions involving a
purchase and sale or sale and purchase within any period of less than six
13. The 1934 report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee stated:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcom-
mittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which
came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to
this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of insider information by large
stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the
destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not
available to others.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). The Commission later noted:
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act, profits from "sure thing"
speculation in the stocks of their corporations were more or less generally accepted by
the financial community as part of the emolument for serving as a corporate officer or
director notwithstanding the flagrantly inequitable character of such trading.
10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944).
14. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33, 47 (1934). One pool in a seven-day period
bought and sold almost 1,500,000 shares of R.C.A. stock, at a net profit to the members of the
pool of almost $5,000,000. In another case, the chairman of an executive committee partici-
pated with a director in a pool organized to trade in the stock of their company. When the pool
was formed, the company was paying no dividends. Shortly thereafter, the chairman and direc-
tor caused the company to declare a dividend. A policy of irregular dividends was continued,
payable at such strategic times that more than twenty-five percent of dividends paid was re-
ceived by the pool. These dividends were paid despite the fact that the company's earnings
were insufficient to cover them and corporate surplus was diverted for that purpose. S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). In another case, the president of a corporation and his
brothers controlled the corporation with approximately ten percent of its shares. Shortly before
the corporation passed a dividend, they disposed of their holdings for over $16,000,000 and later
repurchased them for approximately $7,000,000. Id.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
16. § 12(g) requires the registration by an issuer having total assets exceeding $1,000,000 of
each class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons if such issuer is engaged in
interstate commerce or in a business affecting such commerce or if its securities are traded by
use of the mails or interstate commerce. In addition, any issuer having a class of equity securi-
ties listed on a national securities exchange must register the securities under § 12. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(a), (g)(l) (1976). A national securities exchange is a stock exchange registered under § 6
of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
16(b) AND EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS
months.' 7 An insider for the purposes of section 16(b) is a person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any
class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such a security.'
Section 16(b) was described by the administration's spokesman in the
1934 congressional hearings as a "crude rule of thumb."' 9 Under the "crude
rule of thumb," it is irrelevant that the insider either did not make unfair use
of inside information or did not intend at the time he purchased the security
to sell it within six months. Section 16(b) applies irrespective of the good
faith or intent of the insider. 20 Further, the insider may be liable under
section 16(b) even if stock is acquired pursuant to an incentive stock option
plan initiated by the issuer,2 1 or if stock is sold at the suggestion of the is-
suer.2 2 On the other hand, an insider who separates his "purchases" and
"sales" by more than six months does not become liable under section 16(b)
even if unfair use of insider information is proved.
23
If an insider purchases and sells securities of the issuer within a six
month period, the statute mandates that the issuer recover any profit real-
ized. As Judge Clark said, speaking for the Second Circuit in Smolowe v. De-
lendo Corp. ,24 the first section 16(b) decision of that court, "the only remedy
which its framers deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a
liability based upon an objective measure of proof."
25
Although section 16(b) was intended to ease the plaintiffs evidentiary
burdens and to be rigidly and mechanically enforced, the apparent simplic-
ity of the statutory scheme has yielded to significant interpretative
problems.2 6 This article will explore many of those problems as they relate
to insider trading in connection with issuer-granted employee stock options.
17. For the method used in computing profits recoverable under § 16(b), see note 160 infra
and accompanying text.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). See also notes 108-25 iqfa and accompanying text.
19. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Subcomm. ofthe Sen. Comm. on Bankig and Cur-
rencg, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran). See also
Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d I, 5 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
20. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1041 (2d ed. 1961).
21. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534, 540 (7th Cir. 1956); Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Jefferson Lake Sulpher Co. v. Walet, 104
F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D. La. 1952), aj'd, 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
22. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956). The Second Circuit held that the rights of the issuer and its innocent shareholders
cannot be defeated by proving that the real party in interest was the plaintiff's attorney, whose
sole motive was to obtain a fee.
23. See Alder v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959), where Judge Burger noted:
Congress recognized . . . that § 16(b) would not correct all the practices thought
to be evil; obviously the six month limitation alone "let many fish out of the net" since
the tax laws tend to encourage a holding period longer than six months. . . .One can
speculate on whether the moral or ethical values are altered by the passage of 24 hours
but the statute makes an honest if not honorable man out of the insider in that period.
Id at 845.
24. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (944).
25. 136 F.2d at 235. This quotation was repeated in Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). See also Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156,
165 (3d Cir. 1965).
26. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-95
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B. Reporting of Holdings and Transactions Pursuant to Section 16(a)
Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act 2 7 provides that the statutory insider
is required to file, with the Securities Exchange Commission (the Commis-
sion) and the exchange on which the issuer's stock is listed, initial reports of
his holdings of the issuer's equity securities28 within ten days of becoming an
insider. One who is already an insider when the corporation registers must
file by the effective date of the registration statement. Additionally, he must
file reports within ten days after the close of any calendar month in which
there has been a change in his holdings. A report must be filed for each
month in which there has been any change in the amount of securities bene-
ficially owned, even though there are no holdings at the end of the month,
29
or the balance between purchases and sales has resulted in no net change in




Statutory insiders must report all holdings of equity securities of the
issuer, including holdings of unregistered classes of the issuer. Reporting is
required of each officer and director of an issuer which has any class of its
equity securities registered on a national securities exchange, irrespective of
whether he owns any of the listed securities. 32 Reporting is not required of
officers or directors if only debt securities are registered. 33 A beneficial own-
er who is neither an officer nor director is required to report only if he owns
more than ten percent of a registered equity security; if he does not, he need
not report regardless of the amount of his holdings in unregistered equity
(1973); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), ceri. dented, 400 U.S. 854
(1970). Se a/so notes 126-55 infra and accompanying text.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976) provides as follows:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to Section 78/ of this title, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration
statement filed pursuant to Section 78 1(g) of this title, or within ten days after he
becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission
(and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the
exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the benefi-
cial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall
also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the




29. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 21 (1934).
30. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 101 (1935); Form 4, Instr. 6(b).
31. Form 4, Instr. 6(b). The initial filing is made on Form 3 and the subsequent reports on
Form 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (1978); Form 3, Instr. l(a); Form 4, Instr. l(a).
32. The original Feltcher-Rayburn Bill required directors and officers to report only if they
owned five percent of a class of registered securities. S Hearings on S Res. 56, 84 and 97, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6555 (1934). This was altered in the final bill.
33. Note, however, that a convertible bond is an "equity security" under § 3(a)(l 1) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1) (1976). Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831,834
(D.N.J. 1963), modiftdon othergrounds, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). See also notes 78-89 infra and
accompanying text.
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securities of the issuer. If he does own ten percent of a registered class of the
issuer's securities, he must then report all holdings, of whatever amount, of
all other equity securities of the issuer, whether registered or not.
3 4
The reports are public documents and are available at both the Com-
mission and the exchange on which the stock is listed.35 Additionally, the
Commission compiles and publishes the information contained in these re-
ports in an "Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings of
Directors, Officers, and Principal Stockholders," copies of which are avail-
able at the Commission and each exchange, and which are widely distrib-
uted to interested persons.
C. Jursdictton and Venue
The language of section 16(b) permits suits to be instituted "in any
court of competent jurisdiction," 36 but "exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
this title. . . and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this title" is reserved to the federal courts in
section 27 of the Exchange Act. 3 7 Under section 27, venue may be laid in
any district in which the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, transacts busi-
ness, or where any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. 38
Venue has been found to be proper in the district in which the exchange is
located if the order was executed on the exchange, 39 regardless of where the
order to buy or sell was given or where the profits were realized or were to be
payable, and in the district in which any part of the acts, conduct, or trans-
actions constituting the purchase or sale took place.4°
D. Statute of Limitations
The language of section 16(b) specifically provides that no suit may be
brought "more than two years after the date such profit was realized."
4 1
Other civil liability provisions of the Exchange Act provide that an action
may be brought for one year after the cause of action occurred. 42 The two-
year period begins to run when the prohibited transaction is completed.
4 3
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(b) (1978).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-3(a) (1978). Where the security is traded on more than one ex-
change, the issuer may designate one exchange for filing reports. Id § 240.16a-1(c).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
37. Id § 78aa (1976). In American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d 347
(1945), in a § 16(b) action brought in a state court, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the only courts of competent jurisdiction were those in the federal system.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
39. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Berk-
wich v. Mencher, 239 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Grossman v. Young, 70 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
40. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Falco v.
Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953); Rothenberg v. Silberman, 278 F. Supp.
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyser v. Meehan Fund, Inc. 264 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Blau v.
Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), ajdtipart, rev'din part, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 20 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
42. Id §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b).
43. Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Johnson, 387 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
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However, failure to adhere to the reporting requirements of section 16(a)
may extend the period during which an action may be brought.44
E. General Exemptions
1. Exemptions Applicable to the Exchange Act Generally
Section 16(b) parenthetically exempts from coverage an "exempted se-
curity."' '4 5 An exempted security is defined in section 3(a)(12) as a direct
obligation of, or obligation guaranteed by, either a federal or state govern-
ment; securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the United
States has an interest and which are designated for exemption by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury; and any other securities exempted by the Commission
"by such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, either unconditionally or
upon specified terms and conditions or for stated periods."'4 6 The power of
the Commission to adopt rules under section 3(a)(12) has been broadly con-
strued and the Commission has made numerous exemptions thereunder.
4 7
Additionally, the Commission has exempted certain fiduciary transactions, 48
treasury shares,49 and small transactions5° from section 16(b) coverage.
2. Exemptions Applicable to Section 16(b) Specifically
The language of section 16(b) exempts all acquisitions "in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted" 5' and permits the Commis-
sion to exempt any transaction not comprehended within the purpose of sec-
tion 16(b). 52 Further, arbitrage transactions within the meaning of section
16(e)53 and transactions by a broker-dealer as a market maker and not for
investment purposes5 4 are exempt from the operation of section 16(b).
The Commission has adopted several exemptive rules under its section
16(b) authority, which are not relevant to our analysis of insider trading
44. In Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), Judge Rifkind noted that the
short statute of limitations "is intelligible when read in the context of an absolute duty to make
prompt and frequent reports of the activities which may give rise to such an action," but that
the purpose of Congress would be frustrated if an insider were "to escape repayment of his
profits by compounding his fault in failing to file the required reports," and determined that
here as in " 'every federal statute of limitations, . . . the bar of the statute does not begin to run
until the fraud is discovered.' " Id at 378 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397
(1946)). Late reporting will not, however, result in § 16(b) liability if the purchase and sale are
more than six months apart. Rogers v. Valentine, 37 F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a), (b) (1976).
46. Id § 78c(a)(12). For example, certain foreign securities, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1978),
and odd-lot transactions, Id § 240.16a-5, are exempted.
47. For a more complete discussion of this section, see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
797 (2d ed. 1961).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-4(a) (1978).
49. Id § 240.16a-4(b).
50. Id § 240.16a-9.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See aLo Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.
1961); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
53. Id § 78p(e). See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), (d) (1976); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973).
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involving stock options. 55 The Commission has also exercised its exemptive
authority under section 16(b) in two instances crucial to the application of
the section to insider trading involving issuer-granted employee stock op-
tions.
a. Rule 16b-3
In rule 16b-3,56 the Commission exempts from the coverage of section
16(b) any acquisition by statutory insiders of shares of stock (other than
stock acquired upon the exercise of an option, warrant, or right) pursuant to
a stock bonus, profit sharing, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings, or similar
plan, or any acqusti'on of a qualiied or a restricted stock option pursuant to a qualified
or restricted stock option plan, or of a stock option pursuant to an employee stock purchase
plan, by a director or officer of the issuer of such stock or stock option if the plan
complies with all requirements of the rule.57 Nothing in this rule relates to
option transactions by ten percent shareholders because the situation con-
templated here is the employee stock option or stock purchase plan.
Paragraph (d) of the rule58 incorporates portions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code definitions of qualified stock option plan, employee stock purchase
plan, and restricted stock option plan, 59 but the rule deems an option to be a
55. Rule 16(b)-I exempts certain transactions by registered investment companies that
have been exempted from section 17(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16b-1 (1978). Rule 16b-2 exempts underwriting transactions in which a person not an
insider participates in the underwriting on terms at least as favorable as those of the insider
underwriter and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation of all persons ex-
empted by the rule. Id § 240.16b-2. Rule 16b-4 exempts certain transactions by registered
public utility holding companies which have been approved under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935. Id § 240.16b-4. Rule 16b-5 exempts certain transactions where securi-
ties are received by redeeming other securities by corporations who manage and care for the
stock of another corporation. d § 240.16b-5. Rule 16b-7 exempts certain acquisitions and
dispositions of securities in connection with mergers or consolidations that do not result in any
significant change in the character or structure of the company. Id § 240.16b-7. Rule 16b-8
exempts transactions involving the deposit or withdrawal of equity securities under a voting
trust or deposit agreement. Id § 240.16b-8. Rule 16b-9 exempts certain transactions involving
the conversion of equity securities. Id. § 240.16b-9.
56. d. § 240.16b-3.
57. Id.
58. Id § 240.16b-3(d).
59. The three types of plans have many similar features, in part because they must meet
many of the same requirements to qualify for favorable tax treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 421-425.
Relevant features for § 16(b) purposes follow.
Under the plans an employee is granted an option to purchase a specified number of the
corporation's shares. The minimum purchase price is determined under specific rules that differ
for each type of plan. The exercise price of qualified stock options must be not less than 100% of
the fair market value of the shares subject to option at the date of grant, while the exercise price
of employee stock purchase plan options must be not less than the lower of 85% of the fair
market value of the shares at the date of grant or 85% of the fair market value at the date of
exercise. However, restricted stock options are of little importance today because they qualify
for favorable tax treatment only if granted on or before December 31, 1963, unless such options
are granted thereafter pursuant to a binding written contract entered into, or a written plan
adopted and approved by the shareholders, before January 1, 1964, which must meet other
stringent requirements. Id. § 424(c)(3).
Under the prior law restricted stock option plans did not require shareholder approval to
qualify for favorable tax treatment, although such approval was frequently sought for corporate
reasons. In contrast, certain aspects of qualified stock option plans and employee stock purchase
plans (e.g., the number of shares available for the plan) must be shareholder-approved. Id
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restricted stock option even if granted after the Internal Revenue Code's
cutoff date for favorable tax treatment, December 31, 1963.60 To qualify for
the rule 16b-3 exemption, however, the plan must meet both these defini-
tional requirements and the other conditions of the rule.6 ' Although the
requirements of rule 16b-3 appear to make compliance simple, many em-
ployers still do not have conforming plans.
Ordinarily, the acquisition by an insider of a stock option granted pur-
suant to a qualified or restricted stock option plan or employee stock
purchase plan will not be matched with a subsequent sale of that option
itself, because such options must be nontransferable except by will or the
laws of descent to qualify for favorable tax treatment.6 2 On the other hand,
the sale by an insider within six months of acquisition of transferable options
acquired pursuant to a nonqualified stock option plan, or of other transfera-
ble options, may give rise to liability under section 16(b). 63 Further, rule
16b-3 does not exempt the acquisition by an insider of shares of stock upon
the exercise of qualified or restricted stock options or employee stock
purchase plan options from the operation of section 16(b), but rather ex-
empts only the options themselves.
64
For qualification of a plan under rule 16b-3, compliance must be made
with four basic requirements: approval by shareholders, dissemination of
information to shareholders and the Commission, discretion in the selection
of recipients made only by "disinterested" persons as defined by the rule,
and limitation on dollar and share amounts.
65
Paragraph (a) of rule 16b-3 66 provides that an option acquired by an
§§ 422(b)(1), 423(b)(2). Stock option and stock purchase plans may also differ in the type of
eligible recipients of the options and in the manner and periods of the exercise of the options
and payment for the underlying shares. The recipients of qualified or restricted stock options
may be limited for tax purposes to officers and other key employees of the corporation. In
contrast, employee stock purchase plan options must be made available to all employees of the
corporation, except that the corporation, in its discretion, may exclude certain specified classes
of employees, including those who do not work full time or throughout the year and "officers,
persons whose principal duties consist of supervising the work of other employees, or highly
compensated employees." Id § 423(b)(4)(D). Moreover, under the terms of a tax-qualified em-
ployee stock purchase plan, all employees granted options to purchase shares must have the
"same rights and privileges," except that the number of shares allocated under such options
may bear a uniform relationship to an employee's total compensation. Id. § 423(b)(5).
Restricted stock options may be exercisable for a maximum of ten years from the date of
grant. Id § 424(b)(4). Qualified stock options may be exercisable for a maximum of five years
from the date of grant. Id § 422(b)(3). Employee stock purchase plan options may be exercisa-
ble for a maximum of 27 months from the date of grant unless the option price is to be not less
than 85% of the fair market value of the shares at the date of exercise, in which case such
options may be exercisable for five years. Id. § 423(b)(7). Under any of the plans, the corpora-
tion may grant the employees the discretion to elect when to exercise their options until the date
of expiration.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(2) (1978).
61. Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. I.R.C. §§ 421-425. However, acquisition of a nontransferable option may be matched
with a sale within six months of a transferable option of the same issuer.
63. See notes 166-68 ingfa and accompanying text.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1978). Keller Industries, Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1972).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1978).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(a) (1978).
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insider pursuant to a qualified plan is exempted from the operation of sec-
tion 16(b) by rule 16b-3 only if the plan "has been approved, directly or
indirectly" by a majority of the shareholders of the corporation.6 7 Such ap-
proval may be accomplished either by the affirmative votes of the holders of
a majority of the securities of the issuer present or represented and entitled to
vote at a shareholders' meeting, or by the written consent of the holders of a
majority of the securities of the issuer entitled to vote.
Paragraph (a) of rule 16b-3 further provides that if the vote or written
consent for the approval of the plan was not solicited substantially in accord-
ance with the proxy rules in effect under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act 68
at the time of such vote or written consent and proxies regarding approval or
disapproval of the plan were being solicited, the issuer must furnish in writ-
ing to the holders of record of the securities entitled to vote for the plan
substantially the same information concerning the plan which would be re-
quired by the rules and regulations in effect under section 14(a) of the Ex-
change Act on or prior to the date of the first annual meeting of the security
holders held subsequent to the later of the first registration of an equity se-
curity under section 12 of the Exchange Act or the acquisition of an equity
security for which exemption is claimed. Additionally, four copies of such
written information must be filed with the Commission not later than the
date on which it was first sent or given to the security holders of the issuer.
69
Paragraph (b) of rule 16b-3 70 provides that if the selection of those di-
rectors or officers of the issuer to whom stock may be allocated or to whom
stock options or stock appreciation rights may be granted under the plan, or
if the determination of the number or maximum number of shares of stock
which may be allocated to any director or officer or which may be covered
by stock options or stock appreciation rights granted to any director or of-
ficer, is subject to the discretion of any person, such discretion must be exer-
cised under carefully circumscribed conditions. In the case of either officers
or directors, selection for participation in the plan must be made by "disin-
terested persons." Under rule 16b-3, a "disinterested person" is a plan ad-
ministrator "who is not at the time he exercises discretion in administering
the plan eligible for selection as a person to whom stock may be allocated or
to whom stock options or stock appreciation rights may be granted pursuant
to the plan or any other plan of the issuer or any of its affiliates entitling the
participants therein to acquire stock, stock options or stock appreciation
rights of the issuer or any of its affiliates."
71
In the case of participation by directors, discretion may be exercised
only by the board of directors of the issuer, if a majority of the board and a
majority of the directors acting in the matter are disinterested persons, by or
only in accordance with the recommendation of a committee of three or
more disinterested persons having full authority to act in the matter, or in
67. Id.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(a) (1978).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(b) (1978).
71. Id § 240.16b-3(d)(3).
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accordance with the provisions of the plan. If discretion is to be exercised in
accordance with the plan, it must specify the number or maximum number
of shares of stock which directors may acquire or which may be subject to
stock options or stock appreciation rights granted to directors, including the
terms upon which and the periods within which such stock may be acquired
or such options may be acquired and exercised, or the plan must provide by
formula or otherwise some effective and determinable limitations with re-
spect to the number of shares which may be acquired by or be subject to
options of directors based upon such factors as: earnings of the issuer, divi-
dends paid, compensation received by participants, options prices, market
value of shares, outstanding shares of percentages of outstanding shares from
time to time, or similar factors.
72
With respect to the participation of officers who are not directors, dis-
cretion may be exercised by the board of directors of the issuer or a com
mittee of three or more directors, or only in accordance with the recommen-
dation of a committee of three or more disinterested persons having full au-
thority to act on the matter.
73
Paragraph (c) of rule 16b-3 74 provides that the plan must effectively
limit the aggregate dollar amount or the aggregate number of shares which
may be allocated or which may be subject to stock options or stock apprecia-
tion rights issued pursuant to the plan. The limitations, established either on
an annual basis or for the duration of the plan (whether or not the plan has a
fixed termination date), may be determined either by fixed or maximum
dollar amounts or fixed or maximum numbers of shares or percentages out-
standing from time to time or similar factors which would result in an effec-
tive and determinable limitation. To prevent dilution or enlargement of
rights, it is permissible to provide for the adjustment of the plan or of stock




Despite the fact that the Commission was warned by dictum in Ralner v.
Lehman76 that "the Commission may exempt 'transactions' but it cannot re-
duce the liability imposed by Section 16(b)," 77 it has adopted rule 16b-6,78
exempting the portion of profits realized from the sale of securities acquired
pursuant to an option that is attributable to a long-term increment in the
value of the option. The rule exempts from section 16(b) liability profits
realized on transactions involving a purchase pursuant to the exercise of an
option acquired either more than six months before its exercise or pursuant
to an employment contract entered into more than six months prior to its
exercise, to the extent that the profits exceed the difference between the pro-
72. Id § 240.16b-3(b)(1).
73. Id § 240.16b-3(b)(2).
74. Id § 240.16b-3(c).
75. Id
76. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
77. Id. at 566.
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978).
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ceeds of the sale and the lowest market price of the security within six
months before or after the sale.79 The rule was made retroactive, and the
only case testing the applicability of the rule to transactions occurring prior
to its promulgation supported its retroactive application. 0
F. Deflintions
1. Equity Securities
For a violation of section 16(b) to occur, shortswing profits must be
made by a statutory insider in a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of
"any equity security of such issuer." 8' "Equity security" is defined in section
3(a)(1 1) of the Exchange Act8 2 to mean:
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or
without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any war-
rant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any
such warrant or right; or any other security which the Commission
shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appro-
priate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity
security.
8 3
The Commission expanded this definition in 1965 by enacting rule 3al 1-:84
The term "equity security" is hereby defined to include any stock
or similar security, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit sharing agreement, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, voting trust certificate or certificate of de-
posit for an equity security, limited partnership interest, interest in
a joint venture, or certificate of interest in a business trust; or any
security convertible, with or without consideration into such a se-
curity, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase
such a security; or any such warrant or right .... 85
Even before the enactment of this rule, voting trust certificates and certifi-
cates of deposit were considered to be equity securities wherever the underly-
ing securities were equity securities.
86
Treasury stock has been held to be an "equity security" even though it
is expressly included in the statutory definition of "security,"8 7 and not spe-
79. Brenner v. Career Academy, Inc., 467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972); see also note 160 znfa
and accompanying text.
80. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
82. Id § 78c(a)(11).
83. Id.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1978).
85. Id § 240.16a-2.
86. Id.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976) provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock bond, debenture, certif-
icate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or
other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certifi-
cate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as
a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
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cifically mentioned in the statutory definition of "equity security."8 8
That stock options, at least calls, spreads, and straddles,8 9 may be eq-
uity securities is clear under the language of section 3(a)(11),90 the language
of rule 3al1-1, 9 1 and by case law that has determined that the ability to
convert into or to acquire equity securities satisfies the definitional require-
ment. 92 It seems, however, that nonassignable calls issued by stockholders
are not equity securities under the statute.9 3 The legislative history of sec-
tion 16(b) indicates that Congress recognized that options are susceptible to
abuse by insiders and are at the root of the evils of insider shortswing activ-
ity. 94 Thus, it appears that options to purchase stock granted by the issuer
are "equity securities" under the statute and shortswing profits by statutory
insiders in transactions involving such options may be subject to section
16(b) recovery by the issuer.
2. Class
A statutory insider for purposes of section 16 includes the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
than an exempt security) which is registered pursuant to the Exchange
Act. 95 Problems may arise in deciding whether a person is beneficial owner
of more than ten percent of a "class" of equity security. Rule 16a-2 96 pro-
vides that a class of a given security is deemed to consist of the entire amount
outstanding, "exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the ac-
count of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer."'97 However, the class of
securities when voting trust certificates or certificates of deposit for equity
securities are involved consists of the entire amount issuable for the class of
equity securities which may be deposited, regardless of how many have been
banker's acceptance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which
is likewise limited.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l 1) (1976). Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20
(E.D. La. 1952), a fd 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
89. A "call" is an option to purchase stock on or before a certain date at a fixed price; a
"put" is an option to sell stock on or before a certain date at a fixed price; "spreads" and
"straddles" involve combinations of "puts" and "calls," thus giving the holder the choice of
buying or selling on or before a certain date at a fixed price. SEC, Division of Trading and
Exchanges, Report of Pu and Call Options 7 (1961). For purposes of this article, "options" will be
used as the equivalent of calls granted by the issuer.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1) (1976).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3aI 1-1 (1978).
92. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. at 834.
93. Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'don other grounds, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
94. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934) noted: "The granting of op-
tions to pools and syndicates has been found to be at the bottom of most manipulative opera-
tions, because the granting of these options permits large-scale manipulations to be conducted
with a minimum of financial risk to the manipulators."
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1978).
97. Id. In UnitedStater o. Gutena, 281 F.2d 742, 748-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871
(1960), the court sustained this rule and relied on it in holding that the term "class" did not
include unissued shares reserved for the exercise of options or conversion rights.
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deposited. 98 When more than one series of security is issued, each having the
same privileges, they will likely be found to be different series of the same
class. 99 Further, the Second Circuit has held that convertible debentures
were not themselves "a class of any equity security," but were equity securi-
ties only in the sense that the class consists of the common stock outstanding,
augmented by the number of shares into which the debentures are converti-
ble. 100
3. Beneficial Ownership
As has been previously indicated, both initial reports and reports of any
changes in beneficial ownership must be filed pursuant to section 16(a). 0 1
Record ownership is, in itself, of no consequence since the legislative history
indicates that section 16 was intended to encompass more than mere legal
ownership.' 0 2 A record owner, or any other person fearing that he might be
deemed a beneficial owner, may file reports under section 16(a) but disavow
any implication that the filing is an admission of beneficial ownership.
10 3
The term "beneficial ownership" comes into question for section 16 purposes
when persons with a legal relationship to the insider, e.g., family members or
partners, realize short-term profits in the insider's corporation. Whether the
insider is the beneficial owner of securities held in the record name of a fam-
ily member depends on whether the insider obtains benefits substantially
equivalent to ownership or if he can vest or revest title in himself at once, or
at some future time. 10° A partnership which is a ten percent beneficial own-
er for its own account must report regardless of whether reports are filed by
the individual partners. An individual partner must also report if his indi-
rect interest in the issuer through the partnership, combined with the securi-
ties of which he is otherwise directly or indirectly the beneficial owner,
amounts to ten percent, or if he is the ten percent beneficial owner of some
other class of registered equity securities of the same issuer. 105 Similar rules
apply to holding companies and their controlling persons' 0 6 and trusts and
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1978).
99. Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1959), afg 167
F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
100. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). See notes 27-35 supra and accompanying text.
102. Hearngs on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Curreng, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6556 (Testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(d) (1978). Form 4, Instr. 18. A person reporting otherwise than
as the direct beneficial owner must specify the nature of his ownership. Id § 240.16a-3 (1978);
Form 3, Instr. 9; Form 4, Instr. 10.
104. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 7793 (1966). See also B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d
Cir. 1964); Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 523 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1975).
105. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 1965 (1938). In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403
(1962), the Supreme Court held that where a defendant brokerage firm realized a shortswing
profit while one of its partners was a director of the corporation whose stock had been
purchased and sold, only the director-partner was required to pay his pro rata share of the
firm's profit and that the partnership need not disgorge the remaining profits.
106. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. 1965 (1938). Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.






The aim of section 16 was to destroy "the vicious practices unearthed at
the hearings" involving "the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by
officers and directors."' 10 8 In rule 3b-2,10 9 the Commission interpreted the
term "officer" to mean "a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary,
comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incor-
porated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by
the foregoing officers." ' 10 In each case, the court must make "a careful ex-
amination of the nature of the particular applicant's activities, powers and
responsibilities." ' 1" Titles alone are not dispositive and do no more than
raise an inference that the person who holds the title has the executive duties
and opportunities for confidential information that the title implies. The
inference can be overcome by proof that the title is merely honorary and
does not carry with it any of the executive responsibilities that might other-
wise be assumed.'12
b. Director
Section 3(a)(7)' 1 3 defines the term "director" to mean "any director of a
corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." ' 1 4  Presumably,
considerations similar to those used in interpreting the term "officer" apply
in interpreting "director" since the Commission's definition of "officer" is
modeled on the statutory definition of "director." Further, an officer or di-
rector, because of his relationship with another person, may "deputize" an-
other person and render such other person also an officer or director for
purposes of section 16(b) liability.' 15 Deputization is a question of fact to be
settled case by case. 16 Relevant factors are whether the director controlled
or gave advice relative to the investment policy of the other entity; whether,
107. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8(g) (1978). Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 1965 (1938).
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. at 962.
108. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1978).
110. Id.
111. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 651-52 & n.19 (1963). See also Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Colby v. Klune, 83 F. Supp. 159
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
112. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Account Executive was given title "Vice-President" to reward an outstanding sales record but
retained sales duties and assumed no significant executive duties). See also Schimmel v.
Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1976).
114. Id.
115. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. at 406-07; Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260,
265-66 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566
(2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J., concurring); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
at 967.
116. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. at 962.
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in serving as a director, he intended to act as a deputy; and whether the
director was ultimately responsible for the total operation of the corpora-
tion. 17 A formal deputization need not be made if the conduct of the par-
ties indicates that a deputization was intended.' 18
c. Ten Percent Owner
An officer or director may be liable for profits realized on shortswing
transactions even though he purchased or sold shares before assuming" 19 or
after leaving12 0 office as long as both the purchase and sale transactions oc-
curred within the statutory six month period and either the purchase or sale
occurred while he held office. An officer or director will not, however, incur
section 16(b) liability by purchasing and selling stock during a six month
period when both transactions occur after his resignation or retirement.'
2 1
On the other hand, section 16(b)' 22 specifically provides that a ten percent
beneficial owner must be such at both the dates of purchase and sale for
liability to result.' 23 As previously noted, the total amount of the issue, in-
cluding unregistered securities and treasury shares, is used as the basis for the
ten percent calculation. The important issue, then, is when the owner ac-
quires ten percent status. The Supreme Court held in Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
o. ProVdent Securti'es Co.,124 that the ten percent status was not acquired at
the initial purchase making the defendant a ten percent holder. A change in
beneficial ownership is made when a stockholder makes a firm commitment
to take, or divest himself of, the beneficial ownership of securities.
125
5. Purchase and Sale
a. Generally
Since both a "purchase" and a "sale" are specific statutory require-
ments under section 16(b),' 26 liability often turns upon the definitions of
"purchase" and "sale." Section 3(a)(13)127 of the Exchange Act defines
"purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire,"
and section 3(a)(14) defines "sale" to include "any contract to sell or other-
117. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d at 260.
118. Id See also Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d at 872.
119. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d at 847; Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
120. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d at 260.
121. Lewis v. Varnes, 368 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423
U.S. 232 (1976); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d at 845.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1978). See notes 81-100 supra and accompanying text.
124. 423 U.S. 232 (1976). See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc., 527
F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
dented, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
125. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 116 (1935). Compare Champion Home Builders
Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1974) with Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13), (14) (1976).
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wise dispose of."'1 2 8 Determining whether a purchase and a sale have oc-
curred within a six month period presents little difficulty when the
transactions consist of an exchange of cash for stock or stock for cash. ' 29 The
statutory definitions, however, do not furnish explicit direction with respect
to the treatment under section 16(b) of insiders' securities transactions in
complex business dealings involving "unorthodox" transactions, 130 in that
one or both ends of the transaction have exchanges involving securities but
are not clearly either purchases or sales. Federal courts have developed two
different approaches in attempting to apply the terms "purchase" and "sale"
to unorthodox transactions. 
1 3 t
b. Per Se-Objecttwe Approach
As previously discussed, section 16(b) was intended to ease plaintiffs'
evidentiary burdens' 32 and to be strictly and mechanically enforced.133 The
Supreme Court has stated that "the only method Congress deemed effective
to curb the evils of insider trading was a flat rule taking the profits out of a
class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be in-
tolerably great,"' 34 therefore considerations of intent, lack of motive, or im-
proper conduct are irrelevant in section 16(b) suits.135 The judicial method
that developed from this intent of section 16(b) became known as the "objec-
tive" or "per se" approach. This approach appears to be in accordance with
congressional perception of the section as a "crude rule of thumb."' 136 The
"objective" or "per se" test is geared toward the broadest possible construc-
tion of "purchase" and "sale" and results in an all-inclusive prohibition
under section 16(b). The test entails little or no inquiry into either the man-
ner in which the transaction was completed or the reasons or motives behind
it. 137 Under this objective approach, courts focus solely on whether the de-
128. Id.
129. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d at 231.
130. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961) (e.g., options, conversions,
reclassifications, and mergers).
131. Discussions of the tests are found in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582, 594 n.26 (1973), and Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233, 235-37 (10th Cir. 1976).
132. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Suhcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currenc, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
133. As stated by Thomas Corcoran, chief spokesman for the proponents of the Exchange
Act:
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the se-
curity within six months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the
existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of
thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director
intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short-swing. ,
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
134. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972). See also Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 595.
135. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d at 236.
136. See note 19 supra. This method was employed to emphasize that no inquiry into the
intent of an insider was necessary under § 16(b), and because some persons who did not trade
on inside information would nevertheless be forced to disgorge their shortswing profits. Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d at 49.
137. See, e.g., Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. at 361.
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fendant owned the security before and after the transaction. If the security
was owned after but not before, or vice versa, the transaction was deemed a
section 16(b) "purchase" or "sale" under the objective test. 138 In one in-
stance, it was stated that section 16(b) established an irrebuttable presump-
tion that an insider who purchased and sold securities of his company within
six months was trading on inside information, since he would not otherwise
be motivated to exchange his stock so quickly, considering his large stake
and position in the corporation. 139 The objective approach began to be crit-
icized, particularly in the case of certain unorthodox transactions, in which
its utilization could create "manifestly absurd and unfair"' 40 results leading
to "purposeless harshness."14'
c. Pragmalic-Subjeclive Approach
Due to the uncertainty of whether "unorthodox" transactions, described
as "stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and other corporate
reorganizations, stock reclassifications and dealings in options, rights and
warrants,"' 42 should be classified as section 16(b) purchases or sales, courts
have developed a more subjective or pragmatic approach.14 3 This subjective
approach focuses on whether a transaction is of the type the statute was
designed to prevent. 144 Essentially, this means that the test limits the appli-
cability of the "purchase" and "sale" provision of section 16(b) to those
transactions in which a possibility of speculative abuse exists, based on an
examination of the facts of each case. The subjective approach was first ap-
plied to a section 16(b) situation in Ferraiolo v. Newman,' 4 5 where the court set
forth the following test: "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined
as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can
possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section 16(b)."'
1 4 6
The court concluded that the transaction at issue in Ferraiolo was not a
purchase because the "conversion of . . . preferred to . . .common had
none of the economic indicia of a purchase," and "[t]he transaction was not
one that could have lent itself to the practices which Section 16(b) was en-
138. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d at 987.
139. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d at 303-04 (Hincks, J., dissenting). It
must be noted that, although the objective test was the original one used, it has been utilized in
full effect in only a few cases. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d at 156; Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d at 984; Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. at 361. For example, in Park
& Tilford, the defendant insiders converted their preferred stock pursuant to a call for redemp-
tion by the company. The main issue in the case was whether the conversion was a "purchase"
of common stock. The court, in a manner characteristic of the objective test, answered in the
affirmative, stating: the "[diefendants did not own the common stock in question before they
exercised their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within
the meaning of the Act." 160 F.2d at 987.
140. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
141. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304,307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
142. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 593 n.24.
143. See, e.g., Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Feder
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969),
ceri. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
144. Segenerally S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934).
145. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. dented, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
146. Id at 345.
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acted to prevent." 147 Conversion cases subsequent to Ferraiolo have adopted
its approach. 148
Courts have applied this subjective approach to several cases involving
unorthodox transactions. 14 9 For example, in Newmark V. RKO General,
Inc.,150 the subjective test was used to determine that an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger was a "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b). In
Newmark, RKO General had entered into an agreement to purchase the
shares of certain major shareholders of Central Airlines at a fixed price upon
the condition that Central merge with Frontier Airlines. The court found a
possibility of speculative abuse, both because RKO had obtained its option
to purchase Central stock before the news of the merger was made public
and because it had control over the terms and date of the merger.
Courts have also used the subjective approach to determine whether an
option agreement constitutes a purchase or sale, and thus have considered
the possible abuse of inside information in situations where an option could
be used as an instrument to manipulate the sale or purchase price of the
underlying security. ' For example, Booth v. Vanan Associates ' 52 involved an
agreement entered into in 1959 in connection with a reorganization to issue
"contingent shares" based upon a guarantee of the market price of the stock
of the acquiring corporation in 1962. While conceding that the rights and
obligations of the parties with respect to the exchange of the stock became
fixed in 1959, the court held that the date of purchase of the contingent
shares for the purposes of section 16(b) was the date of their delivery in 1962
because the price at which the stock was to be purchased was to be deter-
mined by the market price at the time of delivery. The court intimated that
this date was selected because the possibility of speculative abuse existed in
the transaction
With the continued utilization of the subjective approach, courts have
made section 16(b) analysis inconsistent with the statute which was intended
to protect the marketplace from the evils of inside trading by means of a
"crude rule of thumb." Congress realized in enacting section 16(b) that the
result might be harsh in a given case. In the hearings prior to the enactment
of section 16(b), the spokesman for the administration made it clear: "You
have to have a general rule. In particular transactions it might work a hard-
ship, but those transactions that are a hardship represent the sacrifice to the
necessity of having a general rule."' 1 53 Section 16(b) was intended to serve
147. Id at 346.
148. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d at 507; Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d at 528.
149. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 418; Newmark v. RKO
General, Inc., 425 F.2d at 348; Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d at 304; American Standard,
Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
150. 425 F.2d at 348.
151. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970); Booth v. Varian Assoc.,
334 F.2d at 1; Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
152. 334 F.2d at 1.
153. Hearings on Stock Exchange ractces Before a Subcomm. of the Sen Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (Testimony of Thomas Corcoran). The Courts
decided that such a prohibition did not rise to constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d at 49; Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d at 239-40.
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the public as a whole and the plaintiff-corporation was merely the tool that
Congress chose to enforce its will.' 54 By utliizing the subjective approach
and its "possibility for abuse" criteria, courts have interjected factors such as
control and equitable considerations into actions arising under section
16(b),1 55 have eliminated simplicity and predictability, and have severely
departed from the intent of the statute.
6. Six Month Holding Period
In order for liability to attach under section 16(b), the exchange must
occur during "any period of less than six months.' 56 As Judge Dimock
stated in Stella o. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 157 the statutory period of "less
than six months" means "six months minus one full period from midnight to
midnight since the law does not take into account fractions of a day."' 58
The phrase "for a period exceeding six months" later in section 16(b) was
regarded "as a mere referential inaccuracy which cannot prevail over the
language used by Congress in creating the cause of action. '"'5 9
G. Computation of Recoverable Profits
Profits recoverable under section 16(b) are computed by application of
the lowest-in-highest-out method, where purchases are arbitrarily matched
with sales to maximize the determination of profits. The same certificates
need not be subject to the purchase and sale. Under this rule of computa-
tion, a large recovery may result when the sequence of transactions actually
produced an overall loss to the shareholder. i6o
For purposes of illustration, assume a statutory insider made the follow-
ing transactions in the same year:
January 1: Purchase of 200 shares @ $50
February 1: Sale of 100 shares @ $10
March 1: Purchase of 200 shares @ $30
April 1: Sale of 200 shares @ $60
May 1: Purchase of 100 shares @ $20
June 1: Sale of 100 shares @ $40
Under the lowest-in-highest-out method, the 100 shares purchased May 1 for
$20 per share would be matched with 100 of the shares sold April 1 for $60
154. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D. La. 1952).
155. It had been held that equitable factors, raised as defenses, are not appropriate in
§ 16(b) actions. For instance, in Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. at 655-56, the fact that a defend-
ant may actually have intended to benefit the corporation was held to be an insufficient basis to
estop the corporation from recovering his shortswing profits. In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Giroux, 312 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court held that, irrespective of the resulting
benefit to the corporation, estoppel-based defenses to the actions asserted under § 16(b) are
insufficient as a matter of law.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
157. 132 F. Supp. at 100.
158. Id at 104.
159. Id See also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d at 475 n.3.
160. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d at 50-52.
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per share to produce a recoverable profit on those 100 shares of $40 per share
or $4000. The 200 shares purchased March 1 for $30 per share would be
matched with the remaining 100 shares sold April 1 for $60 per share, thus
producing a recoverable profit of $30 per share or $3000, and with the 100
shares sold June 1 for $40 per share, producing a recoverable profit of $40
per share or $1000. The 100 shares purchased January 1 for $50 per share
could not be used to produce a recoverable profit since the only remaining
sale, that made on February 1, was at $10 per share, a price per share lower
than the purchase price of $50 per share. Thus, the issuer can obtain recov-
erable profits of $8000 when the insider actually had an overall loss of $1000.
II. APPLICATION OF SECTION 16(b) TO INSIDER TRADING INVOLVING
ISSUER-GRANTED STOCK EMPLOYEE OPTIONS
A. Generally
Perhaps the most objectionable of the evils Congress intended to pro-
hibit by section 16 are evidenced in insider trading relating to stock op-
tions. '6 1 When insider trading concerns stock options, the opportunities for
speculative abuse are enhanced by the relatively insubstantial financial in-
vestment required. In the situation of employer-granted employee stock op-
tions, no investment is usually required for the employee to hold the option.
In the case of market trading in stock options, the market value of the option
is usually the difference between market price of the underlying stock and
the exercise price to purchase such stock pursuant to the option, discounted
by a time factor if such options are not immediately exercisable. In either
situation, the insider may greatly increase his likelihood of gain because of
the additional leverage generated. Thus, for modest or no financial commit-
ment by the insider, he may gain a vantage point to use inside information
to his own benefit.' 62 This advantage is, of course, of greater benefit if the
option is immediately exercisable.
There are legitimate corporate purposes for which an employer-issuer
might deem it advisable, or even necessary, to grant options to purchase
stock. For example, the granting of stock options to executives may often be
a less expensive way of providing incentive than increasing salaries. Stock
options have a speculative appeal, in that the uncertain and contingent re-
wards offered are of potentially greater value to the employee. These factors,
combined with the right to obtain more options for relatively low cost, offer
an incentive to employees.163
However advantageous the granting of stock options might be to all
concerned, if the stock subject to the options is listed on a national securities
exchange, or if any other equity security of the company is so listed, then
each of the transactions involving the use of options must be examined in the
161. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934). See also notes 13-15, 94 supra
and accompanying text.
162. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
163. For a more complete discussion of employee stock options generally, see Dean, Employee
Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1953). See also Lang & Katz, Section 16(b) and Extraordi-
nag Transactions: Corporate Reorganizations and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 705 (1974).
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light of section 16(b).'
64
As we have previously noted, many options are exempted from the cov-
erage of section 16(b) by rule 16b-3,165 but the stock acquired upon the exer-
cise of qualified options is not exempted by the rule. Despite the relative
ease with which the exemption of the rule can be obtained, many issuers still
fail to meet the requirements. The remainder of this article will deal with
those situations in which the exemption of rule 16b-3 does not attach be-
cause of failure to comply with its requirements and those situations in
which stock has been acquired upon the exercise of options qualified under
the rule.
B. Unexercised Options
As previously noted, unexercised, employer-granted stock options will
not typically result in section 16(b) liability, since to qualify for favorable tax
treatment stock options granted must be made nontransferable except by
will or the laws of descent.' 66 Thus, a stock option granted to an insider
pursuant to such a plan will not be matched with a subsequent sale of that
option itself for purposes of section 16(b) liability. On the other hand, when
transferable options acquired pursuant to unqualified stock option plans or
transferable options otherwise acquired are sold, section 16(b) liability may
result in the amount of the difference between the sale proceeds and the
value of the options on the date of acquisition.'
67
For purposes of analysis, there is no practical difference between trading
in unexercised, negotiable employee stock options and the market trading of
unexercised put and call options. As a method of insider speculation, neither
is different from the purchase and sale of stock itself.'6' Further, if the con-
tentions of this article are accepted, we can envision no situation in which
insider trading in unexercised options would not be subject to section 16(b)
liability unless such unexercised options are sold more than six months prior
to the date on which they become exercisable.
C. Exercised Options
At least in the case of immediately exercisable stock option plans, the
date of grant may be important for purposes of valuation and determining
the holding period under section 16(b). Of course, many employee stock
option plans are not immediately exercisable. If such options are immedi-
ately exercisable, the exercise and subsequent sale of stock thereunder within
six months would certainly result in section 16(b) liability if a profit was
realized. However, for most purposes, the date of grant has been rejected as
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1978). See notes 56-75 supra and accompanying text.
166. I.R.C. §§ 421-424. See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
167. Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.), a fdpercunm sub noma. Truncale v.
Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
168. For a more complete discussion of the application of Section 16(b) to market trading in
stock options, see Note, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE
LJ. 868 (1960).
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an important date for analysis in determining section 16(b) liability when
stock has subsequently been sold.
As we have previously discussed, for section 16(b) liability to result,
both a "purchase" and a "sale" of the security must be found within the
short swing period. 169 "Purchase" is defined in section 3(a)(13), 70 to include
any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.' 71 In Park & Ti'ford v.
Schulte, 72 the Second Circuit, in deciding that the exercise of a right to con-
vert preferred shares into common shares was a "purchase," held that this
definition was broad enough to include any acquisition as well as an execu-
tory contract to acquire. That the date of exercise may be a purchase date
has been assumed at least since Shaw v. Dryfiss.' 73 This was reaffirmed in
Blau v. Hodgkinson,174 where the court held that the exercise of an option
acquired pursuant to employment constituted a purchase and computed the
holding period from the date of exercise. In Truncale v. Blumberg, 175 an action
was brought against several insiders of Universal Pictures Company, who
had been granted immediately exercisable stock warrants pursuant to their
employment contracts. The court held that the receipt of such a warrant
was "an 'acquisition' in the same sense as was the receipt of the common
stock upon the conversion of the preferred in Park & Tifiord v. Schulte."'
17 6
However, in determining the damages recoverable to the issuer, the court
determined that the cost basis of the defendants in the warrant included past
services rendered and their promises to work in the future. The market
value of the warrants on the date of their acquisition was determined to be a
measure of their value on the theory that the grant of the warrants was like a
payment by the corporation of the amount of cash necessary to purchase
such warrants on that day. Since the sale price was less than the market
price of the warrants on their date of issue, no profits were realized and no
damages were recoverable. '
77
Under that reasoning, the date of purchase in such an option transac-
tion would not be the date of grant if the option was acquired prior to the
accrual of the right to exercise it. In Steinberg v. Sharpe,178 options were issued
which were not immediately exercisable. The court held that the "date of
acquisition" for determining section 16(b) liability and valuation was the
accrual date (the date on which such options became exercisable), since
nothing of measurable value had passed to the optionee until such time as
the option became exercisable.' 79 In Stenberg, the insider held options that
had accrued at yearly intervals commencing one year after their grant for
several years prior to their exercise. The court, reasoning that the insider
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); see a/so notes 126-28 supra.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1976).
171. Id.
172. 160 F.2d at 984.
173. 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
174. 100 F. Supp. at 361.
175. 80 F. Supp. at 387.
176. Id at 392.
177. Id
178. 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), affdper curiar, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951).
179. 95 F. Supp. at 34.
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should retain the benefit of long-term gain attributable to holding the op-
tions for more than six months, applied the Truncale formula' 80 that com-
pensation by way of the options was equal to the difference between the
exercise price of the options and the market value of the underlying stock on
the date of accrual of the options. Thus, the amount recoverable was held to
be the difference between the market value of the stock on the date of ac-
crual of the options and the price received on the date of sale of the stock.
In an effort to mitigate the harsh result of possible forfeiture of long-
term gain in connection with the use of options as required by Steirnberg, the
Commission adopted rule 16b-6,181 limiting the amount recoverable on the
short swing sale of optioned stock to the difference between the proceeds of
sale and the lowest market price of any security of the same class within six
months before or after the date of sale. Thus, the long-term aspects of the
insider profits in such transactions are exempted by the rule. This rule, how-
ever, may not be used to enlarge the amount of profit which would otherwise
inure to the issuer in its absence. Hence, the rule was not applied in deter-
mining the purchase price of stock where the effect of the application would
have been to increase the amount of recoverable profit.'
8 2
D. Unexercised Options
It is not difficult to find recoverable short swing profits when the insider
has exercised options and sold stock within six months of the accrual date of
the options since all critical dates are within the shortswing period. Con-
versely, a more difficult analysis must be made if section 16(b) profits are to
be recovered when stock is sold within six months of the accrual date but
options were never exercised by the insider, or at least not within six months
of the stock sale. For profits to be recoverable to the issuer in this framework,
a "purchase" must be found in the mere accrual of the options. This possi-
bility is suggested in the Steinberg v. Sharpe 83 determination that the date of
acquisition of stock was not the date of exercise but the date of accrual. In
Steinberg both the date of exercise and the date of accrual fell within six
months of the date of sale and it was not necessary for the court there to
determine whether the accrual date used for measuring the cost basis could
also be a "purchase" date for measuring the six month holding period.
We submit that the possibility of evil Congress intended to prevent in
promulgating section 16(b), the abuse of inside information to the insider's
advantage, manifests itself most fully not with the exercise of an option when
a financial commitment has been made by the insider, but rather when the
option becomes exercisable. When the option is exercisable, the insider oc-
cupies a vantage point from which to make the most virulent abuses of inside
information with little or no investment on his part.
For example, assume that, on January 1, 1978, the issuer granted un-
qualified stock options to the president of the issuer, who already held 100
180. Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. at 677.
181. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978). See also notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
182. B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d at 255.
183. 95 F. Supp. at 32.
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shares of the issuer's stock, and that these options became exercisable on
January 1, 1979. If, on March 1, 1979, the president sold the 100 shares he
had held before the grant of the option, the issuer would be able to recover
the difference between the sale price of such stock and the value of such stock
on the date of accrual. This analysis is proper under the intent of section
16(b).' 84 The apparent harshness of this result is, of course, mitigated since
the long-term aspects of gain are protected by rule 16b-6.185
Further, it is our view that, if a further extension of the Steinberg analysis
is made, section 16(b) short swing profits may be recoverable by the issuer in
a situation in which an insider sells stock more than six months from the
accrual date while options are still exercisable, even if no options are exer-
cised within the six month period, or at all. Although the position of advan-
tage gained by an option holder does not begin on the date an option is
exercised, but rather with its exercisability, this position is not isolated in the
single day on which the option first becomes exercisable, the accrual date,
but continues throughout the period of exercisability. Thus, to extend Stein-
berg, any date of exercisability should constitute a purchase date for calculat-
ing the six month holding requirement of section 16(b).
For example, again assume that the issuer granted its president stock
options on January 1, 1978, that the president already held 100 shares of the
issuer's stock, that the options were exercisable on January 1, 1979, and that
such options were exercisable through December 31, 1983. Under this anal-
ysis, if the president were to sell his 100 shares of stock on January 1, 1980,
the issuer would be able to recover the difference between the sale price and
the lowest value of the stock on any date between July 2, 1979, and June 30,
1980. 186
It is our contention that the date on which an option becomes exercis-
able is a valid "purchase" date for determining the six month holding period
of section 16(b) since on that date the insider gains a position of advantage
in the securities of the issuer from which speculative abuse is likely; and fur-
ther, that on any date of exercisability of such an option, not merely the first
date, the insider holds this position. Essentially, this means that an insider
would be unable to sell stock or options of the issuer at any time within six
months of any date on which he held exercisable stock options if the value of
such stock or options on any such date was lower than the sale price without
incurring liability under section 16(b). This analysis is perfectly consistent
with the mandate of section 16(b).
E. Examples
To illustrate the foregoing, a tabular presentation of several possible
transactions involving insider trading in employer-granted stock options and
184. See notes 1-26 supra and accompanying text.
185. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978). See aLso notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
186. As we have previously noted, the statutory holding period is actually six months minus
one day. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded
on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). See also notes 157-59
supra and accompanying text.
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an analysis of the probable section 16(b) consequences of such transactions
follow. We will assume that all options are exercisable for a period of five
years following accrual. We will also assume that all transactions were by
statutory insiders and that the other section 16(b) requirements were satis-
fied.
1. Example (1)
There is little doubt that this transaction would be subject to section
16(b) liability since all critical events occurred within the six month period.
This transaction does not differ practically from the situation of market deal-
ing in options by insiders. 187
2. Example (2)
Again, there seems to be little doubt that this transaction would be sub-
ject to section 16(b) liability. This transaction differs from Example (1) in
that, although the date of sale and the date of accrual occurred within the
statutory period, the date of sale occurred more than six months after the
date of grant. As we have previously noted, the date of grant is not of partic-
ular significance in section 16(b) analysis. This transaction does not differ
practically from the situation of market dealing in options by insiders.
3. Example (3)
This situation is similar to Example (2) except that both the accrual
date and sale date are more than six months from the grant date. As we
have noted, however, the date of grant is relatively unimportant and, since
the two critical dates, the date of accrual and date of sale, are within the
statutory period, section 16(b) liability would attach. Again, there is no
practical difference between this situation and the situation of market deal-
ing in options by insiders.
4. Example (4)
This illustration is intended to emphasize that section 16(b) prohibits
either a purchase and subsequent sale or sale and subsequent purchase
within one statutory period.' 88 Here, since the critical accrual and sale dates
187. For a general discussion of market trading in options by insiders, see Note Put and Call
Opizons Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE L.J. 868 (1960).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976) provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by himfiom any purchase and sale, or any sale andpurchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner . . . . (emphasis
supplied).
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fall within the six month statutory period, section 16(b) liability will result.
This, again, resembles insider market trading in options.
5. Example (5)
We believe this to be the only example situation involving unexercised
options in which the insider would not be liable for recoverable profits under
section 16(b). Here, since the date of sale, January 1, 1980, is more than six
months before the date of accrual, January 1, 1981, no purchase date within
the statutory period exists which can be matched with that sale date to pro-
duce section 16(b) recovery.
6. Example (6)
This situation involves a more difficult analysis than in those situations
preceding. For section 16(b) liability to result in this situation, our conten-
tion that any date on which the insider holds exercisable options may be a
"purchase" date for purposes of section 16(b) analysis must be accepted.' 8 9
Thus, assuming that this contention is valid, when the insider sells options on
January 1, 1981, since options are exercisable within six months of the date
of such sale, section 16(b) liability will ensue. We conclude that in any situa-
tion in which insiders trade in unexercised options, section 16(b) liability will
result unless they are sold more than six months prior to the date of accrual,
because the options must be exercisable presently or must become exercis-
able in the future to have market value. For unexercised options to be re-
moved from section 16(b) vulnerability, they must be sold more than six
months either before or after their term of exercisability. They, of course,
will not be sold after their exercisability, since, once expired, they have no
value.
7. Example (7)
This situation is identical to (1) except that the March 1, 1979, sale is of
stock rather than options. We see no practical difference in this situation
and would expect that section 16(b) recovery would result as in (1). This
situation resembles a section 16(c) prohibition.19°
8. Example (8)
We think there is little doubt that this situation would result in section
16(b) liability. All critical events fall within the statutory six month period.
9. Example (9)
This situation illustrates, once again, that the date of grant has little
importance in section 16(b) analysis.
189. See text accompanying and following note 186 supra.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1976) makes it unlawful for an officer, director, or ten percent
shareholder to sell an equity security, directly or indirectly, if he does not own the security sold




This example illustrates that the date of exercise may be a "purchase"
date for section 16(b) analysis. 191
11. Example (11)
This example is intended to illustrate that the six month statutory pe-
riod is actually "six months minus one full period from midnight to mid-
night."1 9 2 Thus, assuming that the insider here sold all the stock he held on
June 30, 1980, and that all options were exercised on January 1, 1980, no
section 16(b) liability would result.
12. Example (12)
This example illustrates again that section 16(b) liability extends to
sales and subsequent purchases as well as purchases and subsequent sales.
193
13. Example (13)
This example requires more difficult analysis than the preceding situa-
tions dealing with exercised options. For this example, we are assuming that
on January 1, 1981, the insider exercised half of his options, and that on
January 1, 1982, an equivalent number of shares of stock were sold. To
produce section 16(b) liability in this situation, our contention that any date
on which the insider holds exercisable options may be a "purchase" date for
purposes of section 16(b) analysis must be accepted.' 94 Thus, assuming that
this contention is valid, since the other half of the insider's options remained
exercisable at the date of sale, section 16(b) liability results.
14. Example (14)
It seems certain that this situation is one that will not be subject to
section 16(b) liability, even under our contentions. Although half of the in-
sider's options here remained unexercised but exercisable for the five year
period following the accrual date, January 1, 1980, if the sales on January 1,
1987, were the only sales by this insider and such insider held no other exer-
cisable options and had made no purchases of stock within six months of the
sale, no section 16(b) liability would result since more than six months would
elapse between the expiration of the exercisability of such options and the
sale of stock.
15. Example (15)
This example assumes that all options were exercised on January 1,
1981, and that the insider held no other exercisable options within six
months of the sale on January 1, 1982. It appears equally clear that this
191. See notes 183-86 supra and accompanying text.
192. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. at 104. See also notes 157-59 supra
and accompanying text.
193. See also note 188 supra.
194. See text accompanying and following note 186 supra.
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situation will not result in section 16(b) liability to the insider. Since all
exercisable options were exercised on January 1, 1981, no "purchase" dates
remain available to match against the January 1, 1982 sale.
III. CONCLUSIONS
As previously noted,' 9 5 the prime objective of the Exchange Act is the
establishment and maintenance of a free and open market for the trading of
securities in which all traders have full knowledge of all facts and circum-
stances. Section 16(b) recognizes that officers, directors, and ten percent
shareholders, by reason of their relationship to the issuer, have access to in-
formation not available to the market generally and, by reason of their man-
agerial control, have the ability to pervert corporate activities for the sole
purpose of influencing the price of securities of the issuer.
Section 16(b) is a remedial statute, designed to prevent a corporate in-
sider from profiting through speculation in the stock of a publicly traded
corporation with which he is connected by unfairly using information avail-
able to him as an insider. 9 6 Section 16(b) was devised to deprive the officer,
director, or ten percent shareholder of any incentive to trade actively in any
securities of his issuer, by removing the profit from all such transactions in-
volving a purchase and sale of such securities within any period of less than
six months, irrespective of the intention of such person in entering into such
purchase or sale. Although trading in such securities is not forbidden, the
profits resulting therefrom are recoverable by the issuer.
Section 16(b) is a blanket provision predicated on the thesis that statu-
tory insiders, whether they have abused their positions or not, should be de-
prived of the opportunity to do so to the detriment of the market. Section
16(b) restricts officers and directors to their duties as such and restricts sub-
stantial stockholders to being such for the purposes of investment and con-
trol. The provision prohibits such insiders from speculating in shares of the
issuer. The result is that the prohibitions of section 16(b) fall equally upon
the most exemplary of the insiders as well as upon those who would abuse
their trust.
To make administration of the statutory scheme simple, Congress
adopted a prophylactic measure which permits recovery by the corporation
of the profits from a class of insider transactions in which "the possibility of
abuse was believed to be intolerably great,"' 9 7 i.e., purchases and sales by an
insider within six months, "without proof of actual abuse of insider informa-
tion, and without proof of intent to profit on the basis of such informa-
tion."' 98
Section 16(b) was enacted to remedy a recognized abuse of insider infor-
mation and it should be liberally construed.' 99 The Supreme Court has
195. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
196. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 418; Blau v. Max Factor & Co.,
342 F.2d at 304; Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d at 840.
197. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 422.
198. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 595.
199. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233.
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stated that "where alternative constructions of the terms of section 16(b) are
possible, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves the
congressional purpose of curbing short swing speculation by corporate insid-
ers."20 0 This holding was reaffirmed in Kern County.
20 1
The definitions of these terms is a matter of federal law. 20 2 "The phrase
'any purchase and sale' in section 16(b) is therefore not to be limited or
defined solely in terms of commercial law of sales and notions of contractual
rights and duties." 20 3 The transactions must focus on and be consistent with
the congressional mandate of curbing insider short-swing speculation. "The
question thus becomes one of balancing the respective advantages and disad-
vantages of each contended for 'purchase' date and determining which one,
if held to be the date of purchase, would be more likely to lend itself to the
abuses the statute was designed to protect against."
20 4
It is our view that recent decisions of federal courts, favoring the use of
the "subjective" or "pragmatic" approach 20 5 have departed from these basic
objectives of section 16(b).
The section 16(b) remedy, unlike the remedy afforded by rule lOb-5, is
not a fraud remedy and the elements required to establish fraud are irrele-
vant to section 16(b). The factors courts have considered in applying the
"subjective" or "pragmatic" approach have essentially injected fraud analy-
sis into section 16(b). Congress established a unique remedy in section 16(b),
absolute in its prohibition and independent of any fraudulent intent on the
part of the insider. If this remedy is to be altered or eliminated, it is the
province of Congress to do so.
200. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 424.
201. 411 U.S. at 595.
202. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1967); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S.
at 413-14; Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d at 696.
203. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d at 697.
204. Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d at 4.
205. See notes 142-55 supra and accompanying text.
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COMMENTS
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION COLLIDES WITH PRIOR
APPROPRIATION IN A-B CATTLE CO. V UNITED
STA TES
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of a water appropriator in Colorado to receive water of a
quality that will not significantly impair his historic use has been recognized
by Colorado courts since the adoption of the appropriation doctrine.' The
duty of a water appropriator in Colorado to apply the water he receives to a
beneficial use also dates from the beginning of the appropriation doctrine.
2
Implicit in the requirement of beneficial use is the recently articulated con-
cept of maximum utilization, 3-that water application produce the highest
benefit for the greatest number of people.
4
A perhaps inevitable clash between the doctrines of prior appropriation
and maximum utilization occurred in A-B Cattle Co. v. United Slates.5 This
comment will trace the histories of water quality as an aspect of prior appro-
priation and maximum utilization as an outgrowth of beneficial use, analyze
the reasoning of the decision in the instant case, and discuss its impact on
Colorado water law.
II. FACTS OF A-B CATTLE Co. V. UNITED STATES
On June 11, 1969, the United States Bureau of Reclamation instituted
condemnation proceedings in the Denver Federal District Court for the
headgate and upper segment of a diversion ditch owned by the Bessemer
Irrigating Ditch Company (Bessemer). 6 The condemnation action was in
relation to the construction of Pueblo Dam on the Arkansas River in south-
eastern Colorado, as part of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Reclamation Project.
7
Bessemer responded with a claim for damages exceeding $ 100,000,000, alleg-
ing construction of the dam would impound the silt normally occurring in
the Arkansas River. It was claimed that the delivery of clear water rather
1. Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1886). Accord, Rocky
Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638 (1943); Arizona
Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 12 Ariz. 190, 100 P. 465 (1909), aft'd, 230 U.S. 46 (1913); Hill v. King, 8
Cal. 336 (1857).
2. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
3. Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
4. Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Pub/i Regulation, 5
NAT. RES. J. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Trelease].
5. 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
6. United States v. 508.88 Acres of Land, No. C-1480 (D. Colo., filed June 1I, 1969).
Bessemer is a non-profit, mutual ditch company whose operating expenses are shared by its
shareholders on a pro rata basis. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-42-101 to -109 (1973). See also
Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975).
7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 616a-f (1976).
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than silt-laden water to Bessemer would: (1) aggravate seepage loss through
the sides of the ditch, which the silt had formerly sealed; (2) allow the growth
of aquatic plants in the ditch, increasing maintenance expense; and (3) cause
the water to settle more rapidly in irrigating ditches than the same amount
of silt-laden water, cutting down the amount of acreage which could be irri-
gated.8
According to Bessemer, each of these consequences interfered with the
use to which its stockholders had historically applied their water appropria-
tion. Under Colorado law, an interference in decreed water rights is a le-
gally-compensable taking of property, 9 and the United States was therefore
liable to Bessemer for inverse condemnation. 1o
The United States moved to strike Bessemer's response, but Federal Dis-
trict Judge Arraj upheld Bessemer's claim that the loss of silt was a taking of
property under Colorado law." Bessemer subsequently shifted its claim to
the United States Court of Claims under the name of one of its stockholders,
A-B Cattle Company. Judge Arraj then removed his opinion so that all Bes-
semer's rights could be adjudicated by one court. 1 2 The Court of Claims
certified the question of Bessemer's right to silt to the Colorado Supreme
Court, determining that the question involved an interpretation of Colorado
law. 13
On August 21, 1978, the Colorado Supreme Court, in a four to three
decision, held that Bessemer did have a right to a continuation of conditions
formerly occurring in the Arkansas, including silt.' 4 After granting a peti-
tion for rehearing by the United States and amicus Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District (SEWCD), the court reversed its earlier decision
by another four to three vote, with Justice Kelly changing his vote.' 5 Justice
Erickson, joined by Justices Lee and Carrigan, dissented. '
6
III. WATER QUALITY AS AN ASPECT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
The purpose of the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado water law
is to protect a senior appropriator's right to a specific quantity of water.'
7
The right to use water, therefore, has been elevated to a property right.18 As
such, it gives a senior appropriator the power to have an upstream junior
appropriator's use cut off, if the senior is not receiving the full amount of his
8. Brief for Plaintiff Bessemer at 2-3.
9. Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
11. United States v. 508.88 Acres of Land, No. C-1480 (D. Colo., Opinion of May 8, 1973).
12. Id. (D. Colo., June 18, 1976).
13. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. 7 COLO. LAW. 1873 (1978).
15. 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
16. Id. at 62.
17. See generally C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPRO-
PRIATION SYSTEM, National Water Commission Legal Study No. 1 (July 1, 1971). Ste also Note,
A Surve of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226 (1970).
18. Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962);
Sherwood Irrigation Co. v. Vandewark, 138 Colo. 261, 331 P.2d 810 (1958); Strickler v. City of
Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891).
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decreed right.' 9 He may also demand compensation from a governmental
body which condemns his senior right.20 The policy underlying this doctrine
has been to encourage the beneficial application of water to an arid geo-
graphic region, dependent on water diversion for economic productivity. 2'
By protecting a prior appropriator's right to a specific quantity of water,
there is an assurance that his expenditure of time, effort, and money will not
be wasted because of a later upstream diversion.
Under the same reasoning, and provided with the same remedies of en-
joinment and compensation, a prior appropriator has been guaranteed a
continuation in the quality of water existing in a stream at the time of his
appropriation. 22 A significant deterioration in quality can impair an appro-
priator's use to the same extent as a diminution in quantity.
23
The earliest Colorado case addressing the issue of quality was Lari'mer
County Reservoir Co. v. People.24 It involved, as does the instant case, the con-
struction of an onstream reservoir by a junior appropriator. Though the
court upheld the junior's right to store the water, it conditioned the storage
right on the prevention of any impairment of water quantity or quality that
would injure downstream senior appropriators. If downstream use had been
hampered by a deterioration in water quality, the junior appropriator would
have been held liable.
25
The specific quality of water to which an appropriator is entitled has
never been adequately defined by Colorado courts or statutes. Most of the
quality cases have involved a discharge of pollutants, e.g. mill tailings, 26 but
the definition of quality has never been limited to a simple absence of pollu-
tants.
Two aspects of the kind of water quality protected by the appropriation
doctrine have been enunciated and followed by Colorado courts. One is that
there can be no impairment of the use an appropriator has made of the
19. City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
20. Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908); Arm-
strong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 P. 235 (1891).
21. See note 17 supra.
22. "[The senior appropriator's right] is to have the natural waters and all accretions come
down the natural channel undiminished in quality as well as quantity." Humphreys Tunnel &
Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 532, 105 P. 1093, 1096 (1909).
23. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, 448
(1971).
Qualty of the Water. (1) As a general principle, the appropriator is entitled to the flow
of water in the stream to his diversion works in such a state of natural purity as to
substantially fulfill the use for which his appropriation was made. If not protected in
this particular, the usefulness of his water right may be depreciated or even be de-
stroyed. The necessity for the rule is self-evident.
d See Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 96 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
24. 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1885).
25. But the privilege [to store water] so recognized is, of course, qualified by the condi-
tion that no injury to others shall result through its invocation. . . . He cannot lessen
the quantity of water, seriously impair its quality, or impede its natural flow, to the
detriment of others who have acquired legal rights therein superior to his; and he must
respond in proper actions for all injuries resulting to them by reason of his acts in the
premises.
Id at 617, 9 P. at 796.
26. Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 96 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
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water he receives;2 7 the other is that an appropriator has a right to receive
water of a quality which existed at the time of his appropriation.
28
These two water quality protections are codified in the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 [hereinafter "Water Act"].
29
The relevant sections state that a senior appropriator has a right to receive
water of a quality which he has historically put to beneficial use30 and that
upstream storage is a right conditioned on the requirement that the substi-
tuted water be of a quality to meet a senior downstream appropriator's nor-
mal use.
3 '
Even if the impairment in quality is caused by a preferred user, 32 he
must compensate the downstream appropriator.33 The senior's rights are
not subsumed by the fact that the change is of a greater benefit to the public
than his use-his quality rights are still protected.
34
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF BENEFICIAL USE
An essential element of the right to appropriate water is the require-
ment that the water so appropriated be put to a beneficial use. 35 This ele-
ment has been a condition since one of the earliest cases recognizing the
appropriation doctrine in Colorado, Coffin v. Left Hand Dtch Co. 3 6 Later, the
Colorado Constitution explicitly included the beneficial use requirement.
3 7
27. " '[Pjollution' means an impairment, with attendant injury, to the use of the water that
plaintiffs are entitled to make . . . . In reality, the thing forbidden is the injury." Id. at 331, 44
P.2d at 1029. Accord, Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507 (1874); Hallenbeck v. Granby
Ditch & Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966); Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co.
v. San Miguel Consolidated Mining & Milling Co., 9 Colo. App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897).
28. Farmers Hightine Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954); Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co., 47 Colo. 534, 107 P. 1108 (1910) (which
also extended the right to water quality to junior appropriators).
[A] junior appropriator of water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as against his
senior, in a continuation of the conditions on the stream as they existed at the time he
made his appropriation. If this means anything, it is that when the junior appropria-
tor makes his appropriation he acquires a vested right in the conditions then prevail-
ing upon the stream, and surrounding the general method of use of water therefrom.
Id at 541, 107 P. at I111.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (1973). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(3).
30. Id § 37-80-120(3).
31. Id. § 37-92-305(5).
32. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
33. Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908); Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co.,
23 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532 (1896). "[Preferred use] is subject to that other constitutional provision
requiring just compensation to those whose rights are affected thereby." Id at 237, 48 P. at 534.
34. Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966).
[An upstream appropriator storing water and causing injury to the downstream user
cannot use the argument that] the right that is to be changed is proportionately of a
greater benefit to the senior than is the detriment to the junior, for the vested property
rights of the junior appropriator include the right to have the conditions remain as
they were when he obtained his appropriation.
Id at 569, 420 P.2d at 427.
35. People v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P.2d 894 (1936); Farmers' High Line Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530
(1883). See Note, A Surv of Colorado Water Law 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 237-39 (1970).
36. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
37. "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. See CoLAO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)
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Defining beneficial use has proven as elusive as defining quality. 38 The
Colorado Constitution recognizes several uses of water as beneficial-domes-
tic, agricultural, and manufacturing. 39 Court decisions later added uses
such as watering trees and grass, 40 and statutory enactments have added
recreational purposes. 4 1 Other than the above vague categories, there is no
specific list including all those applications considered beneficial.
42
There are, however, certain characteristics of beneficial use which Colo-
rado courts have recognized. The most basic is that a failure to continue
beneficial application of appropriated water will cause a loss of the appropri-
ation right.43 A corollary is that there is no right to appropriate more water
than can be beneficially applied; only the amount of water reasonably neces-
sary for the intended beneficial use is allowed.
44
The Water Act defines beneficial use as that amount of water reason-
ably necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the appropriation,
with consideration given to the special circumstances and reasonably effi-
cient practices of each case.
4 5
The necessity of efficient and economic use of appropriated water has
not been limited to methods employed on land to which the water is applied.
Colorado courts have expanded this requirement to include the manner uti-
lized for conveyance of the water from the point of diversion to the point of
application. In Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co.,46 an attempt by
a municipality to divert water for domestic purposes was opposed by a
downstream prior appropriator. The court stated that water was too valua-
ble to be wasted by either an inefficient application at the point of use or an
inefficient method of conveyance when this loss could be averted by reason-
able diligence.
4 7
(1973), which states: " 'Appropriation' means the application of a certain portion of the waters
of the state to a beneficial use."
38. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939), "The term
'beneficial use' is not defined in the Constitution. What is beneficial use, after al, is a question
of fact and depends upon the circumstances in each case." Id at 204, 96 P.2d at 842.
39. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
40. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 209, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939).
41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4), which states, "'Beneficial use'.., includes the im-
poundment of water for recreational purposes .... "
42. The problems created by lack of specific beneficial use standards is discussed in Carl-
son, Report to CovernorJohn A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DEN. L.J. 293 (1973).
"The existing water law of Colorado does not recognize the possibility that appropriators may
seek to develop water rights which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are nonetheless
socially undesirable for the public at large." Id at 324. This problem manifested itself in the
instant case. See notes 79, 80 & 81 infra.
43. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(2)0) (1973). See Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, 120 P.2d 196 (1941).
44. Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 210
P.2d 982 (1949). "The time during which water may be diverted thereunder is measured by the
reasonable needs of the land, and when the water is not so needed, it may no longer rightfully
be diverted from the stream, but must be left therein for use of subsequent appropriators." Id
at 428-29, 210 P.2d at 984-85. Accord, Snow v. Abalos, 18 N.M. 681, 140 P. 1044 (1914).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973).
46. 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
47. It is a matter of common knowledge that in . . . [conveying the water in the
manner proposed by the city] necessarily a very great proportion of such volume
would be lost by seepage and evaporation before it was conveyed any considerable
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An extension of the requirement that the means used to convey water
be reasonably efficient occurred in City of Colorado Springs V. Bender.48 Colo-
rado Springs had dug wells and appropriated water from an underground
aquifer above the senior appropriator, Bender. This caused the water table
to drop to a point below the capacity of Bender's pumps, thereby cutting off
his water supply. In denying Bender's plea for an injunction against Colo-
rado Springs, the court found that Bender's wells were so shallow that they
constituted an inefficient method of diversion. Bender's request was, in ef-
fect, an attempt to control the entire underground aquifer to protect his inef-
ficient diversion. The court held that no senior appropriator had this
right.
49
An earlier Colorado case, Empire Water and Power Co. v. Cascade Town
Co., 50 recognized the right of an appropriator to take advantage of the
natural flow of a stream as a beneficial use, but it limited this right to an
efficient application. Cascade had constructed a resort to take advantage of
a beautiful, luxuriant plant growth caused by the spray of a waterfall on
Cascade Creek. Empire began to divert the creek above the falls, causing a
significant lessening of the flow reaching the falls, with a consequent deterio-
ration of the plant life. Although recognizing that beneficial application of
water for an intended use did not require construction of man-made diver-
sions, the court held the application by nature had to be efficient, and re-
manded the case for further hearing.
Colorado statutes also recognize the need for efficient diversions, by re-
quiring appropriators using ditches to keep them in a state of repair that will
prevent unnecessary loss through overflow or seepage. 5'
V. THE EVOLUTION OF MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
The doctrine of maximum utilization is a natural outgrowth of benefi-
cial use. The Colorado Constitution implicitly recognizes the need for water
to be applied so that it will produce the best and highest benefits for the
greatest number of people through: (1) the recognition that all water not
appropriated is the people's and for their benefit, 52 and (2) the establishment
distance. The law contemplates an economical use of water .... Water is too valua-
ble to be wasted, either through an extravagant application for the purpose appropri-
ated or by waste resulting from the means employed to carry it to the place of use,
which can be avoided by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care to prevent unnec-
essary loss, or loss of a volume which is greatly disproportionate to that actually con-
sumed.
Id. at 429-30, 94 P. at 341. Accord, Glen Dale Ranches Inc. v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d
1029 (1972).
48. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
49. [Elach diverter must establish some reasonable means of effectuating his diversion.
He is not entitled to command the whole or a substantial flow of the stream merely to
facilitate his taking the fraction of the whole flow to which he is entitled . ...
[P]riority of appropriation does not give a right to an inefficient means of diversion
Id at 462, 366 P.2d at 555.
50. 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
51. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-107-119 (1973).
52. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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of the preference system.5 3 Article XVI, section 6, provides that when a
conflict of use occurs, domestic application of water will be preferred over
agricultural use, and agricultural will be preferred to manufacturing activi-
ties.54 This preference system reflected a realization by the lawmakers that
some water uses are more beneficial for more people than others. Unfortu-
nately, later court decisions limited this policy to the right to condemn and
pay for the taking of a lower use.55 Nevertheless, the first expression of what
would later become maximum utilization had been made.
Though the doctrine of maximum utilization remained in an inchoate
state for many years, court decisions concerning beneficial use and limiting
wasteful or inefficient application 56 were a recognition that the water in Col-
orado should be developed in the best interests of all the people of the
state.
57
An extensive discussion of the concept of maximum utilization comes
from several law review articles written in the mid- 1960's by Professor Frank
J. Trelease, then of the University of Wyoming Law School. 58 In these arti-
cles, Trelease states that Western water should be shifted to more efficient
uses in order to accomodate the rapidly increasing population of Western
states.59 Trelease's suggested method of shifting the water uses to more effi-
cient, productive uses is to encourage free marketability of water rights; the
most economically desirable uses of water will cause private interest to buy
out less beneficial applications.60 Government regulation would be used
only where private interests were not promoting public welfare, and only on
the condition that the less desirable use be condemned and the prior appro-
priator compensated. 6 ' The purpose is to shift to more beneficial uses with-
53. Id §6.
54. Id For an interesting and revealing history of the conflicts concerning which uses were
to have priority during the constitutional convention of 1876, see COLORADO WATER STUDY,
DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE, The Current Legal System, 11-9 to -14 (Colo. Dept. of Nat. Res.,
publication forthcoming). See also Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 133 (1955).
55. Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908); Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co.,
23 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532 (1896). See Thomas, Appropriations of Waterfor a Preferred Purpose, 22
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 422 (1950).
56. See notes 44, 47, 49, & 50 supra.
57. Suffolk Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consolidated Mining and Milling
Co., 407, 48 P. 828 (1897). "[T]he title to the waters of the state always remains, in a measura-
ble sense, in the people . . . . The appropriator may acquire title, but that title is necessarily
subject to many conditions." Id at 412, 48 P. at 830. Seegenerally G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE,
D. ALLARDICE, & C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLUTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER
LAW, 1876-1976 (1976).
58. Trelease, supra note 4; Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case Studies in the Transfer of
Water Rights, I LAND AND WATER REV. 1 (1966). See also Danielson, Water Admiutration in
Colorado--Higher-iorit or Pnority, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 293 (1958); Milliman, Water Law and
Private Decision-Making," A Critique, 2 J. OF L. & ECON. 41 (1959).
59. Trelease, supra note 4, at 4. See Fox, Water- Supply, Demand and the Law, 32 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 452 (1960).
60. Trelease, supra note 4, at 2.
61. Id at 4, 30. Contra, Carlson, supra note 42 at 341: "One approach . . . would be to
treat existing uses in the way that nonconforming uses are treated in zoning law. In this way,
undesirable existing uses might be phased out over a period of time without the necessity of
payment of compensation arising."
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out injuring prior appropriators. 62
The first Colorado court decision to refer to maximum utilization was
Fellhauer v. People.63 This was an action by a prior appropriator to enjoin the
state engineer from shutting off the appropriator's wells. Fellhauer claimed
this was a violation of due process and a taking of his property. Although
the court upheld his request because of the lack of an established method by
which the state engineer could decide whose water to shut off, the court
warned that the time had come to recognize maximum utilization as a neces-
sary policy to be integrated with the doctrine of prior appropriation. 64 Sub-
sequent decisions applied the doctrine of maximum utilization and upheld
the state engineer's right to issue regulations and limitations on use of under-
ground water.
65
The Colorado legislature officially adopted the concept of maximum
utilization in the Water Act, stating that the policy of water use in Colorado
was maximum utilization of all water available, including an integration of
ground and surface waters.
6 6
VI. PRIOR APROPRIATION COLLIDES WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
An appropriator's right to water quality clashed with the policy of max-
imum utilization in A-B Cattle Co. v. United States. In asserting an impair-
ment of water quality through loss of silt, Bessemer raised a unique
question-Can a junior appropriator be held liable not only for adding pol-
lutants to a stream but also for removing material already in the stream?
67
Prior Colorado cases had dealt only with the addition of pollutants; none
had dealt with the proposition that removing stream materials constituted a
deterioration in quality.
The United States and amicus SECWCD argued that Bessemer had no
right to the silt normally occurring in the Arkansas because: (1) Bessemer's
ditch was inefficient; (2) silt is a pollutant, and if required to provide silt to
downstream users, the United States would be violating state and federal
pollution regulations; and (3) allowing Bessemer a right to silt would effec-
tively prevent any future storage project construction in Colorado.68
62. Trelease, supra note 4, at 4.
63. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
64. Id. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (1968):
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions [protecting the rights of appropriators],
that, along with vested righls, there shall be maxi'num utilization of the water of this state.
As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon
the new drama of masimum utidization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be
integrated into the law of vested rights.
Id at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (1968) (emphasis in original).
65. Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329 (1973); Kuiper v. Well Owners Conserva-
tion Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).
66. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Colorado that all waters
originating in or flowing into this state, whether found on the surface or underground,
have always been are hereby declared to be the property of the public, dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation and use in accordance with
law.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (1973).
67. Brief for Defendant United States at 3.
68. Id. at 15-31; Brief for Amicus Curaie SECWCD at 14-27.
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In finding that Bessemer had no right to the silt in the Arkansas, the
court based its reasoning on Shodde v. Twin Falls Land and Water Co. 69 In that
case, a downstream appropriator was denied an injunction against upstream
junior diverters who had impaired his use. Shodde had used the current of
the Snake River to drive water wheels which carried his appropriated water
up to his fields, making two uses of the river. By constructing a dam up-
stream of Shodde, the junior appropriators had slowed the current so that it
would no longer drive Shodde's water wheels. Because his means of diversion
was found to be inefficient, his claim was dismissed, the Supreme Court rea-
soning that his wasteful diversion was in effect appropriating the entire flow
of the Snake River.
70
The Colorado Supreme Court found that Bessemer's ditch was ineffi-
cient. Despite the fact that by the method of irrigation used by some of
Bessemer's stockholders, row irrigation, a given amount of water will irrigate
more acreage if it is silty, 7 1 the court further found that Bessemer's request
for silt was an attempt, like Shodde, to appropriate the entire flow of a river in
order to maintain a wasteful method of diversion.7 2 The court cited Fellhauer
v. People to illustrate the need for maximum utilization of Colorado's wa-
ters. 73 The beneficial effects of water storage, which make possible a contin-
uous, dependable flow of water during the late summer months when water
for irrigation and other uses is critical, is an attempt to put the waters of the
Arkansas to maximum use;74 as such, the court elevated the United States'
use above that of Bessemer.
75
69. 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
70. Plaintiff's claim is that the entire Snake River shall be allowed to flow as in a state
of nature, with volume and current undiminished. This is tantamount to a claim . . .
that the entire river has been appropriated by the plaintiff. . . . This claim which is
the basis of plaintiff's asserted cause of action cannot be sustained.
Id at 113.
71. Row irrigation is being used less frequently in favor of more efficient drip and sprinkler
systems. See, e.g., 13 IRRIGATION AGE (Sept. 1978) and C. HOUSE, C. RUSSELL, R. YOUNG, &
W. VAUGHAN, FUTURE WATER DEMANDS (Final Report to the National Water Commission
1971), which found that use of sprinklers saved 30-40% more water than row or flood irrigation.
"Properly operated sprinkler systems can save water by reducing all elements of losses, convey-
ance from the farm water source, deep percolation, and runoff. . . . For lands newly devel-
oped for irrigation, sprinklers are a common choice. ... Id. at 97. Sediment is particulary
damaging to these more modern systems, clogging intake and distribution devices. See Proceed-
ings of the Second Drip Irrigation Congress (Lib. of Cong. Catalog Card No. 74-15261, 1974).
72. 589 P.2d at 61.
73. Id at 60-61.
74. Id at 61. Many Colorado court decisions have recognized the need for storage projects
to insure a dependable supply of water. See, e.g., People v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 515, 57
P.2d 894, 898 (1936), where the court stated, "The storage of water to insure dependable, con-
tinuous use has always been encouraged by Colorado courts." Accord, Hill v. District Court, 134
Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956); Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794
(1886); Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 3 Colo. App. 437, 33 P. 344 (1893).
75. 589 P.2d at 61.
In using its leaky ditches the Bessemer Co. has not attempted to make maximum
utilization of the water. . . . [Pilaintiffs do not have the right to use silt content to
help seal leaky ditches. To view it otherwise would run contra to a basic principle of
western irrigation that conservation and maximum usage demand the storage of water
in times of plenty for the use in times of drought.
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VI. IMPACT ON COLORADO WATER LAW
The majority in this case characterized Bessemer's ditch as inefficient.
This appears to be a mistake of cause for effect. Bessemer's ditch was reason-
ably efficient until the construction of Pueblo Dam. As Bessemer claimed,
the court was "putting the cart before the horse." 76 Bessemer's use of the silt
to seal its ditch, though fortuitous, was a beneficial application.
77
However, Bessemer's original applications for appropriation rights did
not include an intention to use the silt in the Arkansas to seal its ditch or
extend its use in the fields. That this occurred was fortunate for Bessemer,
but it did not necessarily give Bessemer a property right to the silt.78 In
addition, though not mentioned by the court, a finding that Bessemer had a
right to silt would have placed the United States and SECWCD in an unten-
able position, for they would have been required, in effect to release a statu-
torily defined pollutant in direct violation of state and national water
pollution laws.
79
The point on which the case turned, though, seemed to be on a weigh-
ing of beneficial uses.8 0 Bessemer's use of the silt-laden water of the Arkan-
sas had been beneficial. The storage of water by the United States was also
beneficial. But a finding against the United States would have jeopardized
all future storage projects in Colorado at a time when storage of water has
become critical not only to sustain population growth but also to maintain
current water uses.
8 1
76. Reply Brief for Plaintiff Bessemer at 25. Accord, Middlekamp v. Bessemer Irrigation
Ditch Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909); City of Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 17 Colo.
146, 28 P. 966 (1892).
77. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
78. Most Colorado court decisions have conditioned a decree recognizing appropriation
rights not only on a beneficial application, but also on an intent to apply the water for that
specific purpose. See, e.g., Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960);
Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
79. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-8-101 to -612; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (b) (1976).
80. G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE, R. MEEK, & J. FLACK, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF COLORADO WATER LAW (OWRR project No. A-013-COLO, Feb. 1, 1973).
[Tihe water resource system in Colorado is being increasingly placed under extreme
stress. The goal of providing adequate supplies of useable water to meet the rapidly
growing domestic, industrial, and recreational needs within the state and maintaining
adequate supplies to support traditional agricultural uses is becoming ever more diffi-
cult and costly to achieve. Means must be found to maximize the efficient utilization
of the limited water resources of the state if a water crisis is to be averted.
Id at 7-8. See also REVIEW DRAFT, PROPOSED REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WATER COMMIS-
SION (Wash. D.C., Nov. 1972), which recommends lining ditches and increased construction of
dams and reservoirs to prevent water waste:
A higher degree of efficiency can be realized through storage facilities where waters
controlled by direct flow rights can be impounded and later released on call so that the
irrigator receives the amount of water to which he is entitled at the time needed and
not at some other time. This has significant advantage over direct flow withdrawals
where the amount diverted under direct flow rights might be excessive to the needs of
one moment and deficient at other times.
Id at 7-166.
81. See Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Benefxzal Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo.
L.J. 1 (1957).
[T]here are few absolutes on this list [of beneficial uses] . . . .When one [appropria-
tion applicant] urged that the other's use was not beneficial, he was usually relying
upon the often inarticulate premise that it was not beneficial because his use was more
beneficial. Therefore, most of the cases did actually amount to a choice by the courts
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The conflict in this case was really between two incompatible water use
doctrines. Prior appropriation seeks to protect private property rights in in-
dividuals; maximum utilization contemplates regulation of water use so that
the best interests of the people as a whole are protected and developed. The
hope expressed by Justice Groves in Fel/hauer v. People that the two doctrines
could be integrated is not possible. 82 It will be necessary to further restrict
and modify the prior appropriation doctrine in the future so that Colorado
can keep up with the increasingly complex demands of an expanding popu-
lation.83 Colorado's legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies must
more adequately define beneficial use, establish more efficient methods of
determining which uses are more valuable to the state, and provide processes
which implement the transfer of water rights to those more beneficial uses
without causing undue injury to the rights of prior appropriators.
In the early days of Colorado's history, prior appropriation was essential
to encourage settlement and development of resources. But Colorado's
needs today are for management and conservation. 8 4 It is time for a change.
Stephen M Brown
between one use over another, but analysis of the cases in these terms is generally
impossible because that is not the way the courts talked about them. But as competi-
tion for the supply grew fiercer, and as the realization grew upon the courts and legis-
latures that the allocation of water involved a problem in the conservation of natural
resources, new concepts evolved, that each use must not only be beneficial in the ab-
stract sense, but must also be a reasonable and economic use in the light of other
demands for the little water remaining to be allocated.
Id. at 14-15.
82. See note 65, supra.
83. See discussion of establishing zoning type restrictions on water use to gradually elimi-
nate inefficient uses in note 61, supra; Carlson, Has the Doctrine of Appropriation Outlhved Its Usful-
ness?, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 529 (1974).
Prior appropriation grants claimants private property rights on a first come, first
served basis. Maximum utilization, on the other hand, would appear to involve a
sharing of water resources among senior and junior users to foster intensive and effi-
cient use of water for the overall benefit of the state. It is not a quantity of use concept
but one of quality of use. Maximum utilization would appear to involve an analysis as
to the best means and pattern of allocation for the state and its people. Such a con-
cept does not lend itself to a system designed to protect private property in water,
where the protection of vested rights is the paramount concern.
Id at 537. Accord, Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268
(1971), in which the court upheld the regulations on underground water use promulgated by
the state engineer as a result of the decision in Fellhauer and the enactment of the "Water Right
Determination Act of 1969", and stated:
[T]here is a slight indication of a feeling upon the part of the plaintiffs and on the part
of the trial court that changes should not be required in the operation of wells on the
Platte River. There must be change, and courts, legislators, the State Engineer and
users must recognize it.
Id at 150, 490 P.2d at 283.
84. For specific suggestions for implementing various changes in the prior appropriation
doctrine, see Recommendations 7-26 to 7-35, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE (Report of the
National Water Commission, 1973).

COLLISION COURSE: COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT: PARKLANE HosIERY
Co. V SHORE
INTRODUCTION
In Parklant Hosteg, Co. v. Shore,1 the Supreme Court held that a prior
equitable determination can estop a defendant from relitigating issues before
a jury in a subsequent damages action. Leo M. Shore brought a sharehold-
ers' class action in federal district court against Parklane Hosiery Co. (Park-
lane) alleging the defendant had issued a materially misleading proxy
statement in violation of common law and various sections of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Act). Prior to trial, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) instituted a separate lawsuit in federal district court
against Parklane based on similar allegations. While the fact finder in the
private class action was to be a jury, in the SEC action (one seeking an in-
junction based entirely on violations of the Act) it was a judge.
When the private action was still in the pretrial stage, Judge Duffy ren-
dered a declaratory judgment in favor of the SEC, finding the proxy state-
ment materially misleading as alleged.2 Thereafter, in an effort to preclude
Parklane from raising the issue of whether the proxy was materially mislead-
ing, Shore moved for a partial summary judgment 3 asserting offensive collat-
eral estoppel.
4
The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed. 5
After granting certiorari,6 Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, af-
firmed the court of appeals and allowed Shore to invoke collateral estoppel.
This comment examines the general conflict between collateral estoppel
and the seventh amendment right to jury trial.
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND MUTUALITY
A. The Collateral Estoppel Doctrine
Once an issue essential to the judgment is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent
1. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
2. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aJ'd, 558 F.2d 1083
(2d Cir. 1977).
3. In addition to proving the proxy statement was materially misleading, Shore, a private
plaintiff, must prove his injury and damages to a jury. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 386-90 (1970).
4. Offensive estoppel occurs when the plaintiff attempts to preclude the defendant from
relitigating an issue decided in an earlier action. Defensive use occurs when the defendant
attempts to estop the plaintiff. Some refer to this distinction by the more descriptive
sword/shield dichotomy.
5. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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action between the parties7 is generally precluded. When the second action
is based on a different cause of action than the first, a litigant may invoke the
collateral estoppel doctrine to foreclose a party from retrying the identical
issue.
8
Closely related to collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) is res judicata
(claim preclusion). Both doctrines involve the conclusive effect ofjudgments
in subsequent actions.9 Res judicata, however, is limited to a subsequent
action involving the same cause of action as the initial suit. At the same
time, res judicata has a broader scope than collateral estoppel; conclusive
effect is given not only to issues actually litigated, but to all matters which
could have been litigated. 10
B. Mutuality and Its Erosion
The judge-made rule" of mutuality prohibits a stranger (non-party) to
the first action from taking advantage of the judgment. Therefore, only if
the litigant asserting collateral estoppel was a party to and bound by the first
action can he take advantage of the judgment in a subsequent suit. 12 The
rationale of mutuality is that it would be unfair for a stranger to claim the
benefits of a judgment when he cannot be bound by that same judgment.
This unfairness is assumed but not explained.'
3
As the scope of estoppel was narrowed by mutuality, the very purpose of
issue preclusion' 4 frequently became frustrated. For example, an unsuccess-
ful plaintiff in one action could sue an unrelated defendant in yet another
action. With mutuality, the second defendant could not assert either claim
or issue preclusion because he was not a party to the first action. With the
7. For purposes of this comment, the definition of a party will be broadened to include
the privies. For general illustrations of privity relationships, see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 83-92 (1942).
8. Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451,
458-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); RESTATMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942);
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1942).
9. Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620, 623 (1933); Vestal, Preclusion/ResJudicata
Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 28 (1964). See generally Vestal, Extent of Clain Preclusion,
54 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1968).
10. Runyan v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 141 F.2d 396, 397 (6th Cir. 1944); Irving
Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926).
11. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320 (1971).
12. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) See generally Moore & Currier, Mutuah'ty and Conclu-
siveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961).
13. Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965); 1 FREEMAN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 428 (5th ed. 1925); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 96, Comment a (1942). For a criticism, see Note, The Mutuality Requirement of Resjudicata in
Virginia, 41 VA. L. REV. 404, 418 (1955).
14. Res judicata has a dual purpose of promoting judicial economy and providing the
private litigant with repose from repetitious litigation. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
597 (1948). As an offshoot of claim preclusion, collateral estoppel is grounded upon the desire
"to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litiga-
tion." Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and
Jodetr of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1457 n.2 (1968).
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hope of eventually winning, a plaintiff could relitigate the same issue so long
as there is a supply of new defendants.
As rising caseloads have virtually submerged some urban courts, pres-
sures have increased to expand the reach of collateral estoppel and thus pre-
vent the retrial of issues fully tried in a prior suit. 15 Moreover, while the
basis of mutuality is fairness,' 6 if its application would result in an injustice,
courts have not been reluctant to carve out an exception. 7 Consequently,
the focus has shifted away from mutuality"8 and to a case-by-case examina-
tion 19 of whether the party against whom estoppel is being asserted was ac-
corded a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action.20 And now,
in the wake of Parklane, the doctrine of mutuality appears to be completely
abrogated 21 in the federal courts.
22
II. OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: FRAMEWORK FOR APPLICATION
A. The Full-and-Fair-Oppor/unilj Test
The Parklane Court enunciated a two-prong test to be used when the
plaintiff is a stranger to the judgment he seeks to assert as conclusive against
the defendant. First, the plaintiff must be unable to join in the earlier ac-
tion; second, invoking collateral estoppel offensively must not result in an
15. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971);
Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965); Vestal, Res Judi-
cata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1724
(1968).
16. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
17. E.g., Tipler v. E. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971); 1
FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 429 (5th ed. 1925) ("mutuality is itself
based upon policy and practical necessity and justice . . . and on the same grounds of policy
and justice there would seem to be no objection to departing from it where the party affected
has been given one adequate opportunity to be heard. ... ) Id. § 1929 at 935-36. For a
description of these exceptions, see Moore & Currier, supra note 12, at 311-29.
18. During the past 45 years, the strict rule of mutuality has been steadily eroded by ex-
panding the boundaries of privity and creating numerous exceptions. Some courts have explic-
itly abandoned it. E.g., B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). Unless a court allows offensive estoppel by a stranger, however, one can-
not safely say mutuality has been entirely abrogated in that jurisdiction.
The leading federal case departing from mutuality is Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d
419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
19. "[Tlhe mutuality rule is deservedly dead, and . . . any reservations about the totality
of its demise should rest on particularized inquiry . Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest
Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25, 31 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971); Popp v. Eberlein, 409 F.2d 309, 310-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 909 (1969);
United States v. Webber, 396 F.2d 381, 389-90 (3d Cir. 1968); Graves v. Associated Transp.,
Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Gliden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327
F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267
F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967) ("the philosophical basis for the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
that a party should have a full and fair day in court to be heard on the issue but should not be
able to litigate that issue ad nauseam." Id. at 303-04).
21. Shore, a stranger to the SEC judgment, was allowed to assert offensive estoppel.
22. In non-diversity controversies, "the federal courts will apply their own rule of resjudi-
cata." Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). In most state courts, however, mutuality is
still required. Comment, Collateral Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuahty, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 521, 521-22 (1976).
1979]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
injustice to the defendant.
2 3
B. Plaintifs Ability to Join
As a general rule, a prior judgment's preclusive effect will be denied a
stranger if he could have effected joinder in the first action against his pres-
ent adversary.2 4 The trouble has been that, contrary to the very design of
estoppel, offensive use by a stranger may actually promote repetitious litiga-
tion. 25 By waiting for other plaintiffs to litigate their actions first, a potential
plaintiff can assert estoppel and reap the fruits of another's victory without
incurring the costs of trial or any consequences of another's defeat.2 6 In rec-
ognition of this, Parklane would have denied Shore the benefits of the SEC
judgment if he "could have easily joined in the earlier action .... *27 This
prerequisite should prod a potential plaintiff into joinder and will tend to
remove any reward for intentionally sitting on the sidelines. Both case 28
and statutory29 law operated to deny Shore of the opportunity to join in the
SEC action.
C. Fairness of Ofensive Estoppel
1. Striking the Proper Balance
In essence, Parklane attempted to reconcile two competing policies: the
desire for judical economy with the corollary of avoiding inconsistent factual
determinations, and the need to ensure practical fairness to the defendant.
30
When concerned with the fairness of issue preclusion, it is important to
note the offensive-defensive distinction.3 1 Offensive estoppel involves a trade
off between judicial economy and fairness to the party against whom the
issue preclusion is being invoked. The Supreme Court is more inclined to
allow a stranger the use of a prior judgment as a shield rather than a
23. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
24. Eg., Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) (1975)].
25. See generally Semmel, supra note 14, at 1471-79.
26. Note that when asserted by a stranger, one of collateral estoppel's goals is rendered
irrelevant: a stranger does not need the protection of repose. The only applicable policies are
judicial economy and the prevention of possible inconsistent results.
27. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
28. SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976) (a private party can consolidate his action with an SEC
action only if the SEC consents).
30. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328
(1971); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950);
"Such a rule of public policy [collateral estoppel] must be watched in its application lest a blind
adherence to it tend [sic] to defeat the even firmer established policy of giving every litigant a
full and fair day in court." United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 825 (1948). But see Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199 (1932) ("the mischief which would
follow the establishment of a precedent for so disregarding. . . [res judicata] would be greater
than the benefit which would result from relieving some cases of individual hardship.").
31. See generally Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a
Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
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sword.3 2 Indeed, defensive estoppel offers the plaintiff a strong incentive to
join all potential defendants as soon as possible, while offensive application
has the opposite effect.3 3 More importantly, courts carefully avoid awarding
issue preclusion to a stranger if it would perpetrate an injustice on the de-
fendant.
3 4
Parklane and the federal courts in general have recognized many factors
as possible justifications for refusing to bind a party to a particular judg-
ment. 35 Given the wide variety of recognized factors and the very nature of
a case-by-case inquiry, the following discussion is not meant as an exhaustive
list of considerations when applying the full-and-fair-opportunity test. In-
deed, the Parklane Court appreciated the futility of attempting to draw in-
flexible boundaries when determining if offensive estoppel would be unjust
to a defendant. The Parklane rule reads: In the trial judge's discretion, offen-
sive estoppel should be disallowed for the reasons discussed in the opinion
"or for other reasons .... "36
2. Appellate Review
The Parklane Court intimated that the unavailability of appellate re-
view may have been fatal to Shore's plea of issue preclusion.3 7 Indeed, it is
clearly unfair if a defendant is precluded by an erroneous factual finding he
is unable to redress through appellate channels.38 Parklane was unsuccessful
in appealing the judgment of the SEC action. 39 It is not surprising Parklane
was unsuccessful in arguing that the court erred in finding that the proxy
statement was materially misleading given the appellate courts' reluctance
to disturb a trial judge's factual findings.40 In addition, the appeals court is
to accord to the SEC all favorable inferences. 4 1 Justice Stewart did ac-
knowledge that Parklane had exercised its right to appeal in the SEC action.
32. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402. U.S. 313, 329-30
(1971).
The leading federal case permitting offensive estoppel was Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee
Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). The Zdanok court
took pains to articulate the hazards of using estoppel as a sword and then proceeded to demon-
strate those dangers would not manifest. 327 F.2d at 955-56.
33. See accompanying text to notes 25-26 supra.
34. In view of the problems with offensive estoppel, Parklane established some rather de-
tailed safeguards. 99 S. Ct. at 650-51. See also Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968)
("We should guard against allowing procedural novelties, conceived as shortcut ways of han-
dling litigation, to lead to unjust results." Id. at 81).
35. For a listing of recognized considerations, see Hazard, Res Nova in Resjudtatia, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1043-44 (1971).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 651. Cf Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971) ("no one set of facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide
an automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas.").
37. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n.18.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1973)].
39. See note 2 supra.
40. The standard of review for factual findings of a nonjury trial is that they "shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Parklane, the party
attacking the findings, therefore shouldered the heavy burden of attempting to prove the find-
ings are clearly erroneous. Hedger v. Reynolds, 216 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1954).
41. Stacher v. United States, 258 F.2d 112, 116 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 907 (1958).
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However, the Court did not consider the nature of a defendant's right to
review and its impact on the full-and-fair-opportunity test.
4 2
3. A Defendant's Incentive to Defend
Unlike Shore who had every motive to fully litigate and decided when,
whom, and where to sue, a defendant may lack a motive to thoroughly de-
fend for various reasons.43 Consequently, litigation of an issue generally will
not be precluded by a judgment if the defendant did not have an adequate
incentive to fully and vigorously defend in the initial action.
44
It is generally recognized that the stake in the first suit may be too small
and the trouble and expense too great to justify a vigorous defense. 45 The
unfairness of offensive estoppel is evident where a less than exhaustive de-
fense of a small property damage claim resulted in defendant's liability-
only to have the same judgment later haunt the unsuspecting defendant in a
large personal injury action springing from the same circumstances. 46 The
Court in Parklane concluded that in light of the gravity of the charges levied
by the SEC, Parklane did not lack the incentive to vigorously defend.
4 7
Closely related to the stake a defendant had in the earlier action is the
foreseeability of future suits in which the identical issue would again arise. If
it is unforeseeable (at the time of the first action) that the same issue would
again surface in the context of a second suit, and if as a result the defendant
conducts a perfunctory defense, collateral estoppel should be inoperative. 48
In light of the factor of foreseeability, Parklane noted that not only could
Parklane anticipate a shareholder's action following a successful SEC action,
but that the class action had been filed before the commencement of the
SEC action.
49
As a general guideline for determining whether one defended with the
utmost vigor, it is submitted that it would be useful for courts to ascertain
whether the defendant would have been more diligent if the two separate
actions had been merged into one. An affirmative answer would suggest the
defendant did not receive a complete prior adjudication.
42. In the context of patent litigation, one court did recognize the difficulty of correcting
erroneous findings by judicial review and noted its impact on the "full and fair criteria." Blum-
craft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., Inc., 482 F.2d 542, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1973).
43. Eg., James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 461-62 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1973), supra note 38, at § 68.1(e)(iii).
45. Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 245 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum); Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); Fink v. Coates, 323 F.
Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. One could argue that because the defendant could anticipate a future lawsuit coupled
with a plea of issue preclusion, he did indeed have an incentive to defend fully. For a discussion
of the foreseeability factor, see text accompanying note 48 in/fa.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
48. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 720 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1973), supra note 38, at § 68.1(e)(ii).




When a single mishap results in multiple tort actions against a common
tortfeasor, the potential for unfairness to the defendant is readily apparent:
50
If twenty successive actions are filed and the defendant successfully defends
the first fifteen, the defendant cannot use collateral estoppel as a shield
against the remaining five actions.5 However, if the defendant is found lia-
ble in the sixteenth action, can the remaining four plaintiffs successfully
plead the aberrational sixteenth judgment as conclusive against the common
defendant? Like other federal courts,
52 Parklane answered in the negative.
53
The question Parklane left unanswered is: What if in the inconsistent
sixteenth judgment, the defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity
to litigate, but the jury simply decided the defendant was liable?54 Under
these circumstances, would it be "tenable to afford a litigant more than one
full and fair opportunity forjudicial resolution of the same issue"? 55 In sum,
Parklane asserted it may be unfair if the plaintiff invoking estoppel relies on a
judgment that is inconsistent with previous judgments in favor of the de-
fendant. 56 In the same breath, the Court declared that if the defendant re-
ceived one full and fair opportunity to litigate, the defendant shall be
estopped from relitigating his liability.5 7 If these two propositions are found
in the same action, which one must yield?58
50. See generaly Currie, Mutuaity of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 285-89 (1957).
51. Issue preclusion cannot be asserted against a stranger to the judgment. The stranger is
entitled to his day in court. Makariw v. Rinard, 336 F.2d 333, 334 (3d Cir. 1964); RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96, Comment j (1942).
52. E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327
F.2d 944, 955-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). Contra, Maryland v. Capital Air-
lines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967).
53. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
54. According to one court, an aberrational judgment is not uncommon. The court noted
that when the subject of the action is a factual issue of negligence, it would be "subject to the
varying appraisals of the facts by different juries .... " Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Fa-
mous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). As a further
source of inconsistent judgments, it may be uneconomical for the defendant to vigorously de-
fend a relatively small claim; however, the potential of issue preclusion lurking in the wings
virtually compels a fullfledged defense, regardless of the amount of damages sought.
The defendant, faced with a relatively small claim, is offered a strong incentive to settle out
of court-thus avoiding the expense of full litigation and the risk of an adverse judgment. Ironi-
cally, the threat of collateral estoppel, not the doctrine itself, serves the policy of judicial econ-
omy.
55. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 650 (1979) (quoting Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971)).
Of course the Court's failure to address this subject can be explained by the absence of any
clearly inconsistent judgment in Parklane similar to the inconsistent sixteenth judgment de-
scribed in the text (although the SEC judgment might have been an aberration had further
litigation of the issue been allowed).
56. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
57. Id. at 652.
58. One commentator argues that a full and fair adjudication would prevail regardless of
any inconsistency. Comment , The Use of Governmentudgment in rivate Anttrust Litizaton." Clayton
Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, anariuq Thal, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 351-52 (1976).
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III. THE TENSION BETWEEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RIGHT TO
JURY TRIAL
A. Defendant's Procedural Opportunities
1. In General
The Parklane Court discussed one last situation where it might be unfair
for a stranger to invoke a prior judgment as conclusive against a defendant.
Namely, where the defendant can avail himself of procedural opportunities
in the present action which were unavailable in the first action and these
opportunities "could readily cause a different result."
59
By way of illustration, the Court noted that issue preclusion may have
been denied had Parklane been forced to defend the SEC action in an incon-
venient forum. 60 A defendant does not receive a full and fair opportunity if,
because of the forum, he is forced to significantly compromise his discovery
or access to witnesses.6 ' The convenience of the earlier forum is especially
relevant with offensive estoppel. Unlike defensive use where the party
against whom the judgment is being asserted could decide where to sue, a
defendant generally is not afforded the luxury of forum choice.
62
The Court, of course, also ruled that to justify denying estoppel, the
procedural opportunity must be sufficient to have an impact on the judg-
ment.6 3 Accordingly, if the location of forum is of little consequence, this
alone should not impede the application of offensive estoppel.
64
The Court conceded Parklane would be entitled to a jury fact finder in
the private action were it not for the SEC action. 65 Thus, there was a proce-
dural opportunity unavailable in the equitable SEC action that was avail-
able in the private action. Specifically, Parklane did not have the right to a
trial by jury in the former but did in the latter. The Court, however, held
that the mode of a trial (judge or jury) is "basically neutral" and it is un-
likely that a jury trial would engender a different judgment. 66 The question
then becomes whether the right to a jury trial is of enough significance that
without it Parklane was not afforded a full and fair prior adjudication.
59. 99 S. Ct. at 651 (footnote omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1975), supra
note 24, at § 88(2).
60. 99 S. Ct. at 651 n. 15.
61. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 333
(197 1) (considered choice of forum to determine if patentee had a full and fair oportunity); Fink
v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)(denied estoppel where defendant unsuccess-
fully opposed the forum of the first action and defended against relatively small claim).
62. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1975), supra note 24, at § 88, Comment d.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
64. E.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973).
65. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n.19.
The seventh amendment to the Federal Constitution preserves the right of trial by jury in
suits at common law. Therefore, a party to a common law action (e.g., for damages) has a right
to jury trial. The common law action is in contradistinction to equity, admiralty, and adminis-
trative proceedings where a party generally cannot demand a jury trial. See genera/ly Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
66. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n. 19. Amazingly, the Court neither explains why nor cites any author-
ity for this conclusion.
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2. A Trial's Mode: Is It Neutral?
The impact of jury trials has been written about at length.67 It is be-
yond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of juries.68 However,
whether one views a jury as too fickle or as fundamental to our system of
justice, the fact remains that a jury fact finder does seem to influence a deci-
sion-either for the better or worse. If the jury mode is truly insignificant,
why would so many commentators devote their energies to this subject?
Why have a Constitutional amendment preserve a right unless that right
could affect the outcome of the trial? Moreover, Justice Stewart's assertion
that juries are "basically neutral" is a departure from the importance the
Supreme Court traditionally has accorded the jury mode.
69
Aside from these troubling questions, Parklane did not reconcile a previ-
ous decision where the Supreme Court ruled that a trial by jury could cause
a different outcome: Speaking for the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
70
Justice Frankfurter ruled that in a diversity action when state and federal
procedures clash and the choice of one may determine the outcome of the
case, the federal courts are to apply the state's rules of procedure.
As part of the evolution of Guaranty Trust, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Coop-
erative, Inc. 71 recognized that a trial's mode could indeed determine a case's
outcome. In Byrd, South Carolina law required the factual issues be decided
before a judge, and federal law allowed the right to a jury-hence, the con-
flict of procedure. Admitting a jury fact finder could substantially affect the
judgment of the trial and therefore state law should govern, 72 Justice Bren-
nen cited "countervailing considerations"' 73 and upheld the right to the jury
mode.
7 4
B. The Seventh Amendment and Its Preservation
When determining whether a litigant is entitled to the seventh amend-
ment right to jury trial, the Court traditionally employs an historical ap-
proach. 75 That is, if a party was entitled to a jury under the common law of
1791 (when the amendment was adopted), then he could similarly demand a
jury trial today.
76
While rarely departing from the historical test when denying a jury
67. E.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4 n.2 (1966)(bibliography).
68. For such a discussion, see Redish, Sevenih Amendment Right toJug Triatl: A Stud in the
Irraiionaliy ofRaionatl Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 502-08 (1975).
69. E.g., Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wa11.)657 (1873)("twelve men
know more of the common affairs of life than does one man .. . they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." Id. at 664.)
70. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
71. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
72. Id. at 537.
73. Namely, federal policies favoring the jury mode and not permitting state statutes to
disrupt the federal judge-jury relationship. Id. at 537-38.
74. Contrary to Parkane, the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments notes that the jury mode
may be "significantly influential in the determination of the issue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1975), supra note 24, at § 88, Comment d.
75. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
76. See generaly Redish, supra note 68.
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trial, 77 the Supreme Court has not been reluctant to expand the right be-
yond the 1971 common law. 78 This can be explained, in part, by the federal
favoritism towards the jury mode79 and the difficulty experienced with the
historical approach. 0
An historical analysis to determine if Parklane would be entitled to a
jury trial is beyond the scope of this comment. 8 ' However, in addition to a
historical search, Justice Stewart also relied on the recent cases of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 8 2 and Kachen v. Land 8 3 to buttress his proposition
that an equitable determination may operate conclusively as to a defendant
in a subsequent legal action and thus deny a jury trial. 84 Justice Stewart's
reading of Beacon is novel and seems to subvert its very thrust.
The plaintiff in Beacon sought equitable relief and the defendant an-
swered with a legal counterclaim. 8 5 The trial judge tried the equitable issues
in the complaint before any jury trial of the counterclaim. After recognizing
that this equitable determination by the judge might preclude a jury trial of
subsequent legal issues,86 Justice Black for the majority in Beacon reversed
and held the seventh amendment cannot be impaired in such a manner.
8 7
Parklane, however, cited an assumption in Beacon of possible effects of collat-
eral estoppel, notwithstanding Beacon's earnest attempt to preserve jury tri-
als. By requiring the resolution of legal claims before a jury first, Beacon
sought to insulate a defendant from estoppel when its application would
deny him of a jury trial of his legal claims. Justice Black went on to declare
that, when there are legal issues involved, only under the most compelling
circumstances can a prior equitable determination deny a litigant a jury
trial. 88
Justice Stewart then cited Katchen as confirming his interpretation of
Beacon and notes that Katchen allowed an equitable determination to estop
77. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943). The extent of the departure was to matters of form, and the right was preserved as to its
substance.
78. Eg., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959). Beacon represents the leading case in the extension of the seventh amendment
beyond the historical standard. James, Right to atugy Trlin Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 687
(1963).
79. Eg., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). "This Court has long
emphasized the importance of the jury trial." Id. at 510 n.18).
80. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). The Ross Court viewed the historical test as
an "abstruse historical inquiry ... most difficult to apply." Id. at 538 n.10.
81. For an able historical examination, see Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.: The Seventh
Amendment and Collateral Estoppel, 66 CAL. L. REv. 861 (1978). The Note concludes that con-
trary to the result reached in Parklane, the historical test would disallow estoppel and grant a
jury trial. Id. at 862.
82. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
83. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
84. 99 S. Ct. at 653.
85. It should be noted that Beacon can be distinguished on its facts from Parklane. Parklane
involved not a blending but a separate equitable claim followed by a legal one.
86. 359 U.S. at 504.
87. 359 U.S. at 510 (quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891)).
88. 359 U.S. at 510-11.
Parklane refused to apply Beacon to separate actions and limited its application to situations
involving a mixture of legal annd equitable claims in one action. Justice Stewart does not
explain why Beacon should not equally apply in Parklane.
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subsequent legal issues without a jury trial. Again, this analysis seems to be
based on a strained reading of Beacon.
The facts of Katchen are arguably within the extraordinary circum-
stances exception enunciated in Beacon. Katchen stressed that to allow a ple-
nary suit with a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding-a proceeding which
is designed to be summary in nature-would "dismember a scheme which
Congress has prescribed." 89 Hence, Katchen easily fits the exception to Bea-
con's general principle that a prior equitable judgment cannot deny a liti-
gant a trial by jury.
9
0
Unlike Katchen, Parklane mentions no extraordinary circumstances, no
pressing reason why a jury already impaneled to decide damages could not
also decide if the proxy statement was materially misleading.
A case further questioning Parklane's interpretation of and reliance on
Beacon is Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co. 9 ' Justice Black's fears in Beacon of es-
toppel operating to deny a jury trial never did materialize---except, of
course, in Parklane. Four years after Beacon, Meeker refused to apply collateral
estoppel when a prior equitable determination would have denied the plain-
tiff a jury trial on his legal claims.
92
C. Unfairness and the Accident ofJoinder
Aside from recent case law, simply employing Parklane's own fairness
test 93 seems to suggest that issue preclusion should not be invoked against
Parklane. First, in Colgrove v. Balltn 94 the Court held that the very design of
a jury trial is to guarantee a fair factual determination.
95
More importantly, however, it seems manifestly unfair that one's invio-
late right to jury trial96 depends (among other things) upon the accident of
joinder. Paradoxically, if Shore could have joined in the SEC action, Park-
lane could have demanded the legal issues be submitted to a jury.97 Park-
lane discovered its inviolate right was reduced to the accident of joinder.
As a result of the application of estoppel in Parklane, a defendant's Con-
stitutional right is now contingent on whether joinder can be effectuated;
89. 382 U.S. at 339.
90. In response to Katchen's demand for a jury trial, the Court said:
In neither Beacon Theatres nor Daty Queen was there involved a specific statutory
scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the intervention of
a jury. We think Congress intended the trustee's § 5 7g objection to be summarily
determined .... To implement congressional intent, we think it essential to hold that
the bankruptcy court may summarily adjudicate ....
Id. at 339-40.
91. 308 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'dper curtaim, 375 U.S. 160 (1963).
92. Citing Beacon in a one-line opinion, the Meeker Court reversed the trial court. 375 U.S.
160.
93. Offensive estoppel should not be allowed when its use would be "unfair to a defend-
ant." 99 S. Ct. at 651-52.
94. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
95. Id. at 157.
96. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be pre-
served to the parties inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
97. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.Il (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469, 479 (1962).
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whether the equitable decree is rendered while the legal action is still in its
pretrial stage; and whether the government even decides to file a complaint.
By seeking an injunction, the SEC now can divest a defendant of the jury
mode. Ignoring the seventh amendment aspects, how equitable is it that
Parklane's right to a jury hinges on these fortuitous circumstances?
CONCLUSION
Park/ane represents the demise of mutuality in the federal courts, a
framework of considerations when applying the full-and-fair-opportunity
test in the context of offensive estoppel, and a conflict between the common
law doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Constitutional right to trial by
jury. The Court's decision will be praised by those who denounce juries or
those who seek to expedite litigation. Parklane, however, should be viewed
with concern by those who recognize the serious erosion of the seventh
amendment for minimal savings of judicial resources.
A stranger's ability to assert collateral estoppel should depend on the
extent he furthers estoppel's policy goals. With Shore invoking estoppel as a
sword, only two policies are served: preventing a jury from reaching a deter-
mination inconsistent with the SEC judgment, and avoiding the delay of
relitigating Parklane's liability. Without the policy of repose from repeti-
tious litigation applicable, Shore represents, in effect, society's interests at
large.
Symmetry of factual findings should not stand in the way of fairness to
Parklane, and the amount of judicial energy conserved here would be mini-
mal.98 In any event-and especially when juxtaposed against the insignifi-
cant judicial economies achieved--collateral estoppel should be disallowed
when it so derogates the seventh amendment.
First, Parklane was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue of its liability in the SEC action. The jury mode is significant, Parklane
notwithstanding. The Court's decision relegates the seventh amendment to
a level of importance subordinate to an inconvenient forum.
Second, recent Court decisions, Beacon in particular, do not support the
result reached in Parklane and, in fact, would argue to preserve the right to
trial by jury. There were no imperative circumstances present to justify de-
nying Parklane the right to a jury trial.
Finally, there is the inherent unfairness of granting one defendant the
jury mode if the legal and equitable claims happen to be present in the same
action and denying Parklane a trial by jury because the equitable claim is
followed by, and separate from, the legal claim.
Parklane does not represent the high mark of judicial respect for the sev-
enth amendment or its preservation.
Steve M. Skoumal
98. Note, supra note 81, at 870-73.
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